Brave new world?

Earlier this month, Robert McMahon of the Council on Foreign Relations published a piece in the Foreign Service Journal titled “The Brave New World of Democracy Promotion.” Written from a macro-level perspective, it highlights current perceptions and controversies surrounding the world of democracy promotion, and raises the possibility that a new era is on the horizon under the Obama Administration. What could this mean? According to McMahon, experts on both sides of the aisle recommend that the U.S. should:

1. Draw a distinction between regime change and democracy promotion, making clear the United States does not use military force to remove governments in the name of democracy;
2. Establish more modest goals for bolstering democracy in a limited number of states;
3. Take steps to improve coordination on democracy promotion across the numerous U.S. agencies involved in related work;
4. Renew engagement in the Community of Democracies as a forum for strengthening democratic institutions and increasing involvement with existing multilateral bodies that deal with democracy, such as the United Nations;
5. Emphasize strengthening of governance and rule of law over the holding of elections in countries in transition; and
6. Take a more realistic approach to democracy promotion in the Middle East, while continuing to prod states in the region to open up their societies politically and economically.

Regardless of one’s feelings toward the utility or relevance of these recommendations, it will be interesting to keep an eye on whether or not they are implemented during the course of the new administration.

The full text of the article is available here.

Conference: Globalizing Autocracy, US Foreign Policy, and Democracy Assistance

Wednesday, December 10, 2008
2:00 to 5:00 PM
National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC

Democracy is in decline. More troubling, authoritarian regimes are coordinating to suppress political freedom at home and abroad. What are the implications of these strategies for U.S. foreign policy and democracy assistance programs?

Conference Agenda:

2:00-3:20: Causes and Consequences of Authoritarian Globalization

• Dan Brumberg, Georgetown University and US Institute of Peace
• Larry Diamond, National Endowment for Democracy and Hoover Institution
• Tom Melia, Freedom House
• Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

3:20-3:30 Refreshments

3:30-5:00: Challenges for Democracy Assistance Programs

• Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Michelle Dunne, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Gerald Hyman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Carina Perelli, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Please RSVP. Space is limited.

Facing the Democracy/Security Distinction

The conflict in Georgia returns us to the familiar topic of democracy losing out to security considerations. It is argued that Western powers—most especially the United States—lacked the will and means to defend Georgia’s fledgling democracy in its moment of peril.

The debate is not new; in a much different context, Jeane Kirkpatrick famously argued that the Carter administration erred in its focus on “human rights” at the expense of national security.

Does the democracy/security distinction remain appropriate? Robert Kagan does not think so. Kagan contends that the division between democracy promotion and national security has been erased by the shift in foreign policy demanded by the attacks of 9/11.
Read the rest of this entry »

Russia ate NATO’s carrot

With Russian troops now within 25 miles of Tbilisi, the U.S. has stepped up its tough talk on Russia.  But regardless of how the military situation plays out, the democracy agenda has been dealt a serious blow.

Press Conference

Today, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice gave a joint press conference with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.  Saakashvili decried looting and what he referred to as “ethnic cleansing” by Russian forces and irregulars.  He also made grim reference to a report released yesterday by Human Rights Watch blaming 11 civilian deaths and several injuries on the Russian use of cluster bombs, which Saakashvili called “an inhuman weapon.”  [In the interest of full disclosure, the United States does not renounce the use of cluster bombs.]

Saakashvili called the Russian invasion an effort “to kill Georgian democracy, and to end the independence of Georgia.”  He defiantly added, “Russia has lots of tanks, but no tank is enough to crush the will of a free people.”

The Response of International Institutions

For her part, Secretary Rice demanded that Russia respect the ceasefire agreement signed today, and withdraw its forces from Georgia.  (At the time, they were a mere 25 miles away.)  She also called on the international community to hurry to provide observers and a peacekeeping force, which would deny Russia an excuse to stay.  The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) began to take steps that would up its current number of observers in Georgia from 200 to 300, but this would require all 56 member-states to sign off.

Meanwhile in Washington, President Bush delivered a strong condemnation of Moscow at the White House.  In it, he said the U.S. would work with members of the G-7 to resolve the crisis, thus seemingly kicking Russia out of the G-8 club with one word.  This would follow on the heels on Monday’s conference call among foreign ministers of the G-8 sans Russia.  This kind of diplomatic response is a sure step in the right direction, but a sign that the West is nowhere near prepared to bare its teeth.  No surprise there – if it were, this would never have happened.

HEY!  Who ate our carrot?

Which leaves one questioning the relevance of NATO.  Before the Russian invasion, Georgia was actively trying to join NATO.  The U.S. was pressing other members on its behalf, without success.  In a world where Russia is expected to keep quietly to itself, the U.S. could offer the prospect of NATO membership as an inducement to states to implement democratic reforms.  Reforms would gradually take place, and the entire eastern European neighborhood would benefit from having more democratically inclined neighbors in it. 

But now the calculus is quite different.  With the real Russia unmasked for all the world to see, joining NATO becomes much more serious business for all parties concerned, for several reasons.  First, with the United States tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, an American promise to come to the aid of aggrieved European allies looks – for the foreseeable future – a lot like an empty threat.  This means that even as countries like Georgia and Ukraine want NATO membership with increasing urgency, it stands to do them less and less good.  They could bend over backwards to implement reforms – right up until the Russians marched in.

Second, even if we had a free hand, our security policy would likely trump our democracy policy, as it has many times before.  In a rush to extend NATO membership, the United States would be willing to overlook democratic gains – or lack thereof.

Third, even if we had a free hand and prospective members suddenly became advanced consolidated democracies, a Russian menace decreases the likelihood that any of our other NATO partners want to risk war with Russia by entering into an alliance.

All of this spells trouble for the democracy agenda.  

Craner and Wollack write on D&G

Those of us who follow the goings on of democracy-promotion NGOs may be interested to see (if you haven’t already) a new paper co-written by Lorne Craner, (President, International Republican Institute) and Kenneth Wollack (President, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs).  Entitled “New Directions for Democracy Promotion,” the paper gives an overview of the activities of the two organizations (and others) and makes policy recommendations for the next president of the United States.  

Policy recommendations include:

• Re-energizing U.S. alliances among democratically minded nations inside and outside of the United Nations, including within the UN’s regional groupings;
• Committing diplomatic resources to fixing the UN’s new Human Rights Council and/or expanding U.S. financial and political commitments to the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and its field-based operations;
• Enshrining democracy promotion as one of the key pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the National Security Doctrine;
• Announcing continued or expanded funding for democracy support programs within various agencies of the U.S. government;
• Announcing continued support for and funding of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Community of Democracies;
• Announcing continued support for congressionally initiated funding for democracy support programs in Iraq; and
• Ensuring that the value of democracy promotion efforts is understood by American diplomats through extensive programs by the Foreign Service Institute and other mechanisms.

Those who follow democracy-promotion closely won’t find anything earth shattering here, but at a tight 20 pages (complete with full-color photographs) it provides an authoritative primer for newcomers to the field, and a ready alternative to Thomas Carothers’ significantly longer Aiding Democracy Abroad.

A few things on Morocco

My pal Shadi Hamid at Democracy Arsenal, who is trying his best to become an ex-pal, recently posted some comments on the political situation in Morocco. Among his points are that the main obstacle to democracy in Morocco problem is the King, and that the PJD is simply going to be more pro-regime with new Sec-Gen Abdelilah Benkirane. Along the way, he calls U.S. democracy efforts “cosmetic” and singles out a particular program working with the Moroccan Parliament… which happens to be a program I am familiar with (Shadi – why don’t you come to Morocco and see what these programs are really about? Or are you afraid that once you leave the Mashrik for the Maghrib you’ll never go back…).

Indeed, the greatest hindrance to democracy is the institution of the Monarchy, no matter how liberal a particular king may be. Sure, the country has been changing, as one of your readers suggests, but not a single ounce of power has shifted hands in the past 9 years. The presence of the Monarchy, which can only be criticized by some people on some occasions when they do not cross a vaguely pronounced line, and the political institutions it has set up, prevent real opposition from taking shape.

The “serious effort” required to make structural changes in Morocco is possible. Change often requires crisis, so imagine the U.S. attacks Iran. If the supply of oil is cut short and Morocco’s energy prices soar, food prices continue to soar, and more revelations of makhzenian lands being sold for well below market prices come to bear, then we have the recipe for a political opportunity. When opposition parties find it in their interest to confront the sources of power, they will do so. Of course, getting to that point is difficult…

From my standpoint, you are partially correct about Benkirane: he’s an ultra-social conservative who is Read the rest of this entry »

Foreign Aid and National Security

There’s an interesting new site that everyone should check out (just a touch of self promotion here).  It’s an online community called Next America, run by CSIS, that facilitates foreign policy debates on some of the hot topics in this election.  Each week they feature a debate between two contributors with varying opinions on a given topic.  This week’s debate is on whether development assistance should be a tool for promoting national security.  Here’s my opinion piece arguing that development is and should be a tool for national security, but check out the other article plus the ongoing debate through comments here:

One of the major foreign policy developments of the 20th century was the advent of foreign assistance as a major endeavor of the developed world. Unlike other instruments of foreign policy, including diplomacy, military force, and strategic alliances, all of which are explicitly designed to further a country’s national interest, development aid is normally characterized as a moral obligation to help the poor and feed the hungry in the developing world. Despite this perception by policymakers and the public alike, development assistance is and should continue to be an important tool for promoting U.S. national security interests.

Read the rest of this entry »

What to do about Mauritania?

According to Article 40 of the Constitution:

Article 40 [Interim Presidency]

(1) In the case of a vacancy or an incapacity declared to be absolute by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate shall become the interim President of the Republic for managing current business. The Prime Minister and the members of the government considered as having resigned, shall assure the managing of current business. The interim President may not discharge them from their functions. He may not have recourse to the people through a referendum nor dissolve the National Assembly.
(2) Unless a case of force majeure is declared by the
Constitutional Council, the election of the new President of the Republic will take place within three months from the declaration of vacancy or absolute incapacity.
(3) During the interim period, no constitutional modifications may be instituted either by referendum or by parliamentary means.

So, there is a constitutional out from the current crisis if the military agrees to return to the barracks and to reinstate the president.  The international community should keep this in mind as policy makers determine how to handle the situation.

Coup in Mauritania

The AP is reporting that a military coup has taken place in Mauritania. Most people are not familiar with this spacious (about the size of Texas and New Mexico combined) West African nation of 3 million people, but after a coup in August 2005, the military junta called for elections in what was to be the beginning of a transition towards democracy. Here’s some background info:

On August 3, 2005, a coup by elite military forces ended the 20-year-old autocratic regime of President Maaouiya Ould Taya. Promising a democratic transition, the Junta, calling itself the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (CMJD), oversaw elections on the municipal, legislative, and presidential levels, as well as a successful national referendum to reform the 1991 Constitution. On April 19, 2007, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi became the first democratically elected president of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Political parties were legalized in 1991, but the political system was dominated by Taya and his political party, the Republican Democratic and Social Party (PRDS), until the 2005 coup. During this period, the Parliament was perceived as highly ineffectual. Parties had a reputation for self-aggrandizement and independents were often empowered in their stead. During the transition, the CMJD signaled its intention to consult with the political parties to set the rules that would lead Mauritania toward democracy. The parties took advantage of this opportunity, for example, by harnessing the power of collective action in order to successfully lobby the CMJD to change aspects of the electoral law.

Mauritania’s institutional design, which is set forth in the French-inspired Constitution, provides a tenuous starting point for a young and fragile democracy. The Constitution calls for a semi-presidential structure featuring a powerful president (term limit: 2/ 5-years) who appoints a prime minister (PM) and cabinet. While the Constitution endeavors to facilitate the interdependence of the executive and legislative branches, the opposition may not be able to exercise these functions if it does not form the majority coalition in the National Assembly (NA; the lower house of Parliament). This unequal distribution of checks and balances renders the political system prone to hyper-presidentialism, whereby a small group of individuals is able to retain executive powers through the selective dissemination of government posts, state resources, patronage, and the like.

Preventing hyper-presidentialism requires strong opposition politics, which, in turn, requires opposition parties to use their collective strength to check the government. However, the electoral system generates incentives that promote contradictory behaviors that make stable alliance formation difficult. Parliamentary elections encourage party fragmentation by pitting parties head-to-head in districts where a candidate must receive a majority vote to avoid a second-round. Since there are no threshold requirements or restrictions on who can win and be sat in Parliament, many seats are filled by local chieftains and family heads, who, due to their privileged position, have little reason to join nationwide political party. Presidential elections, on the other hand, encourage coalition building, but only after first promoting fragmentation. Anyone, party affiliated or not, can run for president, and last year’s election attracted 18 candidates. With so many candidates, a second round, pitting the top two vote-winners against one another, is almost inevitable. These two candidates must then battle for the support of the leading vote-getters who did not make the cutoff, entering a negotiating process that has significant consequences for the form and structure of the governing and opposition coalitions. Such incentives do not make for stable alliances (68 different alliances have been made), particularly in a nascent setting in which political actors do not yet have a grasp of their level of support in society and many actors are still vying for power.

While opposition politicians and parties are aware of the threat of hyper-presidentialism, other, often more pressing, incentives stymie the growth of the party system and the development of government-opposition politics. Politicians’ first priority is getting results. Mauritanians are poor and the current food crisis has made life harder for many. They have high expectations for democracy, stoking fears that they will turn their backs on democracy if their lifestyles do not quickly improve. Moreover, the potential reawakening of the military – if multiparty politics does not function effectively – provides an imminent danger. With these exigencies incentivizing policy to the detriment of process, the opportunity for the government to consolidate its power – either formally or informally – over Parliament is ripe.

To be sure, process has not been ignored in its entirety. Some new laws (like that on political opposition) and laws under consideration (like the Rules of Procedure, which NDI has spearheaded) aim to consolidate government processes and delineate the functions of different branches and agencies. However, serious challenges to the implementation of these laws could render them ineffectual: the paucity of resources and capacity within Mauritania’s public sector.

The public sector lacks sufficient resources to support the obligations of a modern government. The NA is the most underfunded of the government bodies; parliamentary commissions and groups do not have offices, while many parliamentarians and their staffs lack computers, photocopiers, and even phones. There is no parliamentary library or archive, or a translation service for MPs who may speak and read the principle languages of business (Arabic and French) to varying degrees. This scarcity of resources prevents the Parliament from fulfilling its role as a source of legislation, thus depriving it of one of its most essential duties. Instead, most MPs rely on legislation and information passed down to them by the government, thus abetting the power imbalance. For the public administration, the resource deficit facilitates the lax implementation of statutes and policies, allowing the infiltration of politics into its work and the replacement of formal rules that cannot be followed with informal rules that can.

Moreover, the public sector lacks human capacity. Since the CMJD took power, a number of government organs, including independent electoral and human rights commissions, an ombudsman, and inspector general’s office, and regulations, such as a law requiring elected and high-ranking officials to disclose their public assets, have been established. Their intention, at least in theory, is to check the government and ensure a balanced and competitive playing field. However, the staffs tasked with operating these bodies and implementing regulatory policies lack the capacity to implement their mandates. Morale within the bureaucracy is low. For most national level politicians, moreover, tasks like reading budgets and drafting legislation are new. On the local level, a substantial proportion of politicians are illiterate. Support staffs for politicians at all levels of government are similarly inadequately qualified, oftentimes having obtained their positions for reasons other than merit. As a result, politicians oftentimes rely on, for example, the Ministry of Finance, for answers to their technical questions.

A closer look at 2007′s “democratic recession”

Thomas Friedman in last Wednesday’s NY Times argued America’s oil dependence and declining soft power – but mostly oil dependence – are driving a global “democratic recession.” I’m sympathetic to the concern about oil but not the logic. One, state weakness has raised the costs of freedom in some places. Two, autocrats are simply more sophisticated when it comes to keeping power. Three, and most important, the ‘developed’ democracies have not consistently supported democrats abroad. My working conclusion: soft power is indeed waning for reasons both structural and intentional.

Friedman cites the Freedom House index for 2008. Attention to where and why ratings fell reveals a more complex causal narrative.

Military interventions in democratic politics drove down ratings in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Faulty, stolen or generally unfree elections affected the Comorros, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Russia.

Political violence rocked Sri Lanka, Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Insurgency or generally rising insecurity eroded freedom in the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Afghanistan.

Media crackdowns drove down ratings in Georgia, Mali, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela and, arguably, the Solomon Islands, where governing authorities refused to address criticism related to a cabinet appointment.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and organization increased in Burma, Lesotho and Venezuela.

Whether by violence, intimidation or dubious institutional reengineering, executives eroded checks and balances in Malawi, Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Egypt.

Overt opposition crackdowns took place in Congo-Kinshasa, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Corruption and the entrenchment of economic oligarchies diminished freedom in Chad, Latvia, the Philippines, Tunisia, Burma, Madagascar and Somalia.

In Switzerland, the election of overt racists merited demotion.

Government paralysis earned negative points in Lebanon.

The infiltration of state and military by drug cartels drove down ratings for Guinea-Bissau.

While Freedom House’s executive summary does mention oil in two other places, only in Chad does it cite falling transparency in the “management of oil revenues.”

Next year’s report no doubt will cite eroding executive-legislative relations in Russia, a(n attempted?) stolen election in Zimbabwe, and whatever dubious constitutional amendments, opposition crackdowns, exiles and media shutdowns the remainder of 2008 brings. It will be interesting to see how Chinese ‘foreign aid’ packages and the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation figure in.

Overall, freedom declined in 38 nominal democracies. The dominant sources of backslide were corruption, media and opposition crackdowns, state weakness, deliberate election mismanagement and entrenchments of executive power.

Oil dependence is a big problem for the US and even the rest of the world, but it is not the principal driver of “democratic recession.” Alongside more structural problems of uneven economic development and state capacity are growing gaps between flagship democracies’ missions to spread freedom and their wills and means to do so. On one hand, emphasis on stability is replacing their post-Cold War emphasis on democratization. On the other, aid conditionality loses efficacy as rising authoritarian states like China and Russia reach out to Africa and Central Asia.

If democracy is to boom in the last seven months of 2008, the old democracies need to (1) renew their commitment to democratization and (2) cooperate to balance the soft power of authoritarian alternatives.