The Democratic Piece

Last weekend another round of protests took place in Russia. First, on Saturday, April 14, 2007 Moscow was witness to 4 separate demonstrations. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Other Russia (aka Another Russia), and two pro-Kremlin organizations held competing rallies around the city. Although all four protests took place, media reports indicate that the Other Russia protests received the most police attention. In fact, I’ve yet to find an account of the protests that mention arrests or beatings of participants in non-Other Russia demonstrations.

Reports have Other Russia’s turnout between 2,000 - 3,000 people in Pushkin Square, while Police turnout numbered around 9,000. Garry Kasparov, the nominal leader of Other Russia which is a loose coalition of opposition groups, was arrested, charged with “shouting anti-government slogans in the presence of a large group of people.”

Although Other Russia received permission at the last minute to hold a rally, it was unable to acquire permission to hold a march. After the rally in Pushkin Square, part of the rally contingent attempted to march down one of Moscow’s main streets. Citing the illegal nature of the march because of lack of permit, the Russian government ordered the gathering to be dispersed. The response by the police was swift. Over 200 marchers (and apparently bystanders) were quickly arrested or beaten my the police. Although the cohesion of Other Russia is questioned, there is no doubt that the Kremlin is concerned about growing opposition to its policies and moves to tighten political competition.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a fascinating process of political change. To say the least, the situation in Russia is complex. The unsustainable chaos that characterized the political environment of the early 1990s resulted in an ineffective reform process, which tainted democracy in much of the Russian public. Democracy, as pushed by Western advisers and economic liberals, became associated with gridlock, corruption, oligarch enrichment, and chaos.

While no one would argue that Russia ever met the criteria of a “liberal democracy”, the extent of political competition that occurred through the 1990’s was genuine. Parties, politicians, ideas, and policy platforms competed in a fairly open political environment. Since the transition from Yeltsin, Russia has gradually slide from its strong-presidential system toward the “managed” democracy farce that Putin heads. This change has been gradual as the government has sought to slowly restrict the political arena by implementing regulations limiting speech, hindering the ability of civil society organizations to form and placing hurdles for political party formation.

This strategy has been complemented by a corresponding group of pro-Kremlin oligarchs to gain control of media outlets and bankrolling pro-Putin parties in elections. A perfect example of this dual creep is the recent NYTimes article covering a new policy implemented by the new owners of Russia’s largest independent radio network that 50 percent of all news coverage be “good news.”

To say the least, the current state of Russian politics is complicated. While there still is a strong desire of the Russian population to participate in the selecting of their leaders, Putin continues to ride a wave of popular approval. His approval has been buoyed by the strong economic growth accompanying continued high energy prices and the resulting strong economic growth. However, the moves to limit political contestation can lead to longer-term problems for the ruling elite as they become increasingly isolated from popular opinion and the impetus it can serve to change ineffective and unpopular policies.

So where does this leave the West and its efforts in democracy promotion? First, the West will have to acknowledge and adapt to operating in a hostile environment. The West is no longer working in the immediate post-Soviet environment where almost each state had a nascent, unstable government, which are hungry for foreign aid, be it political, economic or technical. Sixteen years later, new political systems and regimes are entrenched in the former Soviet states. Some have made democratic transitions, but the majority exist in the gray area between liberal democracy and autocratic regimes. These new non-democratic regimes have consolidated support bases that have an interest in maintaining the status quo. In order to prevent the potentially destabilizing influence of of democracy promotion, these governments have implemented legal regimes that create a difficult, if not hostile, environment in which most democracy promotion activities take place.

Second, new strategies and approaches must be developed for working in such environments. I do not sure if it means pursuing confrontational strategies similar to those used against regimes like those in Belarus. Most likely these blunt programs will be counterproductive in states like Russia, which are strategically important and hold significant international sway in issues important such as Iran. However, there needs to be a renewed effort speak truth to and support democratic forces in non-democratic states, even if they are strategically important.

The prospects of this occurring are dim. A recent report by Freedom House highlights the sharp decline in US support for Human Rights and Civil Society. Russia is specifically mentioned in the report’s analysis. I’ll hopefully be addressing this report and broader US strategy in an upcoming post.