The Democratic Piece

Today’s New York Times article examines the growing frustration in Pakistan due to the Bush administration’s consistent support for President Musharraf. Despite the popular vote signaling a desire for change, the administration continues to support Musharraf as a key ally for US policy.

It is not unreasonable for security interests to trump those of democracy. However, the centrality of democracy promotion in political rhetoric necessitates that action backs up the rhetoric. Pakistan is a clear example of an opportunity to visibly stand by those calling for democracy, an opportunity to defy the perception that America only acts in its strategic interest.

As the article points out, the notion that Musharraf can rely on the military is becoming less certain. If the opposition majority becomes a reality, and if it becomes clear that General Kayani, not Musharraf, commands the loyalty of the military, then the US needs to be sure it stands on the side of democracy and not dictatorship. To avoid increasing resentment, and to stem the fading legitimacy of democracy promotion rhetoric, this shift should start sooner rather than later.

I read this article yesterday and thought it might be interesting to all you fine folks heading up to Ohio this weekend. Godspeed, peoples.

Source: Marc Ambinder’s Blog

How Many Delegates Does HRC Need To Win?

28 Feb 2008 04:07 pm

In order to win the nomination, how many earned delegates does Sen. Hillary Clinton have to win?

It’s not an academic question. With a little spreadsheet math, we can figure it out.

We need to start with some assumptions.

First, let’s be generous and assume that all of the superdelegates Clinton currently claims will not switch to Obama.

Perhaps that’s an overly generous assumption given that two have done so over the past two days, but, again, we’re trying to illuminate a path to the nomination, not block one. Let’s assume that, all other things being equal, she’ll win half of the remaining uncommitted superdelegates – maybe 185 of 390. She’ll also win half of John Edward’s delegates.

Before we move to pledged delegates, we need to figure out whether Florida and Michigan delegations are credentials and what effect they’ll have on the nomination. At this point, it’s most likely that they will be segregated from the official nomination scenarios.

So – just for the moment – let us calculate the number of remaining 981 pledged delegates Hillary Clinton would need to earn in order to win the nomination without the help of Michigan and Florida.

Assuming that her currently total is 1275 – a nice amalgam of the various network and print delegate estimates, she needs at least 55.3% — or about 542.

Let’s go to March 4. Let’s assume that Clinton wins Ohio by four points – 52 to 48, netting her roughly 5 extra delegates, and loses Texas 49 to 51, netting Obama three extra delegates, and loses Vermont, netting Obama three extra delegates, and winning Rhode Island by 6 points, netting herself an extra delegate. She ends that day with no additional delegates – she can blame Vermont.

Under the rosiest of scenarios, it’s hard to see her winning more than about 50 percent of the remaining earned delegates, even if she whips Obama in Pennsylvania and earns, say, 16 extra delegates, and drums him in Puerto Rico, where, even if she wins seventy percent of the delegates, she’s still, in essence, playing catch up.

If Clinton wins half of the remaining delegates – about 493 – and loses none – she still trails Obama by a net 50 or so earned delegates.

Now let’s run the scenario with Florida and Michigan’s delegates in play – the best iteration of that scenario, with both pledged and unpledged delegates seated and Clinton’s having earned fully 60% of or more of them. She’ll need at least 52.1% of remaining pledged delegates to surpass Obama.

Playing with the numbers a bit, here’s how she could – in theory – accomplish this.

If Florida and Michigan’s delegations are seated fully to her advantage, and if she wins in Ohio by 65% and wins in Texas by 65%, and all other percentages hold, she can win the nomination.

After making a number of comments on Jack’s recent posting, I felt that it was time to put up or shut up and start posting my own contributions, so that I can aspire to being viciously attacked by anonymous ideologues.

As my first formal blog post on this great site, I’d like to take this opportunity to endorse an online petition by MoveOn.org that encourages superdelegates to support the people’s choice, and can be found at http://pol.moveon.org/superdelegates/. The full text reads as follows:

“The Democratic Party must be democratic. The superdelegates should let the voters decide between Clinton and Obama, then support the people’s choice.”

In the interests of full disclosure, I want to say that I currently support Obama, who is the candidate that would most likely benefit from this petition, but I also support the principles of this petition regardless for the following reasons:

1) Increasing the responsiveness of the Democratic party to the American people to counteract the arcane rules put in place to maximize party control over the process. I’ve enjoyed the switch from “winner take all” primary states, but the effective outcome has been to increase the leverage of the superdelegates, who are not held to the same pledged standards. The outcome of a petition like this may be to increase the concentration of the candidates on persuading the American people of their merit, rather than wooing the party elites.

2) Manufacturing a substantial margin of victory for the winner of the primary process. This is much less of a concern, but I do like the idea that this will guarantee a close battle for the vote of the American people, but a definitive outcome to the entire process, in which the potentially small margin of victory will be augmented by the full weight of the superdelegates. Personally, I’d rather get rid of the superdelegates altogether, or possibly split them exactly in half, but getting them to vote 100% in favor of the primary winners will make that winner look more legitimate, give the appearance of party unity, and sidestep the complexity of guaranteeing the complexity of the other preferred outcomes.

There’s some interesting arguments on NYT blog.

Well? What do you think? If you’re interested in signing the petition, please check out the following link: http://pol.moveon.org/superdelegates/

I am truly spoiled this week by a glut of in-depth Russia coverage by major U.S. daily newspapers.

Earlier I posted about about the series that the NYTimes started this week. It really must be my lucky week; the Christian Science Monitor (CSM) is also starting a series on “The Putin Generation.” The series is examining the lives, views, and involvement of the youth generation that grew up after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of their earliest memories have been shaped not by the horrors of the Soviet regime, but the chaotic decade under Yeltsin that was plagued by economic turmoil and deteriorating standards of living and Russian standing in the world. There is a great slide show that accompanies this article.

As I mentioned before, to understand why and how the Putin appeal is at the heart of this experience. The Kremlin harnessed this appeal to mobilize youth both within the United Russia party and as a phalanx of foot soldiers to counter opposition groups.

The first CSM piece is really insightful. It is based largely on the reporters interviews with Kirill Shchitov, one of the young, ardent supports of Putin. Their discussions are telling. Money quote:

“We support the political course that Putin started,” says Shchitov, an avid reader who draws inspiration from Peter the Great – “a real example of being proud of your country.” He also likes Stalin, a ruler who could solve any problem – including the defeat of Hitler – “by strict measures.” And he admires Franklin D. Roosevelt for, he says, making the United States a strong nation. And now, Putin.

The perceived humiliation of the Russian population has been used by the Kremlin to stoke a resurgent nationalism. In doing so, the Kremlin has referenced the challenges that the Soviet Union / Russia overcame in World War II. Part of this process has involved rewriting Russian history and partial rehabilitating Stalin’s rule as a period of “principled focus and determination” with some unfortunate zealousness.

Relying on youth organizations to protect and further a movement can have benefits, but also large potential pitfalls. Youths, caught up in the rhetoric and promises of a wooing leader, can become disillusioned when the promised future doesn’t materialize. It’s a risky strategy, but so far it has appeared to be effective, when coupled with the blatent abuse of administrative state resources, for the Kremlin in terms of stamping out opposition movements. I hope they realize that they are playing with fire - once started it can be an effective tool for many goals, but it can also burn you out of house and home.

The Eurasia Daily Monitor by the Jamestown Foundation has an interesting piece this morning on Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko initiating the process to draft a new constitution for Ukraine [the piece is not yet on their website - I will past the whole story behind the break and update with a link later].

Yesterday, Yushchenko called to session the National Constitution Council to consider a draft constitution he has prepared. President Yushchenko is seeking to roll back may of the constitutional amendment adopted in the wake of the Orange Revolution in 2003. Supporters of the president claim that the reforms were partly sought to prevent Yushchenko and the victors of the Orange Revolution from taking control of the strong presidential office and affecting real change in Ukraine. The Council will include many prominent politicians, including current Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and recent former Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych, the person which Yushchenko beat out in the rerun of the presidnetial elections after the Orange Revolution in 2003. I’d be interested in the process by which the council considers, amends, and eventually approves a constitution. Given the strong divergent views of the president, prime minister, and former prime minister, it seems that there would be little agreement on a new political structure. The article notes that a draft is expected in approximately six months, in time for Yushchenko’s potential reelection campaign in 2010.

The changes noted in the piece include:

• the Presidential power to appoint the cabinet and PM, with parliamentary approval
• decentralization of authority to the regional governments
• the removal of immunity for members of parliament
• giving citizens the right to directly appeal to the Constitutional Court, directly submit draft laws to the parliament for consideration, and the ability to cancel laws via a referendum

I’m always a bit suspect of constitutional changes sought because the previous constitution prevents “real change from taking place.” While I believe that Yushchenko’s democratic bona fides are strong, some of the changes sought are worrying. While stripping of immunity may be a good reform, it could also be used by Yushchenko or future presidents to go after political rivals via the procuracy. That being said, the decentralization of the Ukrainian state may prove beneficial in terms shortening the lines of accountability between the voters and their elected officails. In short, I can’t say on whole whether this is a good or bad thing, but I can say this is likely to be very divisive. Click throught to read the whole piece from the Eurasia Daily Monitor Continue Reading »

This weekend I posted a quick note about a NYTimes article detailing the authoritarian government being established by Putin and his supporters within the Kremlin and around the country. The NYTimes has taken an interesting approach to this article by creating a Russian translation and opening a live journal account to host a discussion about the article. Needless to say, the responses have been strong.

A few of my quick thoughts about the article. As I mentioned earlier, I am happy that this series of articles is being written by the NYTimes because it puts the whole picture of what is happening politically in Russia into a somewhat “whole picture” context. Too often, the articles detail with one particular aspect of the Kremlin’s closure of the political space, such as the government crackdown on civil society or the administrative obstacles erected to prevent actual opposition candidates and parties. That being said, some of my comments here may be addressed in follow-on pieces of the series.

First, one of the bid missing section is this article is the lack of discussion regarding the reemergence of the use of psychiatric facilities to detain, hide, torture, and drug opposition activists (here and here, among others). Repeatedly, opposition activists have been detained by local police and federal security agencies and forcibly committed to psychiatric institutions. At these institutions, they have been chained to bed and drugged against their will. A chilling thought and a homage to the Soviet practice.

Second, the article doesn’t mention enough the use of Kremlin “NGO’s” to provide pressure against opposition groups. These cadres of youths are intended to intimidate and counter-protest any groups which disagree with the Kremlin. In the NYTimes defense, they did write a strong article on the topic a few months ago.

Third, there was no mention of the farcical results from the recent parliamentary election in some of the most “unstable” regions. As I’ve mentioned here before (here and here),the official results are absurd. In addition, some of the most interesting challenges to Putin’s electoral facade have been wagged in Ingushetia - where allegedly more than 99% turnout with more than 95% supporting Putin’s party. Local groups have begun to collect signatures from individuals stating that they did not participate in the elections, seriously challenging the regional governor’s fraud to please Putin.

Last, and I want to note that I do think the article does this to an degree, but an important facet of Putin’s regime is that he does not actually control each political detention. Many of these are carried out by regional mayors, governors, prosecutors, or security agencies zealously seeking approbation from the Kremlin. While the blood and abuse by not be directly ordered from the Kremlin, Putin is responsible for the environment in which these acts are carried out and, importantly, never prosecuted. Even more so now that Putin took on the responsibility and power to appoint governors and super-federal administrators. Since these officials can no longer answer to the Russian people, Putin is the only one that can put a check on their transgressions.

Also, the article does a good job to note that Putin’s rise has been facilitated by the turbulent Yeltsin years and the stability brought on by high energy prices. However, we should not be seduced by the stability and be tricked into believing that the lives of Russians are getting “better.” Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss provide an insightful article in the last issue of Foreign Affairs which frisks the claims of the “authoritarian model” being promoted by Putin and his celebrants.

Fidel’s brother is officially the president of Cuba. According to the BBC, “The US said Raul Castro’s appointment offered potential for change but said its embargo would remain until there was a transition to democracy.”

My gut reaction is threefold, and most readers will assess the embargo in at least one of the following ways: (1) It’s a Cold War anachronism. (2) The costs fall on the people, not the dictators. (3) It’s an excuse for incumbent lawmakers to keep their districts on lock.

Yet the pressure of a foreign power matters for democracy promotion. If nobody inside a country has the capacity to make leaders respect democratic institutions, maybe external forces can. I enter the treacherous territory of counterfactuals in suggesting the apparent suppression of an IRI exit poll last month helped Mwai Kibaki steal Kenya’s election. Moreover, most would agree the carrot of European Union accession has sped democratization and economic reform in the former Soviet satellites. Diplomacy seems to matter.

The efficacy of the Cuba embargo turns on two questions. One, what are the costs for Raul? We know it contributes to general poverty, but how does it make letting go more attractive for him? Two, does the lack of similar policies by all other powers render useless our own?

If we take democratizing Cuba seriously, there’s a third question: how do we minimize the pain to Castro II of stepping down?

Ralph has decided to run again, and he’s getting a beating for it. The argument goes like this: Green-leaning candidates “take” votes away from Democrats. This particular election is so critical that “we” can’t afford to lose. Nader therefore should do the “right” thing and withdraw.

I want to make the case for Nader’s candidacy. This is not an endorsement of the man or his program. His decision to run urges consideration of structural ‘democracy problems’ in America. 2008 may be more critical than 2004, 2000, 1932, 1896 or even 1796, but that doesn’t mean we should ignore our democracy problems. Run-of-the-mill condemnation of Nader reflects a choice to do just that.

The Democratic Party would benefit from three reforms that Nader’s run brings to mind. A direct election for President would decrease third party “spoiler” impact by taking the emphasis off battleground states. Remember Florida 2000. Second, instant runoff voting would translate most votes for Greens into votes for Democrats. Third, proportional representation would undo the conservative bias in Congressional elections that inheres in the nexus of our partisan geography and winner-take-all elections. In a sense, PR would unpack the packedness of those population-dense districts Democrats tend to inhabit.

The absence of each reform is a democracy problem. The electoral college silences voters in “safe” states and sometimes crowns the wrong winner. Plurality elections force voters to support candidates they don’t like and candidates to pay lip service to those voters, lest they defect to a spoiler like Nader. And the only real diversity of opinion in our two-party Congress comes from members’ personal predispositions. These old institutions diminish democracy for everyone.

If bad institutions hurt more people than Democrats, why the concern with Democrats? They are the likely agents of change. Politicians don’t improve institutions out of commitment to democracy. Reforms are self-interested. Nader’s candidacy underscores Democrats’ overall vulnerability in the present party system-cum-electoral system. As the vulnerable camp, with majorities in both houses and a prospect for united government in 2009, Democrats are best positioned to effect electoral reform.

Yet they don’t take their vulnerability seriously. Hence the case for Nader.

Two scenarios confront the Democratic Party. One is to learn the hard way. Nader costs the Dems another election, they make the institutions-outcomes connection, and they become a party of reform. The other option: skip step one, make the connection, and become a party of reform.

To blame Nader is to shoot the messenger. The conversation should be about lasting solutions. Browbeating Greens to depress their turnout, if doable at all, is not a lasting solution.

Finally a large, U.S. newspaper is doing a detailed series on Putin’s regime and the manner in which it operates to preserve itself.  I don’t have a lot of time right now, but I recommend everyone read this good piece by Clifford Levy. Too often the articles on Russia and Putin’s growing authoritarian control focus on a single narrow topic like civil society or journalists.  Get a cup of hot coffee and settle in to read this.

Who won the Georgetown Student Association presidency this week? We won’t know until Tuesday.

“The Election Commission has received several inquiries and complaints about this year’s election. In order to follow up and investigate each claim adequately, the Election Commission has decided, in accordance with the Student Association bylaws, to delay the announcement of results until early next week,” said Election Commissioner Maura Cassidy (COL ‘08) in an e-mail.

The Election Commission declined to comment further on specific complaints.

What were the complaints? Why the wait? Is it technical failure? Fraud? Did someone spend too much money and now needs to be disqualified? This is not a model for transparent election administration.