Facing the Democracy/Security Distinction
The conflict in Georgia returns us to the familiar topic of democracy losing out to security considerations. It is argued that Western powers—most especially the United States—lacked the will and means to defend Georgia’s fledgling democracy in its moment of peril.
The debate is not new; in a much different context, Jeane Kirkpatrick famously argued that the Carter administration erred in its focus on “human rights” at the expense of national security.
Does the democracy/security distinction remain appropriate? Robert Kagan does not think so. Kagan contends that the division between democracy promotion and national security has been erased by the shift in foreign policy demanded by the attacks of 9/11.
Kagan’s point is highly debatable. But the debate is essential for the future relevance of democracy promotion. While no systematic ideology challenges Western-style democracy, autocrats from Caracas to Moscow have used energy resources to push back—often thuggishly—against the advance of liberal movements. As they do so, these leaders are also increasingly aggressive with neighboring countries, threatening the stability of their regions.
The role of “soft” democracy promotion in both developing countries and established democracies remains clear: the training of journalists, election monitoring, education reform, and so on.
But such efforts make little sense when democratic reforms are under attack by autocratic rulers (what good would education reform do in an occupied Georgia?) Unfortunately “hard” democracy promotion has been too quickly dismissed as neoconservative nonsense, weighed down by the war in Iraq. Democracy promoters must now explain why security and democratic ideals are intertwined in our relations with autocracies and the regions they threaten.
If democracy promotion is to be taken seriously in an increasingly volatile world, if it is to influence foreign policy decisions and security considerations, then those promoting democracy must confidently answer the following question: If nations such as Georgia deserve our support when they are building democratic institutions, how are we to respond when the very same institutions are threatened by Russian tanks?
Instead of lamenting the fall of a nascent democratic nation, democracy promoters must propose real policy solutions. The US cannot militarily intervene every time a democracy is threatened, nor should it. But what, exactly, should be done?
Jack on 03 Sep 2008 at 11:17 am #
Georgia is a foreign policy question that soft democracy promotion practitioners perhaps cannot nor should not work on. The immediate fall of that nascent - and weak; see posts here about democratically iffy institutional tinkering in Georgia - democracy resulted from an invasion, not any internal process of backslide. There may not have been anything for the “democracy community” to do in Georgia.
Sadder headlines notwithstanding, there is still a role for soft democracy promotion in this world. Freedom is not in retreat everywhere, and not every new democracy stares down the barrel of a great power’s gun. Further, there are more unstable democracies than consolidated ones.
Narrowly understood, democracy has universal appeal. People want to influence decisions about who will run their lives. In most parts of the world, then, soft democracy promotion designed to build opposition capacities is still relevant.
And ideas also matter. While the Framers’ motives for establishing our own democracy may have had roots in wallets and stomachs, ideas drove development of the world’s most stable democratic constitution. Equally important, ideas drove popular demand for the American Revolution and subsequent democratization of the United States.
It is difficult to prescribe a pill we do not ourselves take, however. Larry Diamond, Tom Melia and Eric Bjornlund often raise or at least allude to this point. Those who believe in democracy enough to promote it abroad should from time to time turn inward. Democratic ideals look hollow to other countries when the ‘model democracy’ doesn’t live up to them. Chinese and Russian dictators can undercut our soft strategies with references to gerrymandering, popular vote reversals, two-party duopoly, idiotic babble masquerading as campaigns, persistent racial inequality and voter suppression tactics.
Denis argues the question is now incumbent: how and why is international democracy integral to national security?
Another question is incumbent: how and why is continuation of the American democratic revolution integral to the international democratic revolution? Rather than giving up on soft strategies, taking that issue seriously might partly renew them.