The Democratic Piece

Kyrgyzstan had a fraudulent parliamentary election on Sunday, according to the OSCE. As in Russia, the strongman’s party won a lion’s share of seats under a new list PR system (5% threshold).

Russia dumped its mixed system for list PR before elections earlier this month. Kyrgyzstan recently passed constitutional amendments, one of which abolished a single-member district plurality system.

Like Russia, Kyrgyzstan also made it harder for small parties to get on the ballot.

Unlike in Russia, the supreme court is reviewing changes to the electoral law.

Other Russia’s blog reproduces Garry Kasparov’s WSJ op-ed here. From rigging the election system to tossing out OSCE poll monitors, Putin has made December 2’s Duma elections as competitive as a US presidential nominating convention.

So why is Mr. Putin so scared if things are going so well? He is a rational and pragmatic person, not prone to melodrama. He knows the numbers, so why the heavy and heavy-handed campaigning if he knows he and United Russia are going to win? The answer is that he is very aware of how brittle his power structure has become. Instead of sounding like a Tsar, high above the crowd, he’s beginning to sound like just another nervous autocrat. As George Bernard Shaw wrote, “The most anxious man in a prison is the governor.”

Kasparov spent 5 days in jail this week for demonstrating. He leads The Other Russia, a conglomeration of opposition parties contesting next week’s parliamentary elections. Over the past few months, the situation for parties like Other Russia has gotten gradually worse - from an engineered voting system to prohibitive ballot access rules to outright repression.

Garry Kasparov is spending five days in jail for protesting Russia’s new ballot access law, Richard Winger reports. Kasparov is leader of The Other Russia, a confederation of opposition parties.

He’s in near total isolation, unable to see relatives and colleagues or even make a phone call.

Other Russia runs a blog on a dot-org, so we’ll still hear from them after thugs shut down the .ru page.

High-five to the Russian opposition. Responding to an earlier post by Danny, I asked how parties would respond to the new institutional environment - especially a 7% threshold and needing 50,000 members for ballot status. What’s more, Putin rendered retail politics nearly useless by eliminating single-member districts last summer. Other Russia is clearly a strategy for dealing with these hurdles.

Sorry we’ve been so quiet. The end of semester looms, and it’s been a week for catching up, especially after last weekend’s Claim Democracy conference. I attended some sessions, reconnected with old colleagues, met a reader and had dinner with one of Election Day’s IRV victors.

Russia meanwhile has refused visas to OSCE election monitors. Not that being able to announce fraud would matter much. The electoral system - from party registration to seat allocation - is basically rigged.

Denmark last week held an election combining list PR with SMD-style nominations.

Slightly dated but no less important, a report out of York University asks why Ontarians rejected MMP last month. The so-called “bads” (evil list tier, bigger legislature) outweighed the goods (especially the citizens’ assembly process). A model predicts MMP would have won with 63% (well above the mandated threshold) had information been more full.

The Onion, America’s Finest News Source, reports that political scientists announce that they have discovered a new form of government: Megalocracy. I think we have a clear front runner for next years Nobel Prize race.

Russia is gearing up for its election season this winter. The Duma, Russia’s legislature, will stand for election in December and Russia is set to elect a new president in March. As I’ve noted on the DP before, democracy in Russia is on life support. Regional governors are no longer elected, the activity of civil society organizations have been curtailed by new laws and registration requirements, long-standing parties have been denied registration, and the independent media has slowly been consumed by the Russian state or Kremlin allies.

While there is little doubt that the upcoming elections will fail to meet international standards and the results will strengthen the Kremlin’s hand, much can be gleaned from the process. The manner in which these elections are carried out will tell outsiders to what extent the Kremlin will go to solidify its hold on power.

Furthermore, the Putin-succession process adds to the drama of the election season. While some observers think that Putin’s recent announcement that he would agree to head the party list for United Russia may indicate Putin’s intention to redirect power to the prime minister’s office, I doubt that is likely to occur. I still believe that Vladimir has a few more twists and turns up his sleeves in the coming months.

I’m going to try and post some interesting stories related to this process during the next few months. While I can’t promise daily commentary, I’ll try to at least link to interesting stories in the press and posts from other blogs.

There are a few interesting stories today that are worth pointing out:

• Carnegie’s Morning Brief links to a NYTimes story detailing the Kremlin’s attempt to further extend government control over the Internet. The take away from this article, besides increased state control, is the extent that the Kremlin is using “pro-Putin” youth group to counter opposition groups, even in blog coverage of protest events.
• In the lead up to the parliamentary elections, the Russian government has reached an “agreement” with food producers and retailers to institute a freeze on prices. Inflation and price increases in basic foodstuffs in recent weeks has made the Kremlin uneasy. After all, when your legitimacy is tenuous when basing your legitimacy on circuses and bread, and the bread is too expensive.
• Pro-Putin demonstrations have recently taken place across the country. The events, allegedly organized by state officials, are urging Putin to stay on as president after his second term ends in March. The take-away: the extent of the cult of personality around Putin is strong. Don’t be surprised to see a “grass-roots” movement seek to change the constitution or pressure Putin’s successor to step down.
• Eleven parties have been approved by the Election Commission to contest in the December elections. Three parties were barred because of problems with the membership signatures turned into the Election Commission for registration. The take-away: eleven parties is a significant amount. Given Russia’s new PR electoral system with a 7% threshold to enter the Duma, this could lead to an utter sweep by United Russia, the pro-Putin party of power. A recent opinion poll stated that approximately 66% of voters plan to vote for United Russia in December.
• Lastly, the Russian Election Commission announced that Russia will invite international observers for the December 2 parliamentary elections. The invitations will be sent out this week and the delegation is expected to reach 400 people. The take-away: While it is good that Russia is finally inviting the monitors, it is too late for any meaningful oversight to be implemented. Obersvation missions typically have a smaller group that observes and analyzes the pre-election evironment and election process months in advance of election day. Additionally, this mission will be signiciantly smaller than previous missions. For the 2003 parliamentary elections the OSCE sent 400 observers alone. The 400 this time will include observers from the OSCE and the Nordic Council, along with the shame election monitoring organizations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced today that following the referendum approving a new constitution, he would dissolve parliament and call for new elections under the new electoral code.

Jack posted some thoughts on Sunday regarding the constitutional referendum in Kyrgyzstan. Bonnie Boyd over at the Foreign Policy Association’s Central Asia blog also provides some good commentary (Note: Anyone interested in Central Asia should regularly read Bonnie’s blog. She provides great coverage and analysis of all things Central Asia - economics, culture, foreign policy, politics, environment, etc. She’s much more than the one-trick pony than I am.)

I am a bit more skeptical about this power play by Bakiev than Jack. I think this is a pretty blatant move by Bakiev to reconsolidate power within the presidency. Bonnie notes that perhaps attempts to increase transparency may be more beneficial for increasing both political stability and economic growth. I think that is the wrong approach because the lack of transparency is rooted in the political structures of Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, the changes in the new constitution do little to address this fact. Instead, the new constitution will probably result in the consolidation of power by Bakiev and a more authoritarian-style of government. An argument could be made that a more authoritarian government that is more stable will provide better growth, but I will not be the one making it and I doubt it will do much for transparency either (not that Bonnie is arguing this either).

I think that three important points have been underplayed in the coverage of this story: the sitting parliament was corrupt / illegitimate, the weakness of parties is one of the major impediments to further democratization in Kyrgyzstan, and the institutions and rules established by the new constitution could be used by Bakiev to establish his own single-party dominant pseudo-democracy.

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Writing for Brookings, Georgetown’s Steven Heydemann notes that Arab authortiarian regimes are upgrading their survivability toolkit with implications for democracy promotion approaches.
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Kyrgyz voters today are considering a referendum to strengthen the executive and centralize legislative elections. President Bakiev aims to break gridlock by gaining control over the ousted Askar Akayev’s residuals in parliament.
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As Russia gears up for Duma elections on December 2, the opposition squeeze continues. What’s interesting: Putin’s use of institutional change to entrench a power grab. Term-limited, he cannot legally seek the presidency again. Rather than breaking the law, it seems, Putin plans to keep power by changing it.
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