Repairing Iraq’s party system
As I write, democracy assistance groups are helping lawmakers develop an electoral system for Iraq’s 18 governorate councils. Some creative electoral engineering could take the sectarian sting out of Iraq’s party system. One proposal worth serious thought is using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) with open endorsements in governorate-wide districts.
Reuters last week claimed that “Iraq’s local elections could reshape power structure.”
Major players — such as the movement of populist Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and Sunni Arab tribal groups — will be competing for the first time and are expected to make gains at the expense of those now in power.
“New alliances will form, old ones will fall. Everything will change. It will redraw the political map of Iraq,” said a senior Shi’ite government official on condition of anonymity.
Really, Reuters means reshaping a balance of power, not an underlying power structure. A party system that continues to revolve around sects will not help consolidate Iraqi democracy. Luminaries from Lipset to Lijphart have taught that stable democratic politics are about more than race, religion or language.33 The challenge is to get Iraqi elites talking about more than sectarian interest. What candidates need are incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Campaigns need to be about what’s-in-it-for-me: jobs, schools, roads and, as a colleague quipped, a shawarma machine in every kitchen.
Thankfully, beltway rumor has it that the chosen system will be candidate-centric. This is a major step away from the closed-list PR systems that blew open Pandora’s box in 2005.
That leaves us with a few basic options:33
First-past-the-post: As long as parties don’t control who gets on the ballot, this system might work. Yet the number of votes needed to win is fairly high, meaning current parties likely would fare best, unless there were numerous candidates in each district, in which case outcomes would be wildly unpredictable. Ultimately, the lack of reliable census data would make fair apportionment virtually impossible.
Open-list PR: Basically, the system modifies list PR so that voters control who ends up being a party’s most popular parliamentarian. While it gets around the apportionment problem, it is unlikely to change much. The list logic would preserve current parties, the logic of party discipline would remain the same, and we would expect the most popular person under such circumstances to be a sectarian leader.
STV: For all its virtues, this is not appropriate for the context. Illiteracy and innumeracy are likely to cause widespread voter error. The only way to get around the apportionment problem is to use one big district in each governorate. Can we really ask Iraqis to rank up to, say, 200 candidates?
Bloc vote: Two words. Palestine 2006.33
SNTV: With open endorsements, of course. If the parties controlled who got on the ballot, there would be little chance for a shawarma machine in every kitchen. The system would stimulate hyper-personalistic campaigns, party fragmentation and pork-barrel politics at its finest. On one hand, these are ugly dynamics. On the other, they’re just what are needed to break the grip of sect on Iraq’s party system.
Using SNTV in governorate-wide districts would obviate the apportionment problem. If each council were the cube root of its respective governorate’s population, council sizes (and district magnitudes) would hover around 100, meaning each candidate would need about only one percent of votes to win.33
Open endorsement SNTV is not a magic bullet. Its efficacy depends on federal-governorate linkages, ballot access rules and the (in)abilities of current parties to coordinate in local contests, to name just a few variables. Iraq nonetheless faces a tradeoff. As long as its electoral rules stimulate disciplined, programmatic parties, sect is likely to be the dominant cleavage. Legislative politics will remain zero-sum with negative implications for the country’s future. On one hand, electoral engineers can reinforce the nasty equilibrium that is Iraq’s party system. On the other, they can try to force it open by stimulating fragmentation and clientelism.3
- ADDENDUM 4/17: Some have read this sentence as my suggestion that the “luminaries” advocate pork-inducing systems in order to activate non-sectarian cleavages. That is not my intention. I drew on the “luminaries” for their emphasis on the importance of such cleavages.333
- Of course, varying factors like endorsement control, pooling, ballot access restrictions, and less feasibly, district magnitude give us far more permutations.333
- For two interpretations of this disaster, see F&V and FairVote.333
- Using data from FairVote.333
3
MSS on 17 Apr 2008 at 2:18 pm #
Thanks for the links, but I have to add that it would be a tad misleading to suggest that scholars such as Lipset and Lijphart (or Shugart, for that matter) have suggested that “Campaigns need to be about what’s-in-it-for-me,” in the sense of pork and patronage.
The case can be made that such a politics oriented around individual legislators’ credit-claiming is a salve to sectarian tensions of countries where party-oriented politics necessarily means sectarian-oriented politics. I am just not aware of that argument having been made by any of the scholars you allude to.
Fruits and Votes » Prof. Shugart's Blog » SNTV comes to Iraq? on 17 Apr 2008 at 2:33 pm #
[...] writes at The Democratic Piece: As I write, democracy assistance groups are helping lawmakers develop an electoral system for [...]
Jack on 17 Apr 2008 at 5:04 pm #
MSS, I might have been unclear. I drew on the literature for the importance placed on non-sectarian social cleavages.
The “salve” case you outline is the one I’m trying to make.
The Democratic Piece » Fixing Iraq’s party system: Take two on 22 Apr 2008 at 11:27 am #
[...] week I argued for open-endorsement SNTV in governorate-wide districts. Under that system, parties would have [...]