A few things on Morocco

My pal Shadi Hamid at Democracy Arsenal, who is trying his best to become an ex-pal, recently posted some comments on the political situation in Morocco. Among his points are that the main obstacle to democracy in Morocco problem is the King, and that the PJD is simply going to be more pro-regime with new Sec-Gen Abdelilah Benkirane. Along the way, he calls U.S. democracy efforts “cosmetic” and singles out a particular program working with the Moroccan Parliament… which happens to be a program I am familiar with (Shadi – why don’t you come to Morocco and see what these programs are really about? Or are you afraid that once you leave the Mashrik for the Maghrib you’ll never go back…).

Indeed, the greatest hindrance to democracy is the institution of the Monarchy, no matter how liberal a particular king may be. Sure, the country has been changing, as one of your readers suggests, but not a single ounce of power has shifted hands in the past 9 years. The presence of the Monarchy, which can only be criticized by some people on some occasions when they do not cross a vaguely pronounced line, and the political institutions it has set up, prevent real opposition from taking shape.

The “serious effort” required to make structural changes in Morocco is possible. Change often requires crisis, so imagine the U.S. attacks Iran. If the supply of oil is cut short and Morocco’s energy prices soar, food prices continue to soar, and more revelations of makhzenian lands being sold for well below market prices come to bear, then we have the recipe for a political opportunity. When opposition parties find it in their interest to confront the sources of power, they will do so. Of course, getting to that point is difficult…

From my standpoint, you are partially correct about Benkirane: he’s an ultra-social conservative who is considered a “moderate.” But I do not think he is a “moderate” simply because he has a “non-confrontational” attitude towards the Monarchy. Rather, Benkirane is what I call a “strategic hardliner.” In other words, he’s a hardliner who is moderate in his strategic outlook. His opinions change with what he considers to be politically feasible at the time; an opportunist, not simply a monarchist. Benkirane’s downfall is that he does not understand that he can’t just contradict himself whenever he feels like it and expect people to believe him. If PJD’ers cannot figure out why they can’t convince more former supporters of the Left who want good governance to vote for them, then they don’t have much further to look. There is a good reason that Moroccans can’t figure out what the PJD stands for. In any event, the ascension of Benkirane to the SG of the PJD hardly means the “end of opposition.” If anything, Benkirane is likely to take some real risks as party head, which should come as a welcome change to the risk averse Othmani.

On your characterization of the U.S.’ democracy promotion efforts, I’d suggest a retraction of your statement. A number of the DG programs here, despite the insane obstacles that they face, have done some pretty good work. Sometimes the linkages made and obstacles offset through such programs play decisive roles in helping agents of change find one another and learn to work together. Democracy promotion is not a mechanism for forcing structural change upon other countries, especially other countries that you are allied with. Sure, it would be nice if the Bush administration would be a bit more helpful and a bit less hypocritical, but that is not something that DG implementers can affect. So, please refrain from thinking about the work that DG implementers do on the ground as being tools of foreign policy. Sure, the money for these projects may come from the administration, but many of the implementers I know here try their best to capitalize on a notion that most of the world can agree upon; that democracy is a good thing.

By the way, how’s that PhD coming along?!