IFES to go in front of Election Supervisory Body in Jakarta

Jakarta – Wednesday July, 15 – According to the Jakarta post (link unavailable), amid accusations by presidential candidate Megawati of illegal campaign activities, the Indonesian Elections Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) will question incumbent Presidenty Yudhoyono, the General Elections Commission (KPU) and US-based International Foundation for Electoral Sytems (IFES) on Wednesday.

As previously posted, the KPU and IFES worked togethr in piloting an SMS voting tabulation system. Criticism has been launched at the KPU for involving a foreign agency in tabulating votes and have asked questions as to why the voting was stopped midstream with only about 20% of the polling stations reporting.

However,  critics seem to have misinterpreted the SMS tabulating project. Approval for the program occured 2 days before election day and the pilot program only expected about 15% of polling stations to participate. The results were not intended to be official in any way, but rather were intended to serve as a parallel voting mechanism and to gauge the utility of this type of reporting system. IFES, for its part, only provided hardware and technical assistance, vote tabulation was done by the KPU.

The media outlets, many tied to political party and leadership, have echoed vice presidential candidate Prabowo’s accusation of foreign meddling, but it seems that these last ditch efforts will not only be fruitless, but will also undermine the progress of parallel vote tabulations, whether official or done by non-governmental organizations.

Currently,  Indonesia relies on media quick count polls and unreliable exit polling, developing civil society capacity for parallel vote tabulation can go a long way in making the elecotral process more transparent and credible, especially if it can be done inexpensively.

Indonesia’s Presidential Election Fair Despite Last Minute Changes

Woman Casts Her Vote in Jakarta

Jakarta – Friday, July 8, 2009 – Quickcount and exit polling shows a comfortable win for incumbent President Yudhoyono in July 8’s presidential election. While the official count is still a few weeks away, most observers reported a relatively free and fair election with disenfranchised voters as the only substantial concern. In the run up to election day there were numerous reports of voters not being listed on the voting lists present at the 400,000+ polling stations across Indonesia. To mitigate this, the election body (KPU) passed a constitutional law that allowed voters to come with the identification card (KPD) at the opening of polling stations to vote later in the day. Observers raised concerns given the short time frame to prepare for this change and for the possibility of voter fraud.

My visit to 4 polling stations only included 2 individuals who had come to register with their KPD cards, there were no significant irregularities and stations seemed well prepared. The polling stations had roughly 300-500 registered voters on their voting lists, the largest I heard of was about 1000. Polls were open from 8 am to noon and were generally a relaxed affair.

Additionally, the International Foundation for Elections Sytems (IFES), with the help of USAID, launched a watershed SMS reporting system at roughly 15% of polling stations. While these did not act as a parallel vote count or as a official report, the SMS reports seemed to correspond to the results.

Figures.

Apparently, the regime (or Ahmadinejad’s people…is there much difference at this point?) have been editing pictures of rallies held in support of Ahmadinejad to make them look bigger.

We shouldn’t be surprised.  The regime has done this before to “augment” their power (think: rocket launches).

Color Me Impressed with Obama

As I was writing a third post on the topic of Iran – discussing how we shouldn’t blow Mousavi’s resistance or the demonstrations out of proportion – I saw this interview Barack Obama gave to CNBC.  Read it.

Needless to say, I think he does a great job of explaining the issues, explaining his policy and his actions thus far.  Furthermore, he brings up an important issue: Mousavi is a regime man.  Even had he won, we would still be dealing with a regime whose interests would have it continuing to support Hamas/Hezbollah while also pursuing nuclear capabilities.

He assumes that Mousavi, who campaigned on lessening tensions with the West with regards to nuclear capabilities and funding for terrorism, wouldn’t follow through.  Regardless of whether Mousavi could have delivered, the basic fact is that not much would have changed right away as the regime fought internally. Obama makes an important argument here that we should heed.

Lastly, regarding the crowds: let’s not get our hopes up.  We should remember that the most common slogan chanted at the onset of the protests was “raye man kojast?” (Where is my vote?).  While the focus and purpose of those protests might have shifted after the way the regime responded to the demonstrations, the truth is that the crowd is brought together against Ahmadinejad and his policies, and not so much for democracy.  While those participating in the marches demonstrate great bravery and determination, they are united in their desire for more liberty and voice, not necessarily the toppling of the Islamic Regime.  The “manifesto” being sent around supports this claim; the articles require the removal of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei but call for the appointment of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri to the post of interim Supreme Leader until constitutional reform occurs.

This in no way is meant to reduce the importance of what these Iranians are doing.  I just want to make sure that we’re not making assumptions about what the Iranian people want.  I don’t know, and from what I’ve read on blogs and tweets, they all want different things. Some want “freedom;” some want “democracy;” others just want Ahmadinejad gone.

In another parallel of the 1979 Revolution, we see that Iranians from different walks of life find themselves working together against a common enemy. Then, it was the Shah. Today, in what is not a revolution (yet), the common enemies are Ahmadinejad and (perhaps) Khamenei.  But, as the 1979 Revolution showed, the leadership that emerges after the removal of the government overthrow is almost as important as the leadership people rally against.

I should say, though, that after few more days of basiji attacks and killings, perhaps it will become a revolution that seeks more than the nullification of the elections and the replacement of Khamenei.  The next week will be extemely important in determining where the Iranians take their movement.

Mir offers new reasons to question Iran result

Many are turning from skeptics to sympathizers about Iran’s election results, particularly in light of the results of Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty’s May poll, published in yesterday’s Washington Post under “The Iranian People Speak.”

Asieh Mir, a Persian scholar and Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, has written a response to this article, noting several reasons why the poll results should not be believed.  You can read her post here.

Mir makes important additions to the running list of reasons – some statistical, others circumstantial – to question the results.

Iran. Pt 2.

I decided to separate the two blog posts into “past/present” and “future.”

The main question floating around right now is: what do these protests signify?  Where is this all going?

Some claim this is the beginning of a revolution.  Others say that very little will change except that a few people die.  I suppose I am in the middle.

On the one hand, things will never be the same.  Any illusion of popular legitimacy is gone.  The regime has been ousted, or has shown (depending on how you look at it), exactly what it is: a repressive authoritarian government.  Power, not Islamic law or legitimacy, is the name of the game in Iran – and now everyone knows it. 

From a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, this complicates our calculation.  We need to continue pressing ahead with negotiations since military intervention is not a desireable option.  Negotiations, however, will be more politically charged and less stable since the majority of people do not support the government.  

An implicit danger here is that the U.S. is seen by Iranians as supporting or working with the oppressive regime, thereby creating anti-American sentiment among the people.  We have managed the balance before, but it is something we must be aware of in order to counteract.  It is also important to note that in his “victory” speech, Ahmadinejad declared the nuclear issue, “closed…forever.”  His declaration, combined with the willingness of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic regime to completely fabricate the election of Ahmadinejad at the last second and risk such popular dissatisfaction, suggests that the Islamic Republic wishes to “double-down” on Ahmadinejad’s policies of pursuing nuclear weapons (not to mention support of terrorists, denial of the holocaust, etc).  I do not envy the Obama administration on the line they must now walk in dealing with Iran.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic will likely weather this storm.  They have the guns and the willingness to use them – and legitimacy takes a time to fade to the point where toppling the regime is a possibility.  It really comes down to, I suppose, how much violence and death the demonstrators can withstand.  I don’t think anyone knows that answer to that question. 

(Sidenote: I think something that should be emphasized, though I haven’t heard it anywhere, is that the Islamic Republic has very much created a culture where resistance and death are glorified.  In such a society, will the killing of demonstrators discourage or encourage further resistance?  According to the BBC, today’s rally is larger than yesterdays…maybe that’s our answer.)

Another important question we must ask is: will Mousavi push so hard that the regime breaks?  It is important to remember that Mousavi is very much tied to the Islamic Republic.  He was Prime Minister in the 1980’s and was very much involved in the University purges that occured during that time.  He’s obviously changed, but would he be willing to topple the regime? 

President Khatami, the previous reformist President whose policies of increased freedom and equality were reversed by the Islamic republic through force and intimidation, faced a similar decision during his two terms as President from 1997 – 2005.  He backed down and told his supporters not to riot or demonstrate.  He likely understood the amount of bloodshed and pain such a move would have caused…and he still believed in Islamic governance.  Now, however, with the facade of people’s participation ripped away from the regime and satisfaction at an all-time low, is Mousavi willing to do what Khatami would not? 

Or will he, too, call on his supporters to accept the decision of Khamenei and move on?  Would they even listen to Mousavi if he did?

How Iranians duck government censors

Now that it has tossed out foreign journalists, the Iranian government is going after social media.

One tweet calls on all Twitter users blogging #iranelection to change their time zones to Tehran in order to frustrate censors.

Another advises Iranian tweeters to frequently change their usernames.

And there are several tweets noting ways for Iranian Internet users to surf around censors, use Internet cafes undetected, et cetera.

Without making any bets on outcomes, I will say that this is exhilarating.

Following #IranElection on Twitter

This page of tweets from and about Iran’s election is interesting to reload every few minutes. For example, it’s how I learned that the BBC has themed its site in green in solidarity with the opposition.

Iran.

Before I write anything, an apology to readers…this post might be a bit scattered as there is simply way too much information right now and I’m finding it hard to write dispassionately about recent events.  I’ll write some background, followed by why the election numbers are questionable.  Then I’ll describe the sequence of events and where we are now.

Background: Over the weekend, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad “won” re-election to the Presidency with 60%+ of the overall vote in the first round.  Needless to say, in the weeks leading up to the election, most observers thought it would be a close race that needed to go to the second round (where the field is narrowed to two contenders).  As the Islamic regime says it happened, Ahmadinejad won 60+%, Mousavi won 32%, with Karroubi and Razaei winnin about 1% each.  On top of the sheer fabrication of those numbers, the “official” tally showed Ahmadinejad winning in ALL of Iran’s provinces (even the hometown of Mousavi – an Azeri – and Karroubi - an ethnic Lur).  Right. 

Why the numbers aren’t right: While some suggest that Ahmadinejad might have won the election anyway (I doubt it, but it’s possible), the sheer percentages in the provinces and regions is unbelievable.  For more on that, look here for the best analysis available on the numbers.  Another suggestion by some Iran observers is that only “upper class” or “middle class” rich people are rioting and that the poor support Ahmadinejad and put him into office.  I disagree with that completely but will leave it to Juan Cole and Michael Totten/Laura Secor to dispute the claim since they do it better than I could.

What happened next: Unfortunately, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, came out and certified the election count…twice.  That, in and of itself, was very odd.  Traditionally, the Interior Ministry releases the results, the Guardian Council certifies them and then the Supreme Leader approves the winner.  Why did they skip these steps? I don’t know…but they did.

As a result, people took to the streets (and they’re still there, by the way).  And when I say people, I mean millions (at least from according to sources here, here and here).  All across Iran.  Just as an aside, here are some of the chants going around: “We will fight, we will die, we will get our votes back”; “Down with the Dictator”.  Also, in a move reminiscent of the 1979 Revolution, people are going to their roofs and chanting “Allah u Akbar” (God is Great).

Glimmer of Hope?: Some in the West, though I guarantee you not in Iran, took heart when the Supreme Leader called on the Guardian Council to “look into the results.”  While it sounds great, it means almost nothing.  To understand why, you must understand the Guardian Council.  This body, intensely powerful in Iran, runs the elections in every conceivable way: they determine who can run, they determine what campaign slogans/advertisements are allowed, they conduct the election engineering and they certify the election results.  Unrelated to elections, the Guardian Council is also empowered to veto any legislation coming from the Majlis (Parliament).  The Guardian Council is composed of 12 clerics.  Six are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader and six are appointed by the Head of Judiciary, who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader.  In essence, the Supreme Leader controls 12 of 12 seats.  (Here is Gary Sick talking about the likelihood of the Guardian Council nullifying the elections).

Another source of hope is the fact that Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former President and one of the founders of the Islamic Republic, has joined the opponents of the regime in contesting the election.  Rafsanjani, in no way a “revolutionary” and still a believer in Islamic governance, is the head of the Assembly of Experts.  Why is that a source of hope?  Well, the Assembly of Experts has the power to appoint and remove the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.  If he manages to get enough support from the 84 member Assembly, he could conceivably remove Khamenei, nullify the election, and call for a recount.  Put me down as skeptical of this plan succeeding.  While Khamenei and his cohort were not wise in the method in which they rigged the election, he demonstrated one crucial point in his activity: keeping his power is the most important factor for Khamenei. 

There is simply no way Khamenei, not to mention the IRGC and Ahmadinejad, would allow Rafsanjani to pull this off if they thought he could get enough votes.  I would go so far as to say they would kill him first.  But it won’t come to that.  Some might wonder, “well why not?”.  Simple: he can’t get enough votes because the IRGC, which controls the majority of the economy at this point (construction, military weapons, nuclear program, etc), also has a strong voice among the “experts” on the Assembly of Experts.  I should say again, this is simply my opinion, so take it for what it is worth.

Ahmadinejad enters with his words of wisdom:In a way only Ahmadinejad could, Ahmadinejad downplayed the importance of the protests and declared that Iran is “the most stable country in the world” and that the protests are like the demonstrations of fans after a soccer match. 

Meanwhile, rumors were flying that Mousavi was under house arrest.  Whether that was true, is unclear.  Mousavi did show up at an election rally on Monday, however, suggesting that he was either released as a result of public pressure or was never under house arrest.

Where are we now?What is known is that the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards or Pasdaran) and the basiji (basically roving bands of thugs with clubs, machetes and guns that are ultra-loyal to the regime) have been authorized to use live fire in the crowds…and that people have died.  Numbers vary, but I would estimate somewhere between 10 and 20 (from unconfirmed sources) with hundreds having disappeared (look here, here or here).  That’s not to mention the high-level reformists who have been arrested.

Additionally, there are reports that IRGC and basiji are ransacking University’s, kidnapping students and destroying the computers in Esfahan, Tabriz and Tehran (the capital).  Also, people using Twitter are saying that the government is blocking cell phones, text messaging, facebook, Gmail, and confiscating satellites and jamming radio signals.  Jamming the radio signals, blocking cell phones and Internet sites is normal fare for the Iranians.  Even going and stealing satellite dishes has happened in the past.  Apparently, however, this is on a more massive scale than ever before.

With regards to the U.S. response – which is much less important than what is happening on the ground – I am torn.  I think that Obama has a tough line to walk.  As many commentators have noted, we don’t want to make this about us and offer Ahmadinejad a “political football” to use against the demonstrators (by calling them puppets of the Great Satan).  So, declaring the election fraudulent probably isn’t a good idea.  On the other hand, it would probably mean a lot to those protesting to know that people are with them.  I think Obama’s response last night was perfectly fine…though I might have liked to see a little more “we are all Iranians” type talk – leave aside the criticism of elections but let Iranians know we’re with them.

HAPPENING NOW: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who was originally meant to succeed Khomeini to the position of Supreme Leader until he voiced concerns over the Islamic propriety of the role, has made a statement here.  Basically says Ahmadinejad’s victory is a lie.  As the second-most important figure in Shia Islam alive (behind Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq), this is a huge development and a much needed boost for the opponents of Ahmadinejad I am sure.

Early Argentine mid-term elections?

Via Vittorio at The Olive and the Arrow, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has asked her country’s congress to move up presidential elections by four months.

Someone in the comments notes the Senate has approved. Kirchner has until Saturday to secure the consent of the lower house. If the Chamber of Deputies goes along, the election will be on June 28, 2009, instead of October 28, 2009.

According to the NYT article Vittorio links, “she wanted to give Argentines less to worry about in the face of the worsening global financial crisis.” That makes sense for Kirchner’s allies in congress if she assumes – probably correctly – that economic conditions will be worse in October than June. Unfortunately her bid appears to have accelerated the decline of investor confidence.