BDM Predicts Whether Iran Will Build the Bomb

A recent NYT magazine article profiles Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s work, including a recent game tree predicting whether Iran will have the bomb. Spoiler alert…..his answer is no.

Could his work be relevant in our understanding of democratic regime change or are there too many preferences to account for?

The Unsustainability of Afghanistan

Michael Yon, an independent journalist and author, has written a great article about Afghanistan and the work that one Provincial Reconstruction Team is doing there.

Here is the overall feeling of the article:

On one hand, we have a fraction of the troops we need, but on the other, increasing troop levels increases hostility toward us. Secretary Gates has made it clear to me that his biggest concern is that we will lose the goodwill of the people and they will turn against us. This happens to be my own biggest concern. The agony is in knowing we need more medicine and the medicine can be highly toxic here.

Yon also makes an interesting observation about the “dependency” that foreign aid can induce.  He gives two examples of such instances:

Unfortunately, these kids had already been taught the benefits of begging and this analogy extends directly to their parents. In Afghanistan, like Iraq, when we invest resources into installing a dieselgenerator for a neighborhood, the people will complain that we don’t supply the fuel. When the Indians paid for local broadcasting equipment in Chaghcharan, the station manager complained that the Indians didn’t make a new office, and there is often a tone that we need something or “give us or we will misbehave.”

While I do not have similiar experiences to Yon’s, the international development literature is full of practitioners worrying about just such a situation.  The solution is difficult: on the one hand, not providing the diesel might result in the locals not using the very expensive diesel system.  On the other hand, providing the diesel simply encourages the foreign aid dependence and kills any long term sustainability to the project.  Once international development organizations cease to provide the diesel, who will step in?

The same concern is echoed with regards to the health facilities in Afghanistan.  Yon speaks at length with a doctor in the Ghor Province, who is upset that the national government is mandating “free” health care when the existing system can barely handle those able to pay.  As Yon writes:

Dr. Yaqubi wants to show people that health care is not free, but he says that the parliament in Kabul thinks it should be free to all. The Afghan government can’t even drill a well for this provincial hospital, and all their machines and supplies were probably donated, yet they want “free” health care. The beggars of Kabul who refuse to drill a well for the Ghor Provincial Hospital want free health care for all!

I told Dr. Yaqubi that the same argument is raging in America, and I asked the Lithuanian doctor sitting beside me if this is an issue in Lithuania. She confirmed that it is. Dr. Yaqubi said that if treatment were completely free, the hospital would be overwhelmed. With about 750,000 people in Ghor Province, they’ve got 85 dirty beds here, and two smaller clinics elsewhere. Free health care? How about steady electricity to run the X-ray machine?

The comparison to the U.S. debate is a bit of a stretch, but the story serves as a good example of the sustainability problems international development organizations, and the Afghani government, face.  The national government is unwilling (unable?) to provide for the basic needs of the hospital but wants to mandate “free” health care without a source of funding.  While international development organizations maintain a presence, they can subsidize the bad policy and mute the negative impacts.  Once their term ends, however, what will the Afghani government do when faced with a dilapidated health care system that slowly deteriorates every year due to the inability of the hospitals to either, a) receive electricity, water or medicine and materials or b) cannot afford to stay open due to lack of revenue?

EIU, Spread of Democracy Has Halted

EIU’s second annual democracy index concludes, unsuprisingly that the spread of democracy has halted. Their index has more statistical detail than Freedom House…have a look

Honduras: What Should Our Response Be?

The more I read about what is happening in Honduras, the more I am convinced that it might be best that Obama use the generic, “the Honduran people will decide their future,” statement. 

Daniel Larison, who supported Obama’s reaction to the Iranian coup (completely illegal, by the way), now seems pleased to skewer Obama on his response to the Honduran coup.  Here is the key quote:

What is so impressive about the bungling here is that it contradicts every argument the administration has made in support of restraint and caution when it comes to the Iranian protests. Obama didn’t want to insert the U.S. into an Iranian dispute. Iranians, he said, would decide their own future. Hondurans apparently are not accorded the same respect. Their sovereignty isn’t quite as important. Obama withheld judgment about the legality of what had happened in Iran. In Honduras, he just knows that what the military did was illegal, despite far stronger evidence that it was legal and a result of the proper functioning of their constitutional system.

Larison’s claims regarding the legality of the coup (from the point of view that the other branches of government supported the actions of the military), seem to be strengthened by interim President Michelleti’s declaration that the only way ex-President Zelaya would be allowed to return is “at the head of a foreign army.”  If he didn’t have solid support from the Legislature, the Supreme Court and other government institutions, it is unlikely he could make such a claim.

The best way to see the events in Honduras, according to Larison, is as the system of checks and balances working even though the means to enforcement were somewhat illegal.  The contradictions is a bit tough but I certainly see his point.  As I’ve mentioned in previous posts, the Attorney General, the Legislature and the Supreme Court all agree with the actions of the army (and claim to have authorized it – feel free to be skeptical, it is probably warranted).

This Honduran blogger, however, makes an interesting and important point:

I fear we have gone from bad to worse. At least Zelaya seemed to speak out for the poor. As one priest said this morning, despite all his errors and his vanity, Zelaya was the first major leader in many years to offer people a little bit of openness to the needs of the poor. The priest said he is not supporting the person Zelaya, but the cause of the poor. Micheletti is closely tied with the economic powers to be. An indication of his position is his support of privatization of water in his own district.

Also, Al Giordiano, a prominent blogger covering Honduras, is claiming that Michelleti and the Congress have suspended a number of Honduran rights.  Take his claims with a grain of salt as he is against Michelleti and for Zelaya.

Beyond Ankara? Obama and the Missing Message to the Islamic World

Ever since President Obama assumed the presidency, there have been clear efforts to mend the strained relations between the United States and the Muslim World. Capitalizing on his presence in Turkey, the President delivered his much anticipated address to the Muslim World, in which he promised a new path based on mutual respect and interest and assured Muslims that the US is not, nor will it ever be at war with Islam.

In his address the President hailed Mustafa Kemal’s legacy which manifests in “…Turkey’s strong and secular democracy.” What repercussions might this appraisal for Turkey’s democratic experiment yield? Or as I mentioned in the title, how do we move “Beyond Ankara?” Turkey might be one of the more liberalized regimes in the Middle East, and a good choice in comparison to other Muslim States. But it is far from becoming a complete democracy.

In a book titled The Politics of the Middle East, Monte Palmer asserts, “Turkey has produced a very complex society that is struggling to balance secularism with its Islamic faith, democracy with the desire for security and statism with economic liberalization.” (2007, p.322). Palmer’s characterization of the “Turkish dilemma” is not distinctive. Arab autocratic regimes, for example, are faced with a similar conundrum, albeit with varying intensity.

Perhaps the most prevalent feature of Turkish political culture is the endurance of the so-called “deep state,” which manifests in the subservience of civil government to the military, and in the dispensation of upper echelons in other security agencies and the judiciary from regulations mandated by elected officials. Both Turkey and Arab States suffer from a lack of separation between “public” and “private”; a phenomenon coupled with the obfuscated relationship between “military” and “civil.” And like Turkey, most Arab populist and monarchist regimes hold elections, allow some room for free press, and claim to heed criticism from the opposition. One difference between both Turkey and Arab States vests in how regimes respond to actions deemed unfavorable. In the case of elections for example, it is not uncommon for Arab regimes to gerrymander, while in Turkey, the military has tended to initiate coups or pressure the judiciary to ostracize undesired political parties from partaking in elections.

Another distinct feature of Turkish politics is its adaptation of secularism, sometimes referred to as “Kemalist” secularism. Without dwelling on the intricacies of secularism, in the broadest sense, it is perceived as the separation of Church and State. Kemalist secularism elected to integrate Islam as a subordinate to state structures. In fact the secular nature of Turkey’s limited democracy, which the President praised in his speech, augments a major construct of Turkish political culture: the preservation of the deep state as opposed to consolidating democracy. And it is this strain of political culture that the United States must stand up to.

In his inaugural address President Obama warned despots across the world, “…know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” This message gave hope to the many disquieted people across the Muslim world. In a way it relieved them of fears that the US would no longer support organic efforts to create more free and just societies. I know that it is in the Muslim World’s interest to push for more reliable democratization efforts. If the US abandons moderate and opposition groups in the wider Islamic world, it may be impossible to  revive these relationships again. I fervently hope that the President realizes that pursuing the democratic agenda in the Islamic world, serves the long-term interests of the United States as well.

Mi última observación

The people of El Salvador have a lot to be proud of. This past Sunday, they took part in an election that, despite a number of irregularities, went smoother than many, including myself, had expected.

As election observers, our day started bright and early. We left for the polls at about 4 a.m. to make sure that all of the proper election materials and personnel were present and in order, and that the rules governing the preparation of voting centers were adhered to. Observing the formalities of this process, though important, was quite tedious, and I will spare the reader the details. What was interesting, however, was to witness the informal interactions between the poll workers and partisans throughout the day.

In Salvadoran national elections, a vote reception board (JRV) sits at each voting table and oversees the actual voting process. Each contesting party receives equal representation within the JRVs. In addition to this, an equal amount of individuals from each contesting party are allowed to serve as vigilantes. Vigilantes provide an additional layer of scrutiny, so that each party can ensure that its interests are fairly represented within the dealings of the JRVs. The role of the vigilante is more overtly partisan than that of the JRV board member. The idea is that the JRV exists to protect the rules, but when adherence falls out of balance, the vigilante, the defender of the slighted party, will call attention to it and even the keel. The institutions immediately governing the actual voting process, in sum, are designed to encourage rigorous contestation.

Two Vigilantes

Yet, despite the high-stakes, competitive race, vigilantes from both parties upheld a standard of respectful disputation, resisting any temptation to resort to degenerative confrontation. Early on in the day, just before voting had opened up and the rush to organize the election materials had settled, I even saw an Arena man light a cigarette for a young FMLN lady. The image was a surreal contrast with the civil war that ended only two decades ago, or even the spike in pre-electoral violence that occurred only days prior. At this point, I remembered in training being told that relations between parties in the early hours would determine how the rest of the day would pan out.

This insight turned out to be quite prescient. For the rest of the day, I personally saw few disputes, and those that did flare up were for the most part quickly and peacefully resolved. At one polling center that we visited, Rodrigo Avila, the Arena candidate, happened to show up with a large entourage of supporters. (Apparently, he was there accompanying his daughter as she cast her ballot.) Given that there were already a large number of FMLN supporters within the polling station, this created a situation where things seemed like they could easily get out of hand. Arena supporters marched in chanting slogans and singing party songs, while the FMLN crowd confronted them in a battle of decibels. At the fault lines of the two groups, there were even several physical skirmishes. However, these were quickly broken up – not by police officers or security guards, but by moderates on both sides who did not want to discredit their cause or the democratic project. To be sure, the gathering of the two crowds was an inherent violation of several rules, but most of us came away with the impression that it could have been much worse, and as evidence that both parties have come a long way in adhering to civil means of political interaction.

"Patria Si, Comunismo No!": A Spot of Rowdiness in the Polling Center

Perhaps the greatest achievement was not what happened during the voting process, but what occurred once all the votes were tallied. Inferring from the polls that FMLN would carry the day, I staked out Arena’s national headquarters to see what the mood would be like on the losing side as the results came in. Before the outcome was settled, the atmosphere was celebratory, and there seemed to be a conscious effort to maintain morale until all of the results were in. However, a number of people that I spoke with conceded that FMLN would likely come out on top, and that democracy and governance would suffer as a result.

“Do you know what this means?” a man asked me as he held up his two fingers in a symbol of peace. (FMLN supporters have adopted the peace sign as a symbol of their cause). “It means two terms,” he said, and went on to elaborate predictions about how the FMLN will change the constitution and transition into a Chavista regime. “Sounds pretty scary,” I said, and asked him whether he thought that this fear would spur violence on the part of Arena radicals. “Maybe…maybe not.” I was glad to know I wasn’t the only one caught up in the ambiguity of the evening.

Concesión

Eventually, as results came in and it became clearer that Avila would likely not be the victor, a caravan of SUVs pulled up and it was announced that Avila would give his concession. We all rushed the doors to the main hall as Avila took the stage. The mood of the crowd was not one of anger or anxiety, although disappointment was in the air. Avila, for his part, reaffirmed his commitment to the democratic process, and encouraged his party to do the same: “In a democracy, we all have to realize that sometimes you achieve your objectives and sometimes not.” He also provided assurances that the party would still be a relevant player within the established institutions: “ARENA now passes into the opposition…it can be assured that it will be listened to and respected.” Since then, I have been unable to find reports (at least in English-language media), of violence on the part of Arena radicals.

Following this, several of us from the Georgetown contingent went to the center of FMLN festivities to get a sense of the mood there. Upon our arrival, we exited our cab into a sea of red t-shirts and flags, beeping horns, and celebratory chants. On the one hand, images of Castro and Che, as well as the hoisting and waiving of flags bearing sickles and hammers was enough to send chills down this gringo’s spine. On the other, the crowds seemed to appreciate the current US president every bit as much as Latin America’s most notorious revolutionaries. Almost every time we were noticed, someone from the crowd would shout “Obama!” Among the more prominent of chants was “Si se pudo” (yes we could), a past-tense adaptation of Obama’s “yes we can.” More importantly, the crowds proceeded orderly through the streets (with some minor exceptions), and none of us witnessed any misconduct.

In many ways, then, this year’s presidential election can be seen as both a culmination of a long-endured democratic peace process. The FMLN has made a big, and perhaps final step towards “coming in from the cold,” while Arena and the majority of its supporters have exhibited a commitment to stepping aside and accepting the role of loyal opposition.

A New Era

Of course, democracy does not end on election day. Many within and outside El Salvador legitimately question the FMLN’s democratic bona fides and whether the new president will ultimately govern in a way that upholds the pillars of democratic preservation. Some even believe that El Salvador is now destined to become another notch in Hugo Chavez’s regional belt of leftist governments with doubtful commitments to liberal democracy.

I have my own thoughts, but there are many variables at play and so for now I will leave predictions to more seasoned analysts of a country with which I have only recently become familiar. For now, suffice it to say that while questions continue to surround the future El Salvador’s democratic experiment, the immediate events of election day, at least those that I witnessed, served as a sign of hope for an otherwise skeptical observer.

Sharia for Peace?

This week the Pakistani government in the NWFP agreed to a truce with the Taliban in the Swat Valley.  In exchange for a permanent cease fire the provincial government has agreed to the imposition of Sharia Law. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has yet to sign off on the deal, but thus far the price of the cease fire looks to be Taliban control in Malakand, Shangla, Buner, Dir and Chitral, which adds up to roughly 1/3 of the NWFP.

On the one hand, this seems to legitimize Islamists in the NWFP and further undermines an already brittle Pakistani state capacity. Critics fear that ceding the territory to the Taliban will create another haven for terrorist activity and the Pakistani’s inability to defeat militants will only embolden their activities.  Indeed, this pact seems to legitimize what has already been happening in the province, namely Islamabad’s continuing inability to exert control and rule of law in its tribal areas.

It is also important to note the historical experience of Swat, Chitral and Dir,  which officially joined the Pakistani state as “Malakand” in 1969. Historically, tribal law was the source of the judicial system in these areas. The imposition of the ineffective Pakistani judicial system led to calls for a return to tribal/Sharia law. By 1994, the Tehrik-Nifazi Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) movement was formed under a slogan calling for a return to Sharia Law. Swat elected a secular party in 2008, but militant elements began assassinating the party’s political leadership.

The best hope seems to be that the cease fire and acquiescence to the demand for Sharia will isolate the “Taliban” elements in the province unwilling to adhere to the ceasefire. In a visit to Washington today Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Quereshi, called the truce a “local solution to a local problem.” However, the imposition of Sharia could ultimately prove to be too costly for Pakistan’s statehood.

A brief NYT documentary captures some of the risks that ordinary inhabitants of Swat face….

It’s called “Elections”

In today’s “The Conversation,” a new discussion format by the New York Times that pits columnists against each other, David Brooks makes a sloppy error that I couldn’t help blogging about (for the first time in several months).  In a discussion about the new stimulus bill, Brooks responds to Gail Collins’ argument that unfettered markets are not the savior that many right wingers want them to be with the following:

As for the broader point that capitalists can be pretty dumb. Granted. But the market does have a mechanism for educating itself: prices, and in some cases bankruptcy. Government lacks a self-correction mechanism, or at least a good one.

Democratic governance features a number of “self-corrective” mechanisms, perhaps the most obvious of which is elections.  For example, when it became obvious that the Republican administration’s policies were no longer effective for the country, voters pulled the plug on the Bush administration and many Republican congress members lost their seats.   This is how democracies self-correct – purge the old and bring in the new.

Perhaps Brooks thinks that this is not a “good” mechanism of self-correction, but I doubt that.  By virtue of the fact that it’s better than all the others, democratic elections appear to be a pretty good check.  This is particularly true when coupled with other checks and balances in addition to protections that permit political oppositions to thrive.

Demanding Accountability: Ending the Spitzer-Craig Legacy

Since proposing that the U.S. political parties implement codes of conduct to provide their officials a disincentive for engaging in corrupt and illegal behaviors, I’ve taken the question of politicians’ sense of immunity around Washington. My formulation of the question usually goes sort of like this:

“Recently, we’ve seen a number of U.S. politicians get into trouble – and even ruin their political careers – by having sex with people other than their spouses and getting caught in the cover-up. How can we put an end to this practice? These acts – and I’m talking about the cover-ups – fuel the perception of the power-hungry politician serving his own interests at the expense of his constituents. And yet, the true victims in this game are the political parties and the political system, which become the target of the people’s frustration and despair. Meanwhile, ‘legal’ law has done little to deter politicians from this type of conduct. [This is where the question deviates depending on the intended respondent]. So what can the political parties do to prevent their officials and operatives from engaging in such behaviors? Can they provide a credible disincentive by enacting and enforcing codes of conduct to withdraw party support from those who hurt the party? What is the role of the primary/campaign system in recruiting people who seem time-and-again to make the same mistake? Does our political system attract certain personality types? Where does responsibility lie for the persistence of this phenomenon?”

DNC Chair Howard Dean thought a code of conduct unnecessary. He argued that Nancy Pelosi had established a credible threat by pulling Representative William J. Jefferson from the Ways and Means Committee after he was investigated by the FBI for corruption. I intervened stating that such disciplining may have some effect, but that it did little to institutionalize such standards within the fabric of the party. Moreover, I suggested, there could be an electoral benefit for the party that takes concrete steps toward ending the sense of impunity that characterizes the political culture. Dean retorted that codes of conduct need teeth and that the Republicans’ Contract with America failed because it was unenforceable. My Democracy & Governance colleagues then protested that establishing enforcement would require hurting the party in the process. Indeed, this would be an unfortunate but necessary consequence; although one that could pay off in the long run.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Spitzer-Craig Code of Conduct

Monday’s revelation that New York Governor Elliot Spitzer was a customer of a high-class prostitution ring, and his subsequent resignation, has raised once again the issue of politicians’ sense of immunity to law and societal norms.  It is not just in the United States, where politicians solicit sex in public restrooms and harass underage congressional pages, that uncouth and illegal behavior on the part of those responsible for making the laws bedevils the political system.  N.R. Kleinfeld’s article in the New York Times points out that power and sex go hand-in-hand, and that the fickle nature of democratic politics attracts particular personality types that thrive in democracy’s high-risk atmosphere.   So how should the U.S. address this problem? 

The purpose of a democratic political system is to engender conduct that is mutually accepted by political actors within a given society.  This occurs through the provision of incentives and disincentives that limit bad behavior and encourage good behavior.    Where a particular activity is illicit and enforceable (without exception), citizens have a disincentive to perform such an activity. 

In the United States, where adultery is not illegal, the formal rules of the political system offer little help in promoting sexual responsibility among members of congress.  One’s sexual life is typically regarded as a private matter and, indeed, it would have been unconstitutional to impeach President Clinton for having sex with Monica Lewinsky.  While adultery is not illegal per the Constitution, it defies the norms of acceptable behavior and often causes politicians to break the law.  The Lewinsky scandal is instructive of the illegal behaviors (lying under oath) to which politicians will resort in order to save face in the ‘court of public opinion.’    

Adultery, thus, is not illegal because the US Government cannot dictate how one may act in private.  However, it has a negative impact on the political system by causing people to lose faith in their representatives as well as their political parties.   In a recent speech at Duke University, Karl Rove cited the Republican Party’s manifold corruption scandals – and not the Iraq War – as the reason for the Democrats’ success in the 2006 congressional elections.   The revelation of a politician’s extramarital affairs and the corrupt behaviors that may accompany also damage the political parties.  Not all of these scandals had a sexual component, but what they do have in common is the insidious belief of the politicians involved that they would not be held accountable for their actions.  Clearly, the present structure of incentives is not doing the trick.

The Republicans and/or Democrats can combat corrupt behavior by adopting internal codes of conduct that provide real incentives and disincentives to promote good behavior.  Just as both parties penalized states that broke party rules by revoking some or all of these states’ delegates to their national conventions, so too can parties leverage their resources against members who break party rules.  Elected officials who hurt the party image by, for example, having extramarital affairs, can be docked funding from the parties’ campaign committees.  Or, those who engage in corruption while in office or in official party positions can be banned from the party.  There are many options in terms of the shapes that these rules can take and the penalties they can impose.

Read the rest of this entry »