The Democratic Piece

Thomas Friedman in last Wednesday’s NY Times argued America’s oil dependence and declining soft power - but mostly oil dependence - are driving a global “democratic recession.” I’m sympathetic to the concern about oil but not the logic. One, state weakness has raised the costs of freedom in some places. Two, autocrats are simply more sophisticated when it comes to keeping power. Three, and most important, the ‘developed’ democracies have not consistently supported democrats abroad. My working conclusion: soft power is indeed waning for reasons both structural and intentional.

Friedman cites the Freedom House index for 2008. Attention to where and why ratings fell reveals a more complex causal narrative.

Military interventions in democratic politics drove down ratings in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Faulty, stolen or generally unfree elections affected the Comorros, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Russia.

Political violence rocked Sri Lanka, Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Insurgency or generally rising insecurity eroded freedom in the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Afghanistan.

Media crackdowns drove down ratings in Georgia, Mali, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela and, arguably, the Solomon Islands, where governing authorities refused to address criticism related to a cabinet appointment.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and organization increased in Burma, Lesotho and Venezuela.

Whether by violence, intimidation or dubious institutional reengineering, executives eroded checks and balances in Malawi, Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Egypt.

Overt opposition crackdowns took place in Congo-Kinshasa, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Corruption and the entrenchment of economic oligarchies diminished freedom in Chad, Latvia, the Philippines, Tunisia, Burma, Madagascar and Somalia.

In Switzerland, the election of overt racists merited demotion.

Government paralysis earned negative points in Lebanon.

The infiltration of state and military by drug cartels drove down ratings for Guinea-Bissau.

While Freedom House’s executive summary does mention oil in two other places, only in Chad does it cite falling transparency in the “management of oil revenues.”

Next year’s report no doubt will cite eroding executive-legislative relations in Russia, a(n attempted?) stolen election in Zimbabwe, and whatever dubious constitutional amendments, opposition crackdowns, exiles and media shutdowns the remainder of 2008 brings. It will be interesting to see how Chinese ‘foreign aid’ packages and the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation figure in.

Overall, freedom declined in 38 nominal democracies. The dominant sources of backslide were corruption, media and opposition crackdowns, state weakness, deliberate election mismanagement and entrenchments of executive power.

Oil dependence is a big problem for the US and even the rest of the world, but it is not the principal driver of “democratic recession.” Alongside more structural problems of uneven economic development and state capacity are growing gaps between flagship democracies’ missions to spread freedom and their wills and means to do so. On one hand, emphasis on stability is replacing their post-Cold War emphasis on democratization. On the other, aid conditionality loses efficacy as rising authoritarian states like China and Russia reach out to Africa and Central Asia.

If democracy is to boom in the last seven months of 2008, the old democracies need to (1) renew their commitment to democratization and (2) cooperate to balance the soft power of authoritarian alternatives.

Fifteen European democracy assistance organizations recently launched the European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership. By pushing for democracy assistance to become a pillar of EU policy, EFDP hopes to rescue the good name of democracy assistance by offering a no-invasion-necessary European variant. The website is only nominally up and running, but check out the brochure here.

The EFDP aims to work in “countries on all continents where EU funding does not reach partners and where there is not sufficient funding available for democracy promotion.” EFDP will also “focus on working with partners that are most necessary in building democracy, but which do not receive funds from other sources.” (They go on to a list of pretty usual suspects, but “political society” comes last.) Anyway, Timothy Garton Ash hopes it will be a “benign European hydra to advance the cause of democracy.”

The NY Times reports a raid on the Zimbabwean opposition headquarters. Police claim the 215 they arrested are suspected of “political violence,” but this is clearly the next step in Mugabe’s effort to ensure he wins a presidential runoff election.

Security forces took “computers and documents,” allegedly including evidence that opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai won the original election. They also targeted the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, NDI’s in-country partner.

According to Le Monde, opposition candidates will control parliament. Even if Mugabe’s Zanu-PF wins each of the five remaining seats in the 23-seat partial recount, it cannot retain its majority.

Mugabe’s loss of parliament makes retaining the presidency even more critical. If there is a transition on the horizon, Mugabe will want to bargain from executive office.

As I write, democracy assistance groups are helping lawmakers develop an electoral system for Iraq’s 18 governorate councils. Some creative electoral engineering could take the sectarian sting out of Iraq’s party system. One proposal worth serious thought is using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) with open endorsements in governorate-wide districts.

Reuters last week claimed that “Iraq’s local elections could reshape power structure.”

Major players — such as the movement of populist Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and Sunni Arab tribal groups — will be competing for the first time and are expected to make gains at the expense of those now in power.

“New alliances will form, old ones will fall. Everything will change. It will redraw the political map of Iraq,” said a senior Shi’ite government official on condition of anonymity.

Really, Reuters means reshaping a balance of power, not an underlying power structure. A party system that continues to revolve around sects will not help consolidate Iraqi democracy. Luminaries from Lipset to Lijphart have taught that stable democratic politics are about more than race, religion or language. The challenge is to get Iraqi elites talking about more than sectarian interest. What candidates need are incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Campaigns need to be about what’s-in-it-for-me: jobs, schools, roads and, as a colleague quipped, a shawarma machine in every kitchen.

Thankfully, beltway rumor has it that the chosen system will be candidate-centric. This is a major step away from the closed-list PR systems that blew open Pandora’s box in 2005.

That leaves us with a few basic options:

First-past-the-post: As long as parties don’t control who gets on the ballot, this system might work. Yet the number of votes needed to win is fairly high, meaning current parties likely would fare best, unless there were numerous candidates in each district, in which case outcomes would be wildly unpredictable. Ultimately, the lack of reliable census data would make fair apportionment virtually impossible.

Open-list PR: Basically, the system modifies list PR so that voters control who ends up being a party’s most popular parliamentarian. While it gets around the apportionment problem, it is unlikely to change much. The list logic would preserve current parties, the logic of party discipline would remain the same, and we would expect the most popular person under such circumstances to be a sectarian leader.

STV: For all its virtues, this is not appropriate for the context. Illiteracy and innumeracy are likely to cause widespread voter error. The only way to get around the apportionment problem is to use one big district in each governorate. Can we really ask Iraqis to rank up to, say, 200 candidates?

Bloc vote: Two words. Palestine 2006.

SNTV: With open endorsements, of course. If the parties controlled who got on the ballot, there would be little chance for a shawarma machine in every kitchen. The system would stimulate hyper-personalistic campaigns, party fragmentation and pork-barrel politics at its finest. On one hand, these are ugly dynamics. On the other, they’re just what are needed to break the grip of sect on Iraq’s party system.

Using SNTV in governorate-wide districts would obviate the apportionment problem. If each council were the cube root of its respective governorate’s population, council sizes (and district magnitudes) would hover around 100, meaning each candidate would need about only one percent of votes to win.

Open endorsement SNTV is not a magic bullet. Its efficacy depends on federal-governorate linkages, ballot access rules and the (in)abilities of current parties to coordinate in local contests, to name just a few variables. Iraq nonetheless faces a tradeoff. As long as its electoral rules stimulate disciplined, programmatic parties, sect is likely to be the dominant cleavage. Legislative politics will remain zero-sum with negative implications for the country’s future. On one hand, electoral engineers can reinforce the nasty equilibrium that is Iraq’s party system. On the other, they can try to force it open by stimulating fragmentation and clientelism.

I just saw this interview from last weekend with Barack Obama on the Washington Post site today. The first question was on democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy:

Q. Do you believe democracy promotion should be a primary U.S. goal? If so, how would you achieve it? How would you balance democracy and human rights priorities against other strategic needs in the case of countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and Russia?

A. We benefit from the expansion of democracy: Democracies are our best trading partners, our most valuable allies and the nations with which we share our deepest values.

Our greatest tool in advancing democracy is our own example. That’s why I will end torture, end extraordinary rendition and indefinite detentions; restore habeas corpus; and close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.

I will significantly increase funding for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and other nongovernmental organizations to support civic activists in repressive societies. And I will start a new Rapid Response Fund for young democracies and post-conflict societies that will provide foreign aid, debt relief, technical assistance and investment packages that show the people of newly hopeful countries that democracy and peace deliver, and the United States stands by them.

I recognize that our security interests will sometimes necessitate that we work with regimes with which we have fundamental disagreements; yet, those interests need not and must not prevent us from lending our consistent support to those who are committed to democracy and respect for human rights.

The whole thing is worth a read.

Fidel’s brother is officially the president of Cuba. According to the BBC, “The US said Raul Castro’s appointment offered potential for change but said its embargo would remain until there was a transition to democracy.”

My gut reaction is threefold, and most readers will assess the embargo in at least one of the following ways: (1) It’s a Cold War anachronism. (2) The costs fall on the people, not the dictators. (3) It’s an excuse for incumbent lawmakers to keep their districts on lock.

Yet the pressure of a foreign power matters for democracy promotion. If nobody inside a country has the capacity to make leaders respect democratic institutions, maybe external forces can. I enter the treacherous territory of counterfactuals in suggesting the apparent suppression of an IRI exit poll last month helped Mwai Kibaki steal Kenya’s election. Moreover, most would agree the carrot of European Union accession has sped democratization and economic reform in the former Soviet satellites. Diplomacy seems to matter.

The efficacy of the Cuba embargo turns on two questions. One, what are the costs for Raul? We know it contributes to general poverty, but how does it make letting go more attractive for him? Two, does the lack of similar policies by all other powers render useless our own?

If we take democratizing Cuba seriously, there’s a third question: how do we minimize the pain to Castro II of stepping down?

President Bush put all of his eggs in the Musharraf basket and the Pakistani people have smashed that basket right in his face by wholeheartedly rejecting Musharraf’s political party. President Bush undermined U.S. standing in the world and our security by believing that the best way to fight Islamic extremism and terrorists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region was unquestioningly supporting President Musharraf and funneling billions of dollars to the Pakistani military without oversight. The results of the Pakistani parliamentary elections have left the Bush administration with a lot of egg on its face.

As the State Department scrambles to get its bearings in the fluid Pakistani political environment, it is important for us to consider three things. First, why did the Pakistani government allow these elections to be carried out in a relatively unfettered manner? Second, what are the likely outcomes? Third, what should the priorities of the U.S. government moving forward in terms of security and democracy promotion? Continue Reading »

It appears that President Musharraf is playing his cards exactly right in order for him to maintain his grip on power while still complying with demands (of varying intensity and credibility) from the US and other Western donor states, and the opposition movement.  In the last two days, Musharraf has announced that elections will be held in February, that restrictions on foreign media imposed on Saturday will be lifted, and that he will resign as army chief of staff very soon.  All of these promises have been made, however, without reference to specific dates.  The BBC has a good summary of events in the last few days here.

Musharraf’s promises have had two major effects:

1. They have drawn the wind from the sails of some opposition figures who claim that Musharraf is only interested in maintaining his own power at the expense of Pakistani democracy.  While they might be right (and I’m inclined to think that they are), it has suddenly become harder to rally their supporters in blatant defiance of the ban on demonstrations in place since saturday.
2. They have eased the pressure on the US and its allies to make good on their rhetorical support for democracy with genuine action.  Now that Musharraf has made vague moves toward fulfilling the conditions set out by President Bush and Secretary Rice this week for continued US support (don’t delay elections, lift emergency restrictions, and take off the uniform), there is less immediacy on the Bush administration (from Congress, the media, Europe, etc.) to withdraw aid or rhetorical solidarity from Musharraf.

While the president is walking his fine line, however, trouble is brewing in Rawalpindi.  The town, located about 30 miles from Islamabad, is scheduled to be the location of a major opposition rally (in defiance of the emergency order) tomorrow, led by former Prime Minister Bhutto.  The rally had been scheduled prior to Musharraf’s declaration of emergency rule, and was supposed to be a ‘historic welcome‘ for Bhutto as she returned from exile.  It may still be historic, but it will be far from welcoming.  Additionally, Bhutto has threatened to call out her supporters in a long march from Lahore to Ismalabad to protest the extra-constitutional rule of Musharraf. 

For now, we’ll have to wait and see what happens in Pakistan tomorrow.

In his monthly column in Sunday’s Washington Post, the Carnegie Endowment’s Robert Kagan argues that free elections should come first in the struggle against autocracy.  My colleague here at the Democratic Piece, Danny Adams, posted his thoughts on this issue earlier this week, arguing that in many ways this approach makes a lot of sense.  Naturally, democracies need elections.  While I agree with his assertion that the “priority should be democracy first, not only development,” I think Kagan misses the broader point: ‘elections first’ is often just as bad of a policy choice as focusing solely on economic development.

Kagan’s argument mirrors the Bush administration’s strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq: if you have elections, democracy will follow.  I think it is safe to say at this point that having elections first in each of these countries was at the very least unhelpful in moving either country toward sustainable democratic government.  Without a stable security situation, developed political parties, and a set of institutions that allow the elected government to effectively govern, elections can often do more to solidify a certain set of interests rather than lay the foundations for democracy.

Kagan points to Russia as an example of a ‘resilient autocracy’ whose rulers have been strengthened rather than undermined by its increased integration into the world economy.  Certainly this seems to be the case in Putin’s oil-rich Russia.  He forgets, however, the period shortly following the fall of the Soviet Union when Western governments were promoting democracy equally as much as economic liberalization and development in Russia.  While there is debate on how democratic Russia actually was between 1993 (first Duma election) and 1999 (Putin comes to power), it cannot be conveniently forgotten that elections did come first in Russia, and in many ways they contributed to the current backsliding we see there.

If we’ve learned anything from the past two decades of democracy promotion efforts, in which elections have played the starring role, it’s this: elections have consequences that do not always have a positive impact on a country’s transition to democracy.  We need to learn from our past mistakes and realize that, while necessary, elections don’t always come first.

Writing for Brookings, Georgetown’s Steven Heydemann notes that Arab authortiarian regimes are upgrading their survivability toolkit with implications for democracy promotion approaches.
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