Thanks for the comments – as always you bring a lot to the table. Just want to post a quick response.

First, with regards to the missile defense system, I don’t agree that using it as a bargaining chip with Russia won’t work. Russia has been very vocally opposed and while they could undoubtedly overwhelm the proposed missile defense system in a matter of seconds, it appears it is none-the-less an issue of national pride/interests for Russia. As an aspiring superpower, Russia is opposed to the system (and NATO expansion) because both undermine its authority and influence in its near-abroad. The missile system in question isn’t aimed at limited Russia’s ability to launch nuclear missiles and kill us – as stated, it’s woefully inadequate to do so – but what it does (intentionally or unintentionally) is reinforce America’s presence in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.

Second, regarding NATO expansion, I think you’re right. It’s fairly obvious to see we’re not that interested in incorporating Ukraine and Georgia. If we had a credible commitment to doing so (such as we do with missile defense – we signed agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic), it might be more effective as leverage.

Third, I think we might just disagree about the likelihood of nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East should Iran attain a weapon. Perhaps it won’t be as widespread as my post implies, but I don’t see Saudi Arabia, for example, allowing Iran to become a nuclear power without also taking steps to attain nuclear weapons as well.

With regards to diplomacy, my suggestions do not contain any direct diplomacy with Iran but my first suggestion is diplomacy with Russia. I don’t think Iran will launch a nuclear warhead at Israel…but I disagree with you that Iran is simply pursuing weapons to keep “the U.S. and Israel” off their backs and is thus “dissuadable” from their nuclear project. In fact, most intelligence shows that uranium enrichment sped up during President Khatami’s tenure in office while the Clinton administration was making serious efforts at negotiation. Simply put, I think that Iran would use “negotiations” as a cover to continue pursuit of HEU (highly-enriched uranium), so that when negotiations failed it would be too late to prevent them from putting together a nuclear weapon.

Just to clarify, I think on this particular issue negotiations will be ineffective. That does not mean I disagree with engaging Iran diplomatically on other issues – such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas where we both have “similar” interests.

Just a few additions . . .

1. Creating a basic fission weapon (like the one we dropped on Hiroshima) is not that hard once you have sufficient quantities of HEU. Developing a warhead small enough and light enough to mount onto, say, a ballistic missile (another Iranian program under close watch) is another matter. Whether or not Iran needs an advanced nuclear capability, or just a basic one, to keep the U.S. and Israel off it’s back is debatable. But Iran, assuming it crosses the threshold, has every incentive to maximize its capability. It will take a lot of work – and a long time – for it to figure out how to design a warhead small enough to mount onto a missile.

2. The notion of using the proposed missile defense system in Europe as a potential bargaining chip with Russia doesn’t jive with the U.S.’s stated position that this system has no bearing on Russia, which, supposedly, can overwhelm any system the U.S. constructs. Surely Russia can overwhelm a system if it launches first, but it gets a little trickier when Russia has to consider launching a retaliatory strike after another nuclear megapower (guess who) hits it first. Scary thought, but someone in Russia has to consider it, and certainly they do. The point is that the U.S. has consistently stated that the missile defense system in Europe doesn’t effect Russia, so to use it as a bargaining chip now basically admits that we were lying – although, frankly, we were. Besides, Russia has created new capabilities of its own to bargain with, so even if we could leverage missile defense restraint in a deal, it might not get us a hell of a lot on Iran because we will have to spend our bargaining capital on other issues such as the tactical nukes Russia is relying on to an increasing degree.

3. NATO expansion is another idea, but I think Russia can see that there’s a very finite amount of interest in the U.S. and parts of Europe in pursuing this, so I don’t think it gives us a ton of bargaining power either.

4. Proliferation throughout the middle east, even if Iran gets the bomb, is not so inevitable. The “cascade effect” sounds cool, but there’s not a ton of evidence to support it – and I think that states are less likely to go all-out for a nuke than is often assumed. True, there is India-Pakistan, but that’s one dyad. It’s certainly possible that there will be rampant proliferation in the Middle East after Iran goes nuclear, but I would not put the odds at above 50%, especially not with some semi-skilled U.S. diplomacy and strategy.

Speaking of that diplomacy, the one thing missing from all of this is dealing with the problem at its source. And whether or not you have options there depends upon what you think Iran wants to do with a bomb. If you think it wants to destroy Israel and that’s it, then you have very little reason to negotiate because Iran’s position is fixed. If, on the other hand, you think that Iran wants the bomb to keep from being attacked, then you have a lot more options.