Tehran Crack-up? Not Likely…
As I’ve noted recently on the Democratic Piece, there has been increasing unrest in Iran in response to the implementation of gas rationing this week. I’ve been trying to read as much as I can on the topic, and luckily Andrew Sullivan posted his thoughts today and linked some interesting Iranian blogs and some great photos.
Andrew and some other commentators I’ve seen have been attempting to read into this event and perhaps forecast the “crack up” of the Iranian regime. While I think this is definitely an important event that should be followed with much interest by the world, I think the prognostications of the Iranian theorcratic-authoritarian regime are premature.
A lot the analysis conflates the Iranian government too much with the Ahmadinejad administration. Too often we look at all non-democratic regimes as being identical black boxes with no distinguishing features. Iran = Iraq = Zimbabwe = North Korea. As someone who studies authoritarian regimes and the factors which contribute to their demise and resiliency, I think this is a major mistake in a lot of the armchair analysis and journalistic coverage. The way in which a regime is constituted and operates is extremely important when examining events and trends and attempting to forecast their impact on a regime.
The rationing story and the unrest that has resulted from it is an interesting story, I don’t think we can easily state that this is a major threat to the Iranian regime. In my opinion, the Iranian regime is fairly stable and resilient. However, the Ahmadinejad administration is much weaker. As recent reports about disagreements between some of the mullahs and Ahmadinejad have shown, Iran is not a “single-autocratic” state. It’s system is based around a ruling coterie of religious authorities with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as the head. Like the Soviet Politburo after Stalin and the CCP after Mao, these regimes have an active internal political system that can respond to threats to the overall regime’s interests by removing or restricting the executive’s actions. The removal of Khruschev is a prime example of a regime responding to what it viewed as an ineffective executive.
Furthermore, the Iranian regime does regularly hold elections, an important feature of the regime that increases their resiliency. True, these elections in no way reach the “free and fair” Western standard, but the fact is that they provide the Iranian regime with some sense of legitimacy, allow it to regularly “take the pulse” of the public mood and adjust accordingly, perhaps relieve some pent up social pressures, and also identify potential new political talent that may either grow into a potential rival or be ripe for co-option. The Iranian regime is fairly dynamic, definitely more so than an autocratic state like Iraq or North Korea. While Iran definitely relies on repression to silence its critics, it has many other tools that it has been able to marshal to maintain fairly broad popular support and prevent a realistic alternative from developing.
I agree that this rationing and unrest is a huge problem for Ahmadinejad, when he was “elected” almost two years ago he ran on a platform that promised economic growth, job growth, and continued (if not increased) subsidies. He has failed on all accounts and has increased international scrutiny and pressure on Iran over his continued flamboyant atomic antics and virulently anti-semitic rhetoric. While many may argue that Ahmadinejad is an “irrational” international actor (which can be the topic of another debate), remember that he isn’t the one that actually calls the really big shots in Iran.
If this rationing unrest continues and increases, it is doubtful that the ruling mullahs would let it get to the point of actually threatening the regime. While Ahmadinejad is useful as a pawn to spew populist rhetoric, he is also useful as a scapegoat who can be dispensed with and replaced by someone who follows a more moderate path that may buy the regime some time so that it may increase its domestic capacity to refine gas and lessed this vulnerability. However, gaining this extra time would require the Iranian regime to lessen international pressure by cooperating to a degree on the nuclear issue so that Iran may increase its access to foreign capital, the knowledge and technology of wester companies which can increase the capacity, and attract new investment.
I agree that in the short run, ratcheting up gas sanctions may be conducive to pressing the mullahs’ hand on this. It could force them to revaluate the costs and benefits of keeping Ahmadinejad around and may force them to seriously consider new presidential options. However, we should have realistic expectations for what changes this crisis may actually engender. I almost surely won’t bring Iran’s theo-autocratic regime to its knees, but it may weaken or end the Ahmadinejad presidency, which may lead to an overall change in strategy that facilitates cooperation and perhaps even rapproachment with the “west” and Iran’s neighbors.
