Who are the IRGC? (And more on the Basiji).

Al Jazeera has an interesting video about the Revolutionary Guard and the basiji (who are part of the Revolutionary Guard).

For those interested in understanding the Islamic side of the Iranian security forces, the clip is a decent primer.

(Here is the link to my previous post regarding the basiji).

The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980’s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980’s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Who are the Basiji?

The Basiji’s have received a lot of media attention as of late.  Yet, the majority of the analysis that I’ve seen has not truly described the organization.  Fortunately, Jon Lee Anderson at the New Yorker wrote a small but accurate analysis a few days ago about the origins and purpose of the basij.

Key section:

Instead, bearded plainclothes militiamen have been attacking and harassing the demonstrators in Tehran this past week. These are Basijis, members of a civilian paramilitary organization founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. It was conceived of as a civilian auxiliary force subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards, and so it has functioned over the past three decades. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, fervent Basijis volunteered to serve on the front lines. For a time, very young Basijis were encouraged to offer themselves for martyrdom by clearing minefields with their bodies in what became known as “human waves”—literally walking to their deaths en masse so that more experienced soldiers could advance against the enemy…

In peacetime, the corps lets the Islamic regime employ violence as a form of social control while retaining some plausible deniability; scruffy bearded men in civilian clothes are not, after all, uniformed soldiers. The Basij is now said to have some 400,000 active members nationwide, with perhaps a million more reservists; in some ways, their relationship to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is also their commander in chief, recalls the one between Nicolae Ceausescu and the loyalist miners trucked in from the Romanian countryside to strong-arm pro-democracy protestors. From 1997 to 2005, during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the Basij showed its usefulness again, by attacking students at demonstrations. Some students were killed. The protests died out.

…During the past four years, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president and the reform movement dormant, the Basij has not been needed as shock troops. Instead they have made their presence felt by periodically throwing up traffic barricades on the streets of Tehran and stopping cars to smell the breath of drivers for evidence of illegal alcohol consumption, or to question couples about their marital status. These Basijis are usually scruffy working-class men, and thus bring an element of notional “class struggle” to the otherwise pragmatically lived lives of the citizens of the Islamic republic. Not surprisingly, among more educated and affluent Iranians, they are almost unanimously despised.

Now, the basij are once again being used as shock troops, praying on straggling protesters, invading University dorms, intimidating families of protesters, and controlling the streets of Iran to try and limit the size of the demonstrations.