A Coup For Democracy?

Mary Anastacia O’Grady at the WSJ is making that claim – and she is supported by many in the Honduran ex-pat community living in the U.S (as well as many Hondurans on the ground it seems).

I will say, as more information trickles out it seems that as far as coups go, the case of Honduras stands out as a particularly process-heavy exception.  The Supreme Court stated it authorized the military action against the President.  The Attorney General is saying that Zelaya knew he would be charged and agreed to leave the country. The Legislature already appointed a president pro-tempore, as outlined in the Constitution.  In his first statement to Honduras, the new President, Roberto Michelleti, declared that no one should refer to this as a coup, since it was in keeping with democracy that ex-President Zelaya was removed from office.  It is ironic that Zelaya’s own party in Congress is investigating whether he is mentally fit to hold office and voted to replace Zelaya with Michelleti.

Furthermore, the events leading up to the Presidents expulsion, if O’Grady is correct, make the case against Zelaya stronger.  He apparently:

1) disregarded the Constitutional requirement of Congressional approval by trying to hold a referendum;

2) disobeyed a Supreme Court order not to hold the referendum or the “unofficial” referendum;

3) stormed a military barracks with some of his supporters and stole the ballots (from Venezuela, no less) and handed them out.

Here is a great quote from the O’Grady article, referring to the fact that democracy can often be compromised from within:

Former Argentine Ambassador to the U.N. Emilio Cárdenas told me on Saturday that he was concerned that “the OAS under Insulza has not taken seriously the so-called ‘democratic charter.’ It seems to believe that only military ‘coups’ can challenge democracy. The truth is that democracy can be challenged from within, as the experiences of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and now Honduras, prove.”

One thing is certain: Zelaya doesn’t have many allies in the country.  According to reports, approximately 200 people protested today in front of the State house (juxtapose that to the situation in Iran).  The military is out in force but is doing nothing to stop the protesters or to disband them.  The courts, the Congress, the military, and the Catholic Church (an important actor in Honduras) are all behind the removal of Zelaya.

I’m also sure it’s never a good idea to be in agreement with Hugo Chavez if the debate is about democracy.

Venezuela’s constitutional referendum

Last weekend, Venezuela’s new constitution won 54% approval at referendum. On one hand, it overturns term limits for all elected officials in Venezuela, especially Hugo Chavez. Many analysts therefore called the referendum a plebiscitary sanction for Chavez’s indefinite rule. On the other hand, the new constitution grants numerous social and economic rights. Moreover, progressive academics from Europe and South America helped draft it. This has led others to denounce the critics as reactionaries.

For instance, alleging a “US media campaign against Venezuela,” the country’s foreign minister lashed out against DC-based editorial pages:

Both editorials belittle Venezuelan citizens by portraying them as sheep unable to act unless motivated by bribery or punishment, incapable of judging whether or not it is in their interest to approve an amendment that would allow public officials to run for reelection for consecutive terms.

What, then, are we dealing with in Venezuela? Did professors’ magnanimous technical assistance undo prohibitions on pro-poor policy? Or is the new constitution our latest case of authoritarian upgrading?

In answering the question, a few points are worth keeping in mind:

1) 54% means an eight point margin of victory. That is not very large. One might explain eight points in terms of a “sheep” effect, to which the Foreign Minister alludes, in terms of performance legitimacy, or in terms of both.

2) As one former Venezuelan politician and social scientist notes, how could the people say no to “expanding the political rights of the citizens as a whole?” This time, the term limit repeal was a rider. When Chavez lost a referendum the last time, socioeconomic rights weren’t part of the package.

3) Most of the numerous, new rights are not enforcible anyway. I would be surprised if Chavez can guarantee free water and education for all – let alone build the infrastructure – as falling oil prices erode “petrosocialism.”

4) As “petrosocialism” becomes less buoyant, Chavez may face a crisis of legitimacy. If his performance legitimacy wanes, desire for a change of government will increase, and term limits would be instrumental in getting one. That instrument is gone.

3) Chavez’s democratic credentials are thin. He attempted a coup in 1992.

4) And procedual democracy has steadily eroded under his tenure.

Those who conclude the new, “Bolivarian” constitution attacks injustice are naive. This is an authoritarian upgrade. Chavez has made impossible promises in return for consent to his continuation in power. If political rights continue to fray in Venezuela, we should not be surprised when he dubiously wins a legal third term in 2013.

How should the U.S. treat Chávez?

On February 28^th, my partner and I handed a memo to the “National Security Council” – which is the format our class, led by Arturo Valenzuela, Clinton’s former special advisor on Latin American affairs, is styled after – composed of three options for U.S. policy toward Venezuela.  Yesterday, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez sent 10 battalions of the armed forces to the border with Colombia.  This came in response to a Colombian incursion into Ecuador, in which 17 members of the FARC, a Colombian revolutionary militia that has earned “terrorist” status, were killed.  Fortunately, our memo is still relevant.

The memo began with the following premise: “An opportunity to bolster U.S. interests in Venezuela may have arisen due to Venezuela’s economic disarray, Chávez’s domestic vulnerability after losing a referendum to consolidate his control of [the Government of Venezuela], and the freezing of $12 billion in assets of PDVSA, the state oil company.”   I’ll quickly explain this assessment.

Although the Venezuelan economy has been prodigious in recent years, high oil prices have concealed the catastrophic effect of Chávez’s economic and fiscal policies (featuring: exchange and price controls, an overvalued currency, and decreasing oil output).  Evidence of the damage is manifest in food shortages, rising inflation, and a terrible crime rate.  The Economist predicts that the Venezuelan economy will grow just 5% this year, and 3.7% in 2009. 

In December, 2007, Chávez lost a referendum that would have amended the 1999 Constitution to, among other things, end presidential term limits.  The ‘no’ vote was championed by a loose coalition of oppositionists, including student groups, the urban middle class, the Catholic Church, and business groups.  Even some significant regime supporters came out against Chávez.  His loss imparted momentum to a fairly weak political opposition that Chávez seeks to recapture prior to the regional and local elections coming up later in 2008.  Meanwhile, the freezing of $12 billion of PDVSA’s assets, the result of a lawsuit brought by Exxon Mobil, is a serious problem for a country that lacks investment its oil infrastructure.  Even OPEC doesn’t believe Venezuelan production claims of 3 million b/d in oil; it has the Venezuelan’s quota at 2.5 million b/d (barrels per day).  Aside from being an oil company, PDVSA, thanks to Chávez, provides many Venezuelans with public services.  When the oil boom ends, that $12 billion in frozen assets is really going to be missed.

Given these constraints, my partner and I proposed three options for dealing with Venezuela: engagement, containment, and confrontation (only in the case of an oil embargo against the U.S. or a military attack on a Venezuelan neighbor). 

The engagement option was based on idea that Chávez needs an exit strategy.   We felt that Chávez is unlikely to beg the U.S. for mercy.  If the U.S. were to offer him a way back into the hemispheric order – in exchange for some serious signs of behavioral reform – then he may just be willing to take it.  After all, Chávez is an elected leader and if the Venezuelan government collapses, we don’t know what it will be replaced with.

The containment option was essentially to continue what we are doing now, but this hasn’t really worked.  Our allies in the region have been hard pressed to join the U.S. in isolating Chávez because the U.S. is so unpopular in the eyes of their citizens.  This is not to suggest that the U.S. needs to be “popular,” but we do need to have enough clout to make it within the interests of other countries to do what is in our interest.  But siding with the U.S. is bad politics throughout most of Latin America.  Our containment option also called for increasing democracy and economic assistance for Latin allies to create a ‘reward’ for being on the U.S.’s good side.  The Bush administration’s 2008 budget request for foreign assistance to Latin America has been slashed, and much of what remains is earmarked for counternarcotics and security training.

Finally, the confrontation option was designed to prepare the U.S. for a dip in oil imports and the possibility of a Venezuelan military incursion.  On the latter issue, we thought the U.S. should be prepared for an airstrike on Venezuelan military targets if Chávez attempts to invade either Guyana or Colombia.  Venezuela has a longstanding boarder dispute with Guyana (it actually claims ownership of a good chunk of its resource-laden neighbor), and plenty of tension with Colombia.  I’d be shocked if Bush didn’t have a similar plan sitting in his desk drawer: Venezuela has imported $4.6 billion worth of arms and military equipment since 2006. 

Given that Chávez has a financial crisis looming and no exit strategy, we should not be surprised that he’s flexing his muscles on the Colombian border right now.  As President Bush knows, wartime offers a number of advantages to a sitting president.  For Chávez, the advantages are far more fantastic.  He can augment his decree powers by calling a state of emergency, silence his political opposition, and, perhaps, find a cause around which he can unite his military.  He can also deflect domestic political and economic pressures by blaming Colombia and the U.S. for Venezuela’s increasingly precarious footing.  If he’s lucky, maybe he can convince some worried country or international institute to pay him to take the soldiers back to the barracks. 

Does Chávez’s military maneuver yesterday render option 1, “engagement,” anachronistic?  If this option does actually exist in the Bush administration’s policy quiver, the situation would have to die down before it could be employed.  So far, it appears that the administration is ignoring the threat from Chávez, which I consider a wise move (yes, I just agreed with the Bush administration).   At present, Chávez is little more than a mouth with an overdrawn bank account.  His armed forces are weak and divided, and I’d be shocked if a rebellion doesn’t occur were Chávez to attack.  Someone in the Venezuelan military must realize, if Chávez doesn’t himself, that Bush and Cheney would relish the opportunity to bomb that place.  They are probably swimming in a pool of their own drool right now, just waiting for Chávez to breach the Colombian border.