(Again assuming Putin transposed into Venezuela, it’s pretty easy to make even an unenlightened self-interest case against meddling much in Russian politics).

I didn’t actually know that much about Venezuela’s constitutional structure so thanks for that quick summary. Unfortunate that the new constitution didn’t prove much of an improvement

However, I think it is worth looking at the mechanism by which people come to care about ‘the rules of the game’ and not just results. I think one key step may be discrediting alternatives to the system such populist strongman and theocrats. In addition, as you say earlier coups makes things worse but I think democratic succession tends to make things better.

One of the really clever bits about democracy is that it allows the ruling party to act as a scapegoat for both the problems it caused and the problems that were beyond its control. Throwing the bums out, even when its not necessarily said bums fault, can be quite satisfying and can strengthen faith in the process.

Anyhow, I really need to find a good data set on democratic norms and start to test some of this speculation.

The Bush administration’s behavior in the wake of the coup was unacceptable. The U.S. should not have even considered accepting it. Sure, Chavez was a punk to begin with, but that experience demonstrated to him that the U.S. was after his head. Bush tried to make it up to him afterwards, even joining a coalition called “Friends of Venezuela,” but these efforts clearly didn’t work. The world could very well be a different place if the U.S. did not accept the coup.

Your point about Putin is well taken, but I’d argue that even that situation, if transported to a country like Venezuela, is preferable to a coup. We’re getting quite hypothetical now, but we’re better off trying to make a democratically elected autocrat more democratic than we are an unelected autocrat more democratic. At least there is a history of free and fair elections and oppositionist political parties in the first scenario (by virtue of the country having been a ‘democracy’ at some point in time).

Getting back to Chavez, I find that the mechanisms he has used to consolidate his authority differ little than those used by Venezuela’s previous leaders. This is significant because Chavez is working under the 1999 Constitution, while the others were governed by the 1961 Constitution. Chavez, like his predecessors, uses the ‘decentralized public administration’, consisting of state-run organizations like PDVSA, to distribute rents and run social programs. The public institutions remain bloated and underused, just as they had before. Neither the parliament or its replacement, the national assembly, provide serious checks on the president; to the contrary, they encourage hyperpresidentialism as a result of the option to give the president decree powers.

So one would hope that people learn from elections, but Venezuelans tend to demand results, not processes. The Venezuelan political system will remain a mess until Venezuelans force their politicians to abide by ‘the rules of the game’ regardless of which rules these are.

I tend to think it’s a good thing that the coup attempt against Chavez failed. Seems to me there’s an excellent chance he’ll leave office both personally and ideologically discredited. Of course it’s easier to say that now that his referendum failed (and he acknowledged its failure).

My pet theory is that elections are not just a way of communicating with and replacing those in power. They also may serve as a learning experience to shape the norms of the general population. Coups or excessive outside intervention interrupt that learning process while providing a short term benefits in terms of leader selection.

Of course if a democratically elected leader takes Putin’s path and prevents truly contested elections the process is also interrupted. So, no guarantees.