It is also likely to enrage the Chinese authorities, who deny that they censor the Internet and are accustomed to having major foreign companies adapt their practices to Chinese norms.

Sorry, but censorship is not a “Chinese norm.” It is a strategy that authoritarian regimes deliberately use to impede collective action for political change. The slippery use of “norm” smacks of a common problem in sloppy cultural argumentation. Sure, culture matters. Culture is useful, for example, when categorizing actors’ exogenous preferences without time to probe them more deeply. Sometimes culture manifests as a norm, or an ‘informal’ rule of interaction (i.e. an institution). Used in this way, “norm” implies that the rule is highly particular – that it has characteristics identifying it with one or another society. But, in China, we are dealing with neither culture nor norm. Plenty of actors in plenty of societies have used censorship and control: President Tandja in Niger, Stalin in Russia, and Woodrow Wilson in our own country.

Hats off to Google for dumping its search query censorship, which the company began in 2006 to curry business favor with the regime. (H/T to the UN Wire.)

In his address the President hailed Mustafa Kemal’s legacy which manifests in “…Turkey’s strong and secular democracy.” What repercussions might this appraisal for Turkey’s democratic experiment yield? Or as I mentioned in the title, how do we move “Beyond Ankara?” Turkey might be one of the more liberalized regimes in the Middle East, and a good choice in comparison to other Muslim States. But it is far from becoming a complete democracy.

In a book titled The Politics of the Middle East, Monte Palmer asserts, “Turkey has produced a very complex society that is struggling to balance secularism with its Islamic faith, democracy with the desire for security and statism with economic liberalization.” (2007, p.322). Palmer’s characterization of the “Turkish dilemma” is not distinctive. Arab autocratic regimes, for example, are faced with a similar conundrum, albeit with varying intensity.

Perhaps the most prevalent feature of Turkish political culture is the endurance of the so-called “deep state,” which manifests in the subservience of civil government to the military, and in the dispensation of upper echelons in other security agencies and the judiciary from regulations mandated by elected officials. Both Turkey and Arab States suffer from a lack of separation between “public” and “private”; a phenomenon coupled with the obfuscated relationship between “military” and “civil.” And like Turkey, most Arab populist and monarchist regimes hold elections, allow some room for free press, and claim to heed criticism from the opposition. One difference between both Turkey and Arab States vests in how regimes respond to actions deemed unfavorable. In the case of elections for example, it is not uncommon for Arab regimes to gerrymander, while in Turkey, the military has tended to initiate coups or pressure the judiciary to ostracize undesired political parties from partaking in elections.

Another distinct feature of Turkish politics is its adaptation of secularism, sometimes referred to as “Kemalist” secularism. Without dwelling on the intricacies of secularism, in the broadest sense, it is perceived as the separation of Church and State. Kemalist secularism elected to integrate Islam as a subordinate to state structures. In fact the secular nature of Turkey’s limited democracy, which the President praised in his speech, augments a major construct of Turkish political culture: the preservation of the deep state as opposed to consolidating democracy. And it is this strain of political culture that the United States must stand up to.

In his inaugural address President Obama warned despots across the world, “…know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” This message gave hope to the many disquieted people across the Muslim world. In a way it relieved them of fears that the US would no longer support organic efforts to create more free and just societies. I know that it is in the Muslim World’s interest to push for more reliable democratization efforts. If the US abandons moderate and opposition groups in the wider Islamic world, it may be impossible to  revive these relationships again. I fervently hope that the President realizes that pursuing the democratic agenda in the Islamic world, serves the long-term interests of the United States as well.

This article in MacLeans challenges that assertion. It also questions the future of democracy…something a bit more worrying. (It’s a relatively long article, but definitely worth a read).

The author starts by talking about the end of Huntington’s Third Wave of democratization. To frequent readers of this blog (and most democracy literature) this comes as no shock. Indeed, the Third Wave is pretty much considered closed by most academics and professionals in the democracy field.

He then posits his evidence: the rise of China and Russia – liberal economy, closed political as alternative options for countries (and leaders) who loathe the idea of implementing democratic institutions that limit their power. He also refers to Hugo Chavez’s successes at undermining democratic institutions in Venezuela and the rise of political Islamism in the Middle East.

The lack of hugely repressive measures, the author argues, is further evidence of the ideological strength of these regimes. While Russia is notorious for silencing independent journalists critical of the regime; even though China continually develops new and fascinating ways of identifying and detaining protestors (remember the Olympics?); and while Hugo Chavez threatens to use tanks against regions that don’t vote for the candidate he supports (thankfully he never did that), the regimes engage in much less oppression than their Soviet predecessors.

The author cites two reasons for the decreased repressive measures: 1) nationalism (which I’ll get in to below), and 2) satisfaction: i.e. the majority of people are satisfied with the system of governance. They are willing to trade their political involvement for economic development, stability and order.

In my view, while the “satisfaction” factor is important, the real reason these non-democratic countries have decreased the use of repressive measures is the rise of nationalism/political Islamism. It is these two ideologies that are the real threat to democracy in the 21st century. And strangely enough, they’re not that different…

Islamism shares much with nationalism. Both rely on identity. Both hearken back to the “glorious past” as a means of mobilization. Both gain legitimacy through empowering the nation and raising the stature of the people and the country. And both co-opt the language of politics. What I mean by the last is that nationalism and political Islamism, when inflamed, have the power to fundamentally alter the political discourse. Candidates no longer talk about who will provide the best services for their people or who will pursue the best macro-economic policy. Rather, the election turns on the issue of state grandeur (or weakness at the hands of the incumbent) or moral bankruptcy and betrayal of Islamic principles as caused by the illegitimate government.

No doubt, in both cases the party (or parties) utilizing the language of nationalism or Islamism to oppose the incumbents gained credibility and legitimacy through the provision of services and other benefits the State failed to deliver for the people (example: Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon or Putin in Russia), but their raison d’etre goes beyond improving government for citizens…and it shows when, even failing to provide for their people and develop their countries, the popularity and legitimacy of the governments remains intact.

The author recognizes the role that these powerful forces play in the survival of the non-democratic regime but simply mentions it as another (among many) factor responsible for the trend.

But look at the evidence. Russian’s support Putin because he managed to deliver what Yeltsin and the democratic leaders failed to deliver: a sense of pride. Russian’s finally feel their nation is given the respect it deserves after a decade and a half of Western suppression. This accounts for the numerous trips abroad to countries such as Venezuela and Iran: Russia is attempting to flex its muscles and show it is, once again, a global power that needs to be taken seriously.

China is much the same. After decades of regional and global unimportance, the Chinese are reclaiming their status as the Middle Kingdom (meaning, the middle of the world). China’s recent anger over the criticisms voiced over the Olympic “problems”, and their continual issues relating to Tibet and Taiwan (both supported by popular opinion), are great examples of the importance of nationalism in supporting the government.

In Venezuela, Chavez has retained power through nationalist rhetoric that earns him (and his country) global and regional relevance. His ability to give the “super power” to the North the finger, and still survive, alone makes him attractive to many Venezuelans.

It’s clear, then, that the allure of nationalism/political Islamism is great, but is it sustainable?

My opinion is no. Much like communism, when given the power to govern, political Islamism and nationalism will both lose their luster. Of course, as with communism, it might take a long time.

So while Fukuyama’s predication of the impending global victory of democracy is proven false, I do not think that his basic premise is wrong. No ideology has as yet arisen that can challenge democracy as communism once did. Whether one will develop remains to be seen, but I do not think nationalism and/or political Islamism fill those shoes.

Update: A reader brought to my attention that political Islamism is not opposed to a democratic model.  The comment correctly forces me to clarify my meaning.  Neither nationalism nor political Islamism are threats to democracy because they are not systems of governance.  Rather, in an ideological sense, they can, and in the contemporary world often are, used to undermine democratic governments and prop up non-democratic leaders (ie Russia, China, Venezuela). 

Thus my point is that governments basing their legitimacy on nationalism or political Islamism as opposed to the legitimacy inherent in democracy (individual sovereignty, improved livelihood, service delivery) will prove unable to seriously challenge democracy over time (long time most likely).

Last April, it appeared Mugabe was in a bind. He was losing a presidential election, and the South African judiciary was blocking $1.2 million in Chinese guns from entering his repressive arsenal. There were rumors in state news of a “national unity government.” Later on, Botswana’s Seretse Khama led regional rejection of Mugabe’s “win.” The pressure was on from multiple fronts, and the only thing holding Mugabe in place was his ability to maintain the loyalty of the military.

At first glance, this is a Kenya-style solution: invent a prime ministership, inflate cabinet, split the spoils. While the NY Times is light on details and slightly optimistic, Le Monde spells it out:

1. Tsvangirai gets the new title of Prime Minister;
2. Cabinet is now 31 members large;
3. Mugabe gets to name 15 members;
4. Tsvangirai gets to name 13;
5. a “dissident faction” of the opposition, led by Arthur Mutambara, names the remaining 3 members;
6. and Mugabe gets to keep the National Security Council, which covers the army, police and secret service.

The Financial Times disagrees a bit on that last point, nonetheless offering an insightfully sober analysis:

Who controls the security portfolios will be critical to restoration of confidence. It appears that Mr Mugabe will control the army, and Mr Tsvangirai the police and justice ministry. That might work, but all those institutions are currently controlled by Zanu-PF loyalists. They cannot be purged overnight.

It appears that the MDC will get the most important economic jobs in the cabinet, although that could be a poisoned chalice if swift action proves impossible to stabilise the economy and revive the vital farm sector. The task would be daunting for a united government: it could prove overwhelming for one divided by years of intimidation and rivalry.

The important question is whether Mugabe will use the army to repress opposition activity. On that, the Times offers this bit of inconclusive insight:

Talking about the negotiations that led to the agreement, Mr. Mugabe also said there were “lots of things in the agreement that I don’t like, and still don’t like.”

However, he said, “we are all Zimbabweans and is there any other road, any other route to follow? History makes us walk the same route.”

Friedman cites the Freedom House index for 2008. Attention to where and why ratings fell reveals a more complex causal narrative.

Military interventions in democratic politics drove down ratings in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Faulty, stolen or generally unfree elections affected the Comorros, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Russia.

Political violence rocked Sri Lanka, Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Insurgency or generally rising insecurity eroded freedom in the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Afghanistan.

Media crackdowns drove down ratings in Georgia, Mali, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela and, arguably, the Solomon Islands, where governing authorities refused to address criticism related to a cabinet appointment.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and organization increased in Burma, Lesotho and Venezuela.

Whether by violence, intimidation or dubious institutional reengineering, executives eroded checks and balances in Malawi, Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Egypt.

Overt opposition crackdowns took place in Congo-Kinshasa, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Corruption and the entrenchment of economic oligarchies diminished freedom in Chad, Latvia, the Philippines, Tunisia, Burma, Madagascar and Somalia.

In Switzerland, the election of overt racists merited demotion.

Government paralysis earned negative points in Lebanon.

The infiltration of state and military by drug cartels drove down ratings for Guinea-Bissau.

While Freedom House’s executive summary does mention oil in two other places, only in Chad does it cite falling transparency in the “management of oil revenues.”

Next year’s report no doubt will cite eroding executive-legislative relations in Russia, a(n attempted?) stolen election in Zimbabwe, and whatever dubious constitutional amendments, opposition crackdowns, exiles and media shutdowns the remainder of 2008 brings. It will be interesting to see how Chinese ‘foreign aid’ packages and the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation figure in.

Overall, freedom declined in 38 nominal democracies. The dominant sources of backslide were corruption, media and opposition crackdowns, state weakness, deliberate election mismanagement and entrenchments of executive power.

Oil dependence is a big problem for the US and even the rest of the world, but it is not the principal driver of “democratic recession.” Alongside more structural problems of uneven economic development and state capacity are growing gaps between flagship democracies’ missions to spread freedom and their wills and means to do so. On one hand, emphasis on stability is replacing their post-Cold War emphasis on democratization. On the other, aid conditionality loses efficacy as rising authoritarian states like China and Russia reach out to Africa and Central Asia.

If democracy is to boom in the last seven months of 2008, the old democracies need to (1) renew their commitment to democratization and (2) cooperate to balance the soft power of authoritarian alternatives.

Security forces took “computers and documents,” allegedly including evidence that opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai won the original election. They also targeted the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, NDI’s in-country partner.

According to Le Monde, opposition candidates will control parliament. Even if Mugabe’s Zanu-PF wins each of the five remaining seats in the 23-seat partial recount, it cannot retain its majority.

Mugabe’s loss of parliament makes retaining the presidency even more critical. If there is a transition on the horizon, Mugabe will want to bargain from executive office.

According to the New York Times, a neighboring democracy won’t let Mugabe bust opposition heads:

South Africa’s High Court on Friday barred transport of the ammunition, rockets and mortar bombs across South Africa from the port of Durban to landlocked Zimbabwe, after an Anglican archbishop argued that the arms were likely to be used to crush the Zimbabwean opposition after last month’s disputed election.

The 77-ton shipment from China was worth $1.245 million. Inflation notwithstanding, Zimbabwe’s dictator has missed out on a lot of guns.

The Times also said Zimbabwe’s state news, “deep in a long editorial,” hinted at a “national unity government.” If I have found the right article, the suggestion is quite near to the top. Here is the first mention:

The [International Crisis Group] report suggests that a negotiated way forward for Zimbabwe need not necessarily exclude President Mugabe, and should that inclusion be part of a genuinely negotiated agreement that aims at reconciliation and renewal, the Euro-Americans “should not hold back”.

On my way over to find the editorial, I noticed on the front page of the site that the ZEC has started releasing election results:

Zanu-PF retains Goromonzi West
ZANU-PF has retained Goromonzi West House of Assembly and Senate seats in the first batch of poll recount results released last night while the Sadc observer team says it is satisfied with the vote recounting process currently underway in 23 constituencies.
FULL STORY

These developments raise several questions.

Is Zimbabwe moving toward a pacted democratic transition or a Kenya-style band-aid solution?¹ Mugabe is an old man, and the rest of the editorial could be read as celebrating his legacy. Will he tap a successor or negotiate his way out?

Is the regime’s repressive capacity dwindling? The coincidence of the “unity government” announcement and failed Chinese arms shipment suggest it might be. If so, what is the opposition’s capacity to get concessions from Mugabe?

In blocking the weapons, is South Africa nudging the country toward democracy, or is this an isolated attempt to maintain social peace?

1. Kenya now has a 40-member cabinet: 20 members from the ruling party, 20 from the opposition.

According to the blog, Kasparov says the arrest was a signal of Putin’s commitment to crack down if the opposition pushes back. But the former chess champ isn’t fazed; he’s writing an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal.

Arab regimes are converging around policies that are explicitly designed to stabilize and preserve authoritarian rule in the context of ongoing demands for political change. At the same time, authoritarian upgrading holds out clues to the kinds of democratic changes it is reasonable to expect in the Arab world…

Two openings hold out particular promise:

First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;

Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.

Does holding relatively clean elections in the context of Morocco’s pho-PR system constitute an authortiarian upgrade? TDP’s Mandelbaum wrote last month about how low district magnitudes encourage party fragmentation and militate against effective legislative oversight.

Does Russia’s recent round of electoral “reforms” constitute an authoritarian upgrade outside the Arab world?

On the other hand, is Abbas’ unilateral decision to eliminate the nominal tier an authoritarian downgrade?

From the paper:

Electoral reforms in Arab countries have less to do with democratization than with making elections safe for authoritarianism. Regime management of electoral arenas reflects the double-edged logic of authoritarian upgrading. Reforms permit increased levels of political contestation—and in this sense they cannot be dismissed as meaningless. Yet they also ensure that elections remain tightly managed and operate as substantially uneven playing fields that distort electoral outcomes to the benefit of regimes. As recent elections in Yemen and Egypt showed, regimes combine tolerance for higher levels of electoral competition, including participation by Islamists willing to play within state-defined limits, with tactics designed to ensure that ruling parties continue to dominate electoral outcomes.