Tentative conclusions on democracy & governance
RSS icon Home icon
  • Democratosis?

    Posted on October 9th, 2007 Andrew G. Mandelbaum No comments Print This Post Print This Post

    In this week’s New York Times Magazine, Noah Feldman writes about Democratosis, an American political disease characterized by our politicians’ excessive use of the rhetoric of liberal democracy.   Feldman argues that democracy is a good thing except that its focal point as a foreign policy tool can backfire do to the hypocrisy that this entails.  He suggests a “chastened version of the democratization doctrine – one that makes no exceptions for friends while also recognizing that building durable institutions may do more good than holding snap elections.”   

    I don’t disagree with either of these arguments per se, but some clarifications are warranted.  Firstly, whenever I see a reference to Iraq in an article about democracy promotion, I become a little queasy (although, Feldman may not be guilty of any crime here).   In Iraq we are nation building.  We are NOT promoting democracy.  While in nation building we try to build institutions from – essentially – ground zero, in democracy promotion, we encourage institutional capacity building and provide skills training so that parliamentarians, for example, can read a budget.  For an example, check out NDI’s Morocco Democracy Online references section, where they have translated manuals on all-things-democracy into Arabic.   

    For Feldman’s part, it seems that he believes the Bush administration’s democratic diarrhea.  He writes:

    “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, sometimes sounding suspiciously like an apostate from the democratization cause, argued in a recent speech for the necessity of using realist methods – including short-term alliances with despots – to pursue idealistic goals such as the establishment of more democracy.”

    I find this slightly confusing because the only thing that’s not “realist” about Dubbya is his language.  Dubbya never fully embraced the democracy promotion agenda as is evidenced by Pakistan, as Feldman points out.  Feldman also suggests that Gates’ “measured realism” is problematic for the hypocrisies it breeds.  To be sure, I see hypocrisy as a result of the democracy agenda as a problem.  However, at the present moment, it is one of the least of our concerns.  In the Arab world, nothing says hypocrisy like the American war in Iraq and its position on Palestine.  I’ve been told by many an Arab that they respect the US for our penchant for working to obtain the interests of the American people.  They are jealous.  They know that we will not support democracy in Saudi Arabia.  After all, trying to democratize that place – where there is very little organized opposition – would bring about another disaster.

    What is interesting about Feldman is that he proposes that we “make no exceptions” for our non-democratic friends.  But pressuring Saudi Arabia publically would be likely to cause more harm than good.  The regime there lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many Saudis and the lack of any federal-level democratic institutions or political parties or NGOs indicates that few Saudis even have the skills to facilitate the representation of public interests. 

    This, of course, is very different than the situations in Pakistan and Egypt.  Although I have my doubts about whether we are getting our monies’ worth out of Musharraf and why we don’t give more support to the opposition, I’ll be honest that I’m far from a Pakistan expert.  But it seems that Musharraf is so weak anyway, I’m not sure what good it will do to keep clinging onto him.  I’d take the opposition in a political game over a coup any day. 

    In Egypt, Bush has always sided with the regime, and this says more about our feelings toward democracy promotion than, probably, anything else.  That country would be a different place today if we showed even a hint of commitment to the democracy agenda.  From the jailing of oppositionists (leftist and Islamist, many of whom are pro-democracy) to the barring of moderate political parties from participating in elections and the absurd constitutional reforms that was just ratified by about 5 people in a referendum, there is, perhaps, no regime to which we turn a blind eye more frequently than that of Mubarak… which brings me back to Feldman.

    “In each of these cases [Pakistan and Egypt], the fear that Islamists would come to power in free elections – as they did in the Palestinian territories – makes the United States’ interest in supporting the status quo understandable.”

    If Feldman actually wrote this sentence, then I’m not sure what the meaning of “…make no exceptions…” is.  Is this not the hypocrisy that he warns us about?!  Furthermore, the fear of Islamists is not a valid justification for supporting an autocrat interminably.  Hamas is a militarized social movement.  Because democracy does not tolerate more than a single source legitimate use of force, Hamas’ election was problematic.  Of course, so is the expectation that Palestine become a functioning democratic ‘state’ without set boarders and while it is under siege by another state (regardless of the reasons for the siege). 

    Most Islamist organizations that stand to win elections are not armed and do not believe in violence.  They have patiently played the political game even though the rules are often doctored to their detriment.  In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has suffered from severe repression precisely because it is playing the regime’s game.  Although it has a long history, the Muslim Brotherhood, like any social movement, consists of hardliners and moderates.  But on the whole, moderation has been the trend and this is a virtue that we should encourage.  The Muslim Brotherhood knows that it cannot come to power and force 70 million-plus Egyptians to obey shari’a law.  Islamists recall the Algerian Civil War and fear such an outcome in their own states. 

    Feldman’s suggestion of building institutions is what we call democracy promotion and he contradicts his own “no exceptions” approach by making the blunt generalization that fearing Islamists is justified. 

    Sadly, perhaps this was a good selection for the New Yorker’s “The Way We Live Now” column.

    Leave a reply