The President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced today that following the referendum approving a new constitution, he would dissolve parliament and call for new elections under the new electoral code.

Jack posted some thoughts on Sunday regarding the constitutional referendum in Kyrgyzstan. Bonnie Boyd over at the Foreign Policy Association’s Central Asia blog also provides some good commentary (Note: Anyone interested in Central Asia should regularly read Bonnie’s blog. She provides great coverage and analysis of all things Central Asia - economics, culture, foreign policy, politics, environment, etc. She’s much more than the one-trick pony than I am.)

I am a bit more skeptical about this power play by Bakiev than Jack. I think this is a pretty blatant move by Bakiev to reconsolidate power within the presidency. Bonnie notes that perhaps attempts to increase transparency may be more beneficial for increasing both political stability and economic growth. I think that is the wrong approach because the lack of transparency is rooted in the political structures of Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, the changes in the new constitution do little to address this fact. Instead, the new constitution will probably result in the consolidation of power by Bakiev and a more authoritarian-style of government. An argument could be made that a more authoritarian government that is more stable will provide better growth, but I will not be the one making it and I doubt it will do much for transparency either (not that Bonnie is arguing this either).

I think that three important points have been underplayed in the coverage of this story: the sitting parliament was corrupt / illegitimate, the weakness of parties is one of the major impediments to further democratization in Kyrgyzstan, and the institutions and rules established by the new constitution could be used by Bakiev to establish his own single-party dominant pseudo-democracy.

One thing should be understood from the beginning when discussing this story — the recently dissolved parliament is not the victim here. The members of the recently dissolved parliament were “elected” in the fraudulent elections of 2005. The protests that grew out of the 2005 elections were not because of lack of transparency and corruption, at least initially. The first protests were local, disparate, and in response regional rivalries. Kyrgyz politics, even under the Soviet Union, has been broken along a regional North-South divide. The elites from each region have built extensive patron-client relationships, especially at the village and town level. These patron-client networks were then used to seek election in the single-member, plurality districts. A side benefit of being a member of parliament is immunity, which comes in handy when some of your regular business dealings may not be the most savory.  The local protests broke out in response to then President Akayev’s attempt to place his supporters in the parliament in these districts by manipulating the vote count in 2005. The protests were initially very much centered on seeking redress from the local administrations, but when this failed the groups converged on the regional major cities, primarily Osh. Opposition movements and democracy advocates capitalized on this mobilization and successfully redirected the attention to the seat of power in Bishkek.

Playing off the recent success of the “colored-revolutions” elsewhere, the movement sought international media coverage and pressure to remove the president and force new elections. This movement was only half successful. Akayev fled to St. Petersburg and new presidential elections were called, but not new parliamentary elections. Bakiev sought the support of the sitting elites in parliament for his presidency by agreeing to not holding new parliamentary elections, after all the new members of parliament had paid a lot of money for those new seats. Some token races were over turned. For example, Akayev’s daughter’s election victory was annulled by the courts.

Bakiev assumed that he could bargain with the parliament and utilize his new democratic credentials to implement his policies. However, this strategy proved to be unsuccessful. The relationship broke down between the president and parliament, resulting in the showdown in late 2006. During this struggle, the parliament adopted a new constitution which curtailed the president’s powers. A few days later, the parliament met at the 11th hour to again amend the constitution to replace a number of the president’s powers after Bakiev threatened to dissolve parliament and call for new elections under the new constitution (notice a theme here).

One of the largest impediments to democratization in Kyrgyzstan is the weakness of political parties. Parties are instrumental to functioning of a democracy. They can not be replaced by civil society, strong institutions, or transparency. Political parties are the vehicles through which interests in a society are able to organize, express policy preferences, and compete for public support. The single-member districts of the previous Kyrgyz electoral system reinforced the patron-client relationships and prevented the organization of broad-based political parties. Parties today in Kyrgyzstan are more of an expression of regional alliances between elites. While I can not find the official statistics right now, if I remember correctly from my previous research approximately 90% of the member of parliament are elected as independents. The adoption of a new electoral system in Kyrgyzstan could help to reverse this trend by providing incentives for party development. Bakiev has made this case while arguing for this new constitution; however, the new electoral system will do little to help the developments of parties. Instead, Bakiev will attempt to use the new party-list PR to develop a “party-of-power” akin to United Russia or Nur-Otan in Kazakhstan.

Aside from the point that the OSCE has documented ballot-stuffing and claimed that the turn out was no where near the 80% reported by the Kyrgyz electoral commission, let alone the 50% necessary for the referendum to be legal, this new constitution provides Bakiev with all the tools to establish the a single-party dominant system. In fact, just days before the referendum Bakiev established a new party. The new party-list PR system will allow parties to determine who gets seats in the new parliament. Parties with significant resources will be able to compete on a national scale, just the types of parties that may have ties to executive with all the resources that accompany the position.

Things should happy pretty quickly as Bonnie notes the elections will be held in mid-December. The international community should watch closely how the state administers the elections. Some issues I can think of off the top of my head that I will research and watch for to tell if this is a real power play: (1) how is the election commission formed, (2) how is coverage of the election season shaped by Bakiev and his supported in the executive campaigning while carrying out official duties, (3) will there be a crackdown against at of Bakiev’s major opponents that may have the personal wealth or stature to form a significant rival party such as Felix Kulov, (4) how will parties register to part-take in the election, (5) will party-lists have to be approved, and (6) will new voter lists be developed? One of the largest issues in the former Soviet Union is the manipulation of laws and institutions to benefit the development of authoritarian governments. This process occurs slowly and is unlikely to result in much international protests because it occurs in a slow drip. Sadly, it seems that Kyrgyzstan, once deemed the hope for democracy in the region, is also going down this path.