Comments on: Malta tinkers with STV http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/ Tentative conclusions on democracy & governance Sun, 25 Jul 2010 08:25:40 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0 By: Bob Richard http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-89 Bob Richard Sun, 14 Oct 2007 19:31:26 +0000 http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/#comment-89 That's my understanding as well -- they add just enough seats to the legislature to get a result proportional to the first preferences. That’s my understanding as well — they add just enough seats to the legislature to get a result proportional to the first preferences.

]]> By: Jack http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-88 Jack Sat, 13 Oct 2007 22:34:18 +0000 http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/#comment-88 Thanks, Bob. So one might assume the reform is a top-up based on first choices/preferences? (That's how I understand your answer.) Thanks, Bob. So one might assume the reform is a top-up based on first choices/preferences? (That’s how I understand your answer.)

]]> By: Bob Richard http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-87 Bob Richard Sat, 13 Oct 2007 21:02:08 +0000 http://democraticpiece.com/2007/10/02/malta-tinkers-with-stv/#comment-87 With an almost purely two-party system, as in Malta, the district magnitude of 5 leads to disproportionalities at the district level. Often these cancel each other out across districts but sometimes they don't. Here's the history: "... the 1981 election produced the 'perverse' result of the the PN obtaining a majority (50.9 percent) of the first-preference votes nationally but nevertheless failing to obtain a majority of the parliamentary seats. ... To prevent a recurrence of such a result, a constitutional amendment was adopted in 1987 to ensure that the party winning a majority of the first-preference votes will also be given a parliamentary majority by allocating so many additional seats as are necessary to give it a one-seat majority. ..." Hirczy and Lane, "Malta: STV in a Two-Party System", pp. 178-204 in Bowler and Grofman, eds., <em>Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote</em>, Ann Arbor, 2000. The quote is on page 186. These additional seats are somewhat analogous to overhang seats in some implementations of MMP. With an almost purely two-party system, as in Malta, the district magnitude of 5 leads to disproportionalities at the district level. Often these cancel each other out across districts but sometimes they don’t.

Here’s the history: “… the 1981 election produced the ‘perverse’ result of the the PN obtaining a majority (50.9 percent) of the first-preference votes nationally but nevertheless failing to obtain a majority of the parliamentary seats. … To prevent a recurrence of such a result, a constitutional amendment was adopted in 1987 to ensure that the party winning a majority of the first-preference votes will also be given a parliamentary majority by allocating so many additional seats as are necessary to give it a one-seat majority. …” Hirczy and Lane, “Malta: STV in a Two-Party System”, pp. 178-204 in Bowler and Grofman, eds., Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote, Ann Arbor, 2000. The quote is on page 186.

These additional seats are somewhat analogous to overhang seats in some implementations of MMP.

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