Who is on What Side in Iran?

Amir Taheri has a great article on the Iranian “movers and shakers” and where the splits are occurring.

Definitely worth reading if you are trying to understand Iran.

The ultimate conclusion, in my opinion, is that no one knows and that what we’re seeing is a “tie” between the opponents and hardliners.  A tie, however, goes to the regime since they control the guns, the majority of the IRGC, the technology to stop opposition activity and organization, and the basij.

The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980’s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980’s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Escalation in Iran

No matter what news is reporting, events in Iran are grim.

It started with the now-infamous, cold-blooded murderof Neda Agha Soltan, captured on film for the world to see.

Now, there are reports of mass beatings, use of tear gas and snipers picking off protesters as an intimidation tactic.  For an example of the situation, listen to this interview from two Iranian women who managed to escape.  As they point out, the regime’s thugs do not discriminate between women and men, young and old.  If you stand in their way, you will feel the baton of the state on your head.  In Iran, going to the hospital is akin to walking to your death.  Chances are the authorities won’t even let you make it to the hospital…and if you do, you probably won’t leave.

The regime is also doing its best to control the movements of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader.  Not seen for almost a week, Mousavi posts occasionally on his newspapers website reaffirminghis dedication to challenging the rigged election engineered by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, considered by many the leading Shi’a scholar alive today (perhaps behind only Grand Ayatollah Sistani), also continues to issue statements attacking the regime and Khamenei for their brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators and the theft of the election.

Make no mistake, the situation is getting worse as the government deploys its forces to prevent large gathers and intimidate protests back into the silent acquiescence that defined “Islamic” governance to this point.  The most frustrating aspect of the Iran situation is that there is nothing we can do but hope and pray for the protection of those fighting for their freedom and for a different future.

I don’t know about you, but that does not seem like it is enough.

Winning the Hearts and Minds of the IRGC

Laura Secor has an interesting analysis over at the New Yorker.  She contends that the protesters are using tactics to make it hard for the IRGC and the basiji’s, charged with protecting the Islamic Republic, to attack them.  In her words:

The purpose of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij is the defense of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader. Rarely have the true believers in the militias been forced to consider the possibility that these two functions might come into conflict. Such a moment may have arrived. It is one thing to unleash brutal force on crowds that insult the Leader or Islam. That was how the members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij could defend their assault on demonstrators at Tehran University in 1999. But now, in the name of Ahmadinejad’s controversial presidency, they are being asked to violently disperse fellow Iranians who are chanting religious slogans, carrying Korans, and calling for the lawful counting of their votes. Whether or not the rumors of splits at the top of the Revolutionary Guards’ hierarchy are true, the rank and file is not necessarily monolithic.

As the above shows, the rank and file IRGC now find themselves between an Ayatollah and a hard place.  If they crackdown on the protesters on behalf of Ahmadinejad, could they possibly be selling out the Islamic Republic?  I agree with her that it’s crucial for the demonstrators/opposition to neutralize the IRGC, however, her analysis fails to mention that the IRGC is particularly wedded to the current regime economically.

Under Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the IRGC received more no-bid grants and control over the economy than ever before.  That doesn’t even include the millions the IRGC receives from the government under the nuclear enrichment program.  Even should there be an ideological conflict regarding the interests of the Islamic Republic, the financial interests of the IRGC commanders (and often mid-level officers) is very clear.

Considering this fact, the real question is: how well trained is the IRGC? Will they follow orders (since the upper brass is financially invested in the current regime) or will each member think for himself?

Who are the Basiji?

The Basiji’s have received a lot of media attention as of late.  Yet, the majority of the analysis that I’ve seen has not truly described the organization.  Fortunately, Jon Lee Anderson at the New Yorker wrote a small but accurate analysis a few days ago about the origins and purpose of the basij.

Key section:

Instead, bearded plainclothes militiamen have been attacking and harassing the demonstrators in Tehran this past week. These are Basijis, members of a civilian paramilitary organization founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. It was conceived of as a civilian auxiliary force subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards, and so it has functioned over the past three decades. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, fervent Basijis volunteered to serve on the front lines. For a time, very young Basijis were encouraged to offer themselves for martyrdom by clearing minefields with their bodies in what became known as “human waves”—literally walking to their deaths en masse so that more experienced soldiers could advance against the enemy…

In peacetime, the corps lets the Islamic regime employ violence as a form of social control while retaining some plausible deniability; scruffy bearded men in civilian clothes are not, after all, uniformed soldiers. The Basij is now said to have some 400,000 active members nationwide, with perhaps a million more reservists; in some ways, their relationship to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is also their commander in chief, recalls the one between Nicolae Ceausescu and the loyalist miners trucked in from the Romanian countryside to strong-arm pro-democracy protestors. From 1997 to 2005, during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the Basij showed its usefulness again, by attacking students at demonstrations. Some students were killed. The protests died out.

…During the past four years, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president and the reform movement dormant, the Basij has not been needed as shock troops. Instead they have made their presence felt by periodically throwing up traffic barricades on the streets of Tehran and stopping cars to smell the breath of drivers for evidence of illegal alcohol consumption, or to question couples about their marital status. These Basijis are usually scruffy working-class men, and thus bring an element of notional “class struggle” to the otherwise pragmatically lived lives of the citizens of the Islamic republic. Not surprisingly, among more educated and affluent Iranians, they are almost unanimously despised.

Now, the basij are once again being used as shock troops, praying on straggling protesters, invading University dorms, intimidating families of protesters, and controlling the streets of Iran to try and limit the size of the demonstrations.

Khamenei Doubles Down…and the Crackdown Starts

In his speech the other day, Supreme Leader Khamenei reemphasized that Ahmadinejad won the election.  Period.

He also warned that any bloodshed would be the responsibility of the protesters.  In Iran, that is an implicit threat that there WILL be bloodshed if the protests do not stop.  Hopefully the affect of that speech is to push protesters who were just out against the vote rigging/against Ahmadinejad to being against the system.  Khamenei’s attachment to Ahmadinejad and the ultra-conservative movement might be what it takes to completely delegitimize the “Islamic Republic” in the eyes of most people – and might plant the seeds of a revolution (which I do not consider this to be yet – though a coup d’etat from within does seem appropriate).

The danger is that Khamenei’s speech will cause Mousavi to do what Khatami did in 2005 – back down and tell the demonstrators to return to their homes.  The question remains: is Mousavi willing to topple the regime?  The answer will become evident in the coming days.

While many claim the movement is much larger than Mousavi, the movement is depending on Mousavi’s leadership and bravery to motivate a wider audience and create larger marches.  Should he defect, I am almost positive that the protests, demonstrations and marches will end as well.

Today, violence is increasing according to reports.  The basiji are out in huge numbers prowling the streets, viot police are controlling most of the large intersections and surrounding universities to stop students from joining the protests.  The imminent crackdown that we’ve mentioned earlier (and that Guardian and Michael Totten caught on to) is happening now.

Say a prayer (if you believe in that) or do whatever you can.  The protesters will need everything we can offer them.

1979 Redux?

There is an interesting, ongoing conversation online between bloggers, academics and policy wonks over who will “win.”  There are two camps in this argument: 

The first believe that the experiences of the current regime (Ahmadineja, Khamenei, etc) during the 1979 Revolution prepare them for what is happening now.  These experiences, proponents argue, suggest that the regime will survive because they know EXACTLY how revolutions occur.  The signs of an upcoming crackdown to prevent such a revolution are increasing (see here, here and here) and the regime has all the guns.  These facts (experience, weaponry and willingness to use it) make the chance of an opposition victory small.

The second camp argues that, while the regime has experience with revolutions, so too do the demonstrators and opposition leaders (Mousavi, Karroubi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, etc).  In fact, these individuals were integral in bringing down the Shah in 1979, making them more able to successfully pull off another revolution against the current government (see here and here).  In addition, the method of pursuing the demonstrations, including silent marches, days of mourning, and shouts of “Allah o Akbar” from rooftops, makes it hard for the regime to mobilize its armed forces and security apparatus against the people.

I hope the protesters win out but I am afraid they won’t.  Sorry that’s not very useful, but it’s the truth. 

What tilts me towards thinking they have a chance (of at least getting rid of Ahmadinejad), is the fact that current Iranian culture glorifies victimization.  As a result, beating or killing people rarely succeeds in quieting the crowds (see my earlier post for a similar point or Juan Cole’s analysis here).  Rather, making the protesters the victim of government oppression simply reinforces their belief that they must stand up against the government. 

It’s a terrifying way to think about the situation, but I don’t think it’s wrong.  Reza Aslan points out  how martyrdom, and the mourning of those martyrs in a culture such as Iran’s, affects a revolution (and how it worked in 1979):

….you have these massive mourning rallies, where you mourn the deaths of those who were martyred in the cause of freedom. And these things tend to get a little bit out of control, they often result in even more violence by the security forces and even more deaths, which then requires another mourning rally which is even larger, which then requires more violence from the government, and this just becomes an ongoing snowball that can’t be stopped.

The Guardian reported that today’s marches were bigger than the last.

Strong, Level-Headed Analysis from Experts

For those following the Iran situation, read over this short piece.  It’s basically the argument, as made by several Iran experts, for why we shouldn’t be calling what is happening in Iran a revolution.

I agree with them for the most part- though I’m not sure the IRGC would sell out Ahmadinejad.  I guess we’ll see.

Irony is Wonderful (Iran)

Click here to see how large the protests today were.

Of course, I read some speculation on Twitter that one possible reason for the enormous number of people protesting is the unemployment rate (generally agreed to be somewhere between 17% to 22% by experts). 

Unemployment among Iranian youth and women is even higher than general unemployment (some sources claim that over 30% of Iranian youth and women are unemployed).  And Mousavi had a great deal of support among these two groups before he was elected (or so it was reported).

Suppose you were unemployed and blamed that fact on Ahmadinejad’s (mis)handling of the economy.  What would you do? (Hint: watch the video).

Figures.

Apparently, the regime (or Ahmadinejad’s people…is there much difference at this point?) have been editing pictures of rallies held in support of Ahmadinejad to make them look bigger.

We shouldn’t be surprised.  The regime has done this before to “augment” their power (think: rocket launches).