President Bush put all of his eggs in the Musharraf basket and the Pakistani people have smashed that basket right in his face by wholeheartedly rejecting Musharraf’s political party. President Bush undermined U.S. standing in the world and our security by believing that the best way to fight Islamic extremism and terrorists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region was unquestioningly supporting President Musharraf and funneling billions of dollars to the Pakistani military without oversight. The results of the Pakistani parliamentary elections have left the Bush administration with a lot of egg on its face.

As the State Department scrambles to get its bearings in the fluid Pakistani political environment, it is important for us to consider three things. First, why did the Pakistani government allow these elections to be carried out in a relatively unfettered manner? Second, what are the likely outcomes? Third, what should the priorities of the U.S. government moving forward in terms of security and democracy promotion?

Why were the elections relatively clean?

In the lead up to the parliamentary elections last week, everybody expected these contests to be marred by extensive ballot stuffing and vote rigging. However, much of this failed to materialize. While there were obvious shortcomings in the preelection environment, the chaos and blatant fraud never fully materialized. We need to ask ourselves why?

My bet is that the Pakistani military clearly expressed to Musharraf behind closed doors that blatant fraud would not be permitted. The prestige of the Pakistani army has been serious damaged by the Musharraf dictatorship that it supported. After being pressured to step down as head of the military, the military has taken a number of steps to distance itself from Musharraf and his policies. In doing so, the space allows for the military to play a constructive role in pressuring Musharraf to leave office, providing an opportunity for the military to begin to repair its image.

What happens next?

The results of the election send a clear sign that the Pakistani public is tired of Musharraf. With an utterly defeated political party in the parliament, Musharraf’s last two vestiges of support are in the military and the U.S. government. If public outcry grows and the coalition announced today between the Pakistani Muslim League-N (PML-N) and the People’s Power Party (PPP) holds, the parliament may be able to seek the removal of Musharraf through two avenues. The parliament can seek to reinstate the courts and again challenge the constitutionality of Musharraf’s previous election, or the parliament can seek to initiate impeachment proceedings if it can muster the necessary two-thirds support. Of these two, I think the second is most likely as we will likely see a number of the member of Musharraf’s party either rejoin the PML-N (many PML-N members joined Musharraf’s party after he overthrew the PML-N Prime Minister Nawas Sharif).

If Musharraf is desperate and decides to attempt to cling to power, he may attempt to exercise the presidential power to dismiss parliament in the face of impeachment proceedings. Doing so would spark widespread public protest, and I doubt the military would enforce an new martial law - leaving Musharraf the option of a C-130 flight or the prospects of mob-style justice. In short, Musharraf’s fate depends on whether the PML-N and PPP can cooperate.

W hat Should the U.S. Do Moving Forward?

In the short-term, the U.S. should follow the lead of the Pakistani military and begin to quickly distance itself from Musharraf. However, it appears the Bush Administration continues to back Musharraf:

The Pakistani Foreign Office said US President George W Bush called President Pervez Musharraf on Thursday to congratulate him on peaceful elections and reaffirm that the US would work closely with the new government.

At least it appears that the State Department is beginning to look to other partners in Pakistan:

“We look forward to working with whoever emerges as prime minister, we look forward to working with President Musharraf in his new role,” said Boucher [US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher].

This is essentially the very least the U.S. can do in this situation. However, the world should realize that just as it does not behoove us to back a single individual to promote democracy, it is also not wise to put trust merely in the PPP and the PML-N.

While Musharraf’s fate rests on the ability of the PPP and PML-N to cooperate, it is unlikely that after Musharraf is dispatched that their cooperation will continue much further. Currently, they are merely united in their opposition to Musharraf, not any broad idea regarding the future direction of Pakistan. These two highly-personalistic parties will only be able to cooperate as long as their leaders can resist the urge seize the advantage - espeically with the prospect of a post-Musharraf Pakistan. Impeaching is fine and good, but afterwards the prize of the presidency, one that has been strengthened by the years of Musharraf dictatorship, will tempt Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto’s widower and successor as head of the PPP. We should not forget that the two previous coups were widely greeted with joy by the Pakistani people because the PML-N and the PPP lead notoriously corrupt governments.

If we have learned anything during the past seven years of the “democracy promoting” Bush administration, it is that it is not built with a single election, a single party, or a single leader. The U.S. should move quickly to not only distance itself from Musharraf, but also to urge the PML-N and PPP to reinstate the Pakistani Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, and to lift the restrictions on the Pakistani media. The courts and media proved to be a resilient force against Musharraf, probably even initiating his decline. Lawyer-led protests back in early 2007 provided the first dent in the Musharraf dictatorship. The social unrest the followed his attempt to remove the Chief Justice changed the political dynamic significantly, allowing for the media to expose the brutality of the Musharraf government and providing an opportunity for Nawaz Sharif and the late-Benazir Bhutto to force their way back into the political conversation.

Democratic Senator Joe Biden announced this week that he would seek to increase non-military aid to Pakistan significantly. This seems like it may be step in the right direction, but a significant portion of that aid should go towards supporting the judicial system, independent media, and civil society.

In terms of security, the U.S. government should begin working directly with the new Prime Minister and military to discuss their strategy to fight the unrest in the border region. U.S. needs to recognize that while the instability there is a threat to U.S. security, it is hardly comparable to the daily, pertinent threat it poses to the existence of Pakistan. In Islamabad, we should provide the technical assistance and moral support to the Pakistanis to handle this problem in how they see fit. However, the U.S. needs increase the level of oversight we give to the Pakistani government and military. Furthermore, the U.S. need to make it clear to the military that if they become directly involved in domestic politics again by overthrowing and elected government, that serious consequences will follow in terms of international isolation, travel bans, and the immediate cessation of all military aid.

All-in-all, the world is incredibly luckily in how the Pakistani elections have played out. So far, the best possible scenario seems to be playing out. The Bush Administration and the next President of the United States should learn from our failed policy that pursuing our security in the “war on terror” context does not mean a false-choice of dictatorships or radical Islamists. We can not be taken in by the mythical reformer who promises to be all things. Instead, we need to simultaneously invest in the multiple institutions and actors that make the democratic process work. We’re lucky that it isn’t too late in Pakistan, and it isn’t too late elsewhere.