Iran Update

While the huge protests and clashes between security forces and protestors have receded, the movement started by reform candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi is not finished.

Here is just a brief round-up of recent news and evidence that we haven’t seen the last of the green clad crowds (I am bolding those that should receive particular attention):

The Guardian Council certifiedthe election.  There is no surprise here.  But as the article point out, Khamenei has now attached his future to that of Ahmadinejad.  Great analysis here:

One positive outcome of this election debacle is that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has now tied himself to Mr Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement. Every uptick in unemployment is a knock against the current power structure. Every bit of inflation is a reminder of the system’s flaws. These are things Iranians deal with everyday, and they are more personal and affecting than the country’s relations with America or Israel. So the American administration should quietly do what it can to foment the economic undoing of the regime, but otherwise get out of the way. Because in many ways, the regime is already digging its own grave.

The Jerusalem Post is reportingthat six Mousavi supporters were publicly hanged.  This is not confirmed, but the Iranian government has often used public demonstrations (stoning, beatings, etc) as a method to keep the populace compliant.

More reports of election tampering continue to come out of Iran (for example, the pictures and reports here show, definitively, that not all was kosher).

The stories here and here are heartbreaking.  These two 18 year old kids, one brutally raped and beaten, and another killed (three shots to the chest), join Neda as examples of the Iranian governments brutality.

Conservative cleric Haddi Ghaffari rips Khamenei for his behavior over the election.  Ghaffari is by no means reformist, pragmatist or liberal.  He is further right than Rafsanjani and was instrumental in the creation of Hezbollah.  It will not be easy for the regime to paint him as a “puppet of the West.”

Khatami. Mousavi and Karroubi are becoming noticeably harsher in their public comments.  Look here and here.

Solid article here from Roger Cohen with some fascinating reporting.  It has been interesting to see his change in mindset throughout the entire “Velvet coup” and his realization of the real purpose of elections in Iran.  His final suggestion is to isolate Iran and let them writhe.  I am inclined to agree, though I am not sure to what end.  Isolation will not slow their nuclear pursuits and there is no way to crash the Iranian economy (such as oil blockades) without doing huge harm to the world economy and other American interests.  (That also ignores the fact that China and Russia probably would not allow it).  On the other hand, negotiations are moot now.  The regime’s message is clear: “we are committed to increasing our regional influence through subversion of other governments and achieving nuclear power status.  Oh, and we hate America.”

As Thomas Friedman wrote a few weeks back: let’s get the leverage before we start the talking.  The only way to get Iran’s government to alter course is through leverage and power.  Otherwise, you will just be wasting your time, legitimating a despicable regime and betraying the hopes of a generation of Iranians who stood up for a better life.

(Side note - I know I still owe you “The Death of the ‘Islamic Republic’ – Part II.”  I promise to have it up by this weekend.  Enjoy your Fourth of July!)

Honduras: What Should Our Response Be?

The more I read about what is happening in Honduras, the more I am convinced that it might be best that Obama use the generic, “the Honduran people will decide their future,” statement. 

Daniel Larison, who supported Obama’s reaction to the Iranian coup (completely illegal, by the way), now seems pleased to skewer Obama on his response to the Honduran coup.  Here is the key quote:

What is so impressive about the bungling here is that it contradicts every argument the administration has made in support of restraint and caution when it comes to the Iranian protests. Obama didn’t want to insert the U.S. into an Iranian dispute. Iranians, he said, would decide their own future. Hondurans apparently are not accorded the same respect. Their sovereignty isn’t quite as important. Obama withheld judgment about the legality of what had happened in Iran. In Honduras, he just knows that what the military did was illegal, despite far stronger evidence that it was legal and a result of the proper functioning of their constitutional system.

Larison’s claims regarding the legality of the coup (from the point of view that the other branches of government supported the actions of the military), seem to be strengthened by interim President Michelleti’s declaration that the only way ex-President Zelaya would be allowed to return is “at the head of a foreign army.”  If he didn’t have solid support from the Legislature, the Supreme Court and other government institutions, it is unlikely he could make such a claim.

The best way to see the events in Honduras, according to Larison, is as the system of checks and balances working even though the means to enforcement were somewhat illegal.  The contradictions is a bit tough but I certainly see his point.  As I’ve mentioned in previous posts, the Attorney General, the Legislature and the Supreme Court all agree with the actions of the army (and claim to have authorized it – feel free to be skeptical, it is probably warranted).

This Honduran blogger, however, makes an interesting and important point:

I fear we have gone from bad to worse. At least Zelaya seemed to speak out for the poor. As one priest said this morning, despite all his errors and his vanity, Zelaya was the first major leader in many years to offer people a little bit of openness to the needs of the poor. The priest said he is not supporting the person Zelaya, but the cause of the poor. Micheletti is closely tied with the economic powers to be. An indication of his position is his support of privatization of water in his own district.

Also, Al Giordiano, a prominent blogger covering Honduras, is claiming that Michelleti and the Congress have suspended a number of Honduran rights.  Take his claims with a grain of salt as he is against Michelleti and for Zelaya.

A Coup For Democracy?

Mary Anastacia O’Grady at the WSJ is making that claim – and she is supported by many in the Honduran ex-pat community living in the U.S (as well as many Hondurans on the ground it seems).

I will say, as more information trickles out it seems that as far as coups go, the case of Honduras stands out as a particularly process-heavy exception.  The Supreme Court stated it authorized the military action against the President.  The Attorney General is saying that Zelaya knew he would be charged and agreed to leave the country. The Legislature already appointed a president pro-tempore, as outlined in the Constitution.  In his first statement to Honduras, the new President, Roberto Michelleti, declared that no one should refer to this as a coup, since it was in keeping with democracy that ex-President Zelaya was removed from office.  It is ironic that Zelaya’s own party in Congress is investigating whether he is mentally fit to hold office and voted to replace Zelaya with Michelleti.

Furthermore, the events leading up to the Presidents expulsion, if O’Grady is correct, make the case against Zelaya stronger.  He apparently:

1) disregarded the Constitutional requirement of Congressional approval by trying to hold a referendum;

2) disobeyed a Supreme Court order not to hold the referendum or the “unofficial” referendum;

3) stormed a military barracks with some of his supporters and stole the ballots (from Venezuela, no less) and handed them out.

Here is a great quote from the O’Grady article, referring to the fact that democracy can often be compromised from within:

Former Argentine Ambassador to the U.N. Emilio Cárdenas told me on Saturday that he was concerned that “the OAS under Insulza has not taken seriously the so-called ‘democratic charter.’ It seems to believe that only military ‘coups’ can challenge democracy. The truth is that democracy can be challenged from within, as the experiences of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and now Honduras, prove.”

One thing is certain: Zelaya doesn’t have many allies in the country.  According to reports, approximately 200 people protested today in front of the State house (juxtapose that to the situation in Iran).  The military is out in force but is doing nothing to stop the protesters or to disband them.  The courts, the Congress, the military, and the Catholic Church (an important actor in Honduras) are all behind the removal of Zelaya.

I’m also sure it’s never a good idea to be in agreement with Hugo Chavez if the debate is about democracy.

Military Coup d’Etat in Honduras

The army in Honduras has overthrown the government of Manuel Zelaya.

The coup is being billed as a consequence of Zelaya’s dismissal of General Romeo Zasquez and his attempt to conduct an unofficial election to gauge support for altering the term limits on the president (1 term of 4 years).

Mr. Zelaya is in Costa Rica where he is claiming political asylum.

The Obama Administration and the EU are calling for calm.  Hugo Chavez has mobilized the army and threatened to use military force against the small country if they encroach on Venezuelan sovereign land (ie, the embassy).

Who is on What Side in Iran?

Amir Taheri has a great article on the Iranian “movers and shakers” and where the splits are occurring.

Definitely worth reading if you are trying to understand Iran.

The ultimate conclusion, in my opinion, is that no one knows and that what we’re seeing is a “tie” between the opponents and hardliners.  A tie, however, goes to the regime since they control the guns, the majority of the IRGC, the technology to stop opposition activity and organization, and the basij.

Who are the IRGC? (And more on the Basiji).

Al Jazeera has an interesting video about the Revolutionary Guard and the basiji (who are part of the Revolutionary Guard).

For those interested in understanding the Islamic side of the Iranian security forces, the clip is a decent primer.

(Here is the link to my previous post regarding the basiji).

The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980’s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980’s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Escalation in Iran

No matter what news is reporting, events in Iran are grim.

It started with the now-infamous, cold-blooded murderof Neda Agha Soltan, captured on film for the world to see.

Now, there are reports of mass beatings, use of tear gas and snipers picking off protesters as an intimidation tactic.  For an example of the situation, listen to this interview from two Iranian women who managed to escape.  As they point out, the regime’s thugs do not discriminate between women and men, young and old.  If you stand in their way, you will feel the baton of the state on your head.  In Iran, going to the hospital is akin to walking to your death.  Chances are the authorities won’t even let you make it to the hospital…and if you do, you probably won’t leave.

The regime is also doing its best to control the movements of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader.  Not seen for almost a week, Mousavi posts occasionally on his newspapers website reaffirminghis dedication to challenging the rigged election engineered by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, considered by many the leading Shi’a scholar alive today (perhaps behind only Grand Ayatollah Sistani), also continues to issue statements attacking the regime and Khamenei for their brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators and the theft of the election.

Make no mistake, the situation is getting worse as the government deploys its forces to prevent large gathers and intimidate protests back into the silent acquiescence that defined “Islamic” governance to this point.  The most frustrating aspect of the Iran situation is that there is nothing we can do but hope and pray for the protection of those fighting for their freedom and for a different future.

I don’t know about you, but that does not seem like it is enough.

Roger Cohen on Iran

Over the last few weeks, Roger Cohen has written several pieces about the aftermath of the Iranian election.  His latest is a solid analysis of the negative consequences for the current regime from the violence and killing the past few days. 

Cohen identifies five “principal factors” that contribute to the decrease in power:

1. The role of the Supreme Leader is now forever tarnished.  While Khomeini was known as a great (if ruthless) moderator between different factions, Khamenei appears the champion of one (Ahmadinejad and the far-right).

2. People who were willing to tolerate the regime in return for a modicum of freedom and elections (no matter how rigged in the regime’s favor) are no longer silent and “acquiescent.”

3. Ahmadinejad’s, or, more accurately, the IRGC’s, power grab is alienating the more moderate members of the governing apparatus (such as Rafsanjani, Khatami, etc).

4. Internationally, Iran’s rhetoric is weakened greatly by the government perceived ruthlessness and violence towards its own people:  Up until now, Iran held a substantial amount of power in the “Arab” street.  After their actions now, many of the moderate Arabs who were pro-Iran might reconsider having seen what “Islamic” governance and the Islamic Revolution are all about.

5. The next generation of Iranians – those who will take up government and run the country – have now firmly aligned against the current regime:  I think it is fair to say that this happened far before the election, but the election firmed the resolve of those previously against the “Islamic Republic” and likely drove numerous moderate conservatives into the opposition camp.

I would add the following:

6. Revealed the dependence of the current regime on the IRGC and the basiji:  In particular, the IRGC have now firmly aligned with the Ahmadinejad camp.  They were there previously, in my opinion, but the post-election events have confirmed that for the people of Iran and external governments.

7. Revealed the strong connection between the IRGC and the regime:  Over the last 4 years, the IRGC’s influence has grown through the economy and many attribute this to the influence of Ahmadinejad (and his relation with Khamenei).  The IRGC has now shown itself to be vested in the survival of the current government (and the economic policies of that government).

8. Demonstrated the cunning ruthlessness of the regime.  I am always amazed by the amount of people who worry about another “Tiananmen Square” incident.  They do not understand the regime.  Khamenei and his ilk know better.  Rather, disappearances is the new name of the game.  Firing on crowds in public is bad PR.  But kidnapping and later burying the dead in unmarked graves?

Reports from some in Iran confirm these types of tactics, as does this article written by a dissenter in hiding.  The massive death tolls will not come from the streets.  The deaths will pass silently, with few to bear witness, from places such as Evin Prison.  In these places, people simply disappear.

Tom Friedman: Multitasker

Tom Friedman’s most recent article provides the solution to three problems: Iran, the environment and energy dependence. 

Key excerpt:

The Obama team wants to pursue talks with Iran over its nuclear program, no matter who wins there. Fine. But the issue is not talk or no talk. The issue is leverage or no leverage. I love talking to people — especially in the Middle East — on one condition: that we have the leverage. As long as oil prices are high, Iran will have too much leverage and will be able to resist concessions on its nuclear program. With oil at $70 a barrel, our economic sanctions on Iran are an annoyance; at $25, they really hurt.

“People do not change when you tell them they should; they change when they tell themselves they must,” observed Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy specialist. And nothing would tell Iran’s leaders that they must change more than collapsing oil prices.

Mr. Obama has already started some excellent energy-saving initiatives. But we need more. Imposing an immediate “Freedom Tax” of $1 a gallon on gasoline — with rebates to the poor and elderly — would be a triple positive: It would stimulate more investment in renewable energy now; it would stimulate more consumer demand for the energy-efficient vehicles that the reborn General Motors and Chrysler are supposed to make; and, it would reduce our oil imports in a way that would surely affect the global price and weaken every petro-dictator.

I, personally, am on board with a gas tax as opposed to the ridiculous Waxman-Markley “cap-and-trade” (more accurately described as the “cap” and hand-out-accoding-to-political-constituency) bill.

Even if you don’t agree, you have to give him credit for the creativity:

An American Green Revolution to end our oil addiction — to parallel Iran’s Green Revolution to end its theocracy — helps us, helps them and raises the odds that whoever wins the contest for power, there will have to be a reformer.