The Democratic Piece

Robert Amsterdam has a bit of exclusive news that, if true, seems to be really unsettling:

Here’s an interesting bit of exclusive news: a trusted colleague of mine has leaked to me copies of a series of worrying placards being printed right now in Moscow by the Nashi for distribution on Sunday following (or during) the successful elections. These items of propaganda urge Putin supporters to take to the streets in premature celebration, to defend the outcome before it is announced officially on Dec. 6. It is in many ways an open gesture of confession that even the Nashi don’t believe that a real election is taking place.

The posters use highly incendiary language and aggressive caricatures in the name of the president, similar to an exhortation to riot seen in other countries far less developed than Russia. I’m considerably concerned about this development, and I warn all friends and colleagues in Moscow to exercise extreme care in the days between the election and the announcement of results. It seems that the murder of a Yabloko candidate, the arrest and jailing of Kasparov and others, and the ongoing violence at any opposition rally isn’t enough to satisfy the Nashi. I fear the worst could still be yet to come.

We expect to post some scans of these materials on the blog within 24 hours.

I’ve written here before about Nashi. The “color revolutions” in Russia near abroad really unsettled the Kremlin. The development of popular demonstrations to overthrow seemingly entrenched regimes showed them the power of the public. Since, Putin has sought to do everything in his power to stymie the development of such organizations in Russia. One of the Kremlin’s solutions was to establish a uncivil society organization that could be called upon to counter any demonstrations. Nashi has been used in the months leading up to the election to intimidate opposition groups and demonstrations.

I  am sure this seems like a smart strategy now for Putin, but youth organizations are notoriously difficult to manage. They can reliably be called upon to demonstrate, but they can also turn on a regime. Putin is playing with fire, and sadly the rest of Russia could easily get burned.

This weekend there were a few interesting stories regarding the situation in Pakistan.

On Friday the BBC noted that the newly installed Pakistani Supreme Court ruled that Musharraf reelection in October was valid. No surpise there, but apparently the decision also stated that General Musharraf will have to step down as Chief-of-Staff of the Army before being sworn in for a new term.

The NYTimes covers Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan this weekend. Sharif first attempted to return back in September, but was forced back onto a plane heading back to Saudi Arabia. This is a huge blow to Musharraf who weeks before had vowed that Sharif would not be permitted to return to Pakistan. It is still unclear why this was permitted to occur, but it may be due to Musharraf’s waning influence. Perhaps the military pressured him to allow Sharif’s return so that the elections in January may appear more legitimate and coincide with Musharraf’s resignation, thus appearing to restore a facade of democracy to Pakistan and relieving international pressure.

Today’s NYTimes also had an interesting store on Pakistan’s burgeoning middle class. The story notes that Pakistan’s strong economic growth under Musharraf has resulted in a growing middle class. However, this new group has so far remained only somewhat politically engaged, but has recently grown somewhat disillusioned with the Musharraf government as corruption and political turmoil has hurt the economy. Importantly, the article notes that the middle class is also afraid of the threat of Islamic radicals, but doubt that the Musharraf government is able to handle the problem and that the US would support a new civilian regime.

If the US is losing the faith of the Pakistani middle class, we are truly losing Pakistan.

De Rebus Antiquis Et Novis again has a great post detailing some of the dirty campaign tactics being used against the opposition parties in the run up to the legislative elections on December 2nd.

I really recommend checking out his post and reading through the examples he has stumbled across, but this is my favorite from the batch:

In the town Balashov, Saratov region, people who planned to vote for Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Fair Russia) receive letters with condolences on the death of their relatives. All their relatives were alive. The fake letters were “signed” by Zinaida Samsonova, the candidate of Fair Russia.

He also notes a recent poll:

55.9% of the interviewees said that they will vote for the United Russia. 5.8% support the Communist Party, 4.7% support Liberal-Democratic Party, 4.9% will vote for the Fair Russia. The threshold for eligibility to win seats in Duma is 7%.

Two things should be noted about this. First, under the new electoral rules, there has to be at least two parties represented in the Duma. If only one party passes a 7% threshold, then the second place party with the strongest showing is awarded seats in the Duma. I am not sure how may seats that party will actually get, but obviously too few to be an real opposition. However, it does also allow for the Kremlin to maintain a “two-party” democratic facade.

Second, my Russian is pretty rusty but I scanned the linked article regarding the poll. The numbers described in De Rebus’ post did not quite add up, so I wanted to see what the article said directly.  The article notes that 13.3% of the respondents were “undecided.” If you take all the totals listed in the article (55.9%, 5.8%, 4.7%, 4.9%, and 13.3%), 15% is still unaccounted for? If I remember correctly, there are 11 parties cleared to run in this election. Is this 15% spread amongst the remaining 7 parties?

The article also notes that the poll shows party support amongst those respondents who were “likely to vote.” In that grouping, United Russia receives 63.8%, the Communists 7.3%, Fair Russia (Kremlin-created opposition party) at 6%, and the Liberal-Democratic Party at 5.2%. This may be a more realistic assessment of party-support than that listed in De Rebus’ post.

Hopefully De Rebus will continue to post the updates regarding the election environment. He’s on the ground and in a unique position to bring these things to light to the Western and English-reading observers. This is even more important considering that the OSCE will not be observing these elections and are unable to comment on the pre-election campaign environment.

As I’ve mentioned here before, the Russia is in the middle of legislative elections. The elections are scheduled for December 2nd, but no one expects the process to be transparent or the electoral environment to be fair. The OSCE announced last week that it is unable to send its regular observation team to evaluate the Russian elections because delays on the part of Russia in terms of invitations and visas.

De Rebus Antiquis Et Novis, a blog that typically specializes on Russian history, had an interesting post today about the electoral environment.  While there have been multiple reports about campaign literature of opposition parties being seized so that it may be examined for “extremist” messages, this is truly a new low in Russian politics (brackets are mine).

I was told yesterday of new leaflets posted on the walls in one of the districts of Samara. The text was like this: “Dear citizens, the Union of the Rightist Forces (SPS) [a pro-market, pro-democracy opposition party with support typically ranging from 3-6% under the old electoral rules] informs you that we have asked AIDS-infected people to participate in our campaign to disseminate printed materials and to participate in the public opinion polls as interviewers. Please, be tolerant towards them.”

Considering the AIDS-phobia, imagine the reaction of the average people when an SPS interviewer would knock their doors… I’ve never heard of such tricks before.

It appears that President Musharraf is playing his cards exactly right in order for him to maintain his grip on power while still complying with demands (of varying intensity and credibility) from the US and other Western donor states, and the opposition movement.  In the last two days, Musharraf has announced that elections will be held in February, that restrictions on foreign media imposed on Saturday will be lifted, and that he will resign as army chief of staff very soon.  All of these promises have been made, however, without reference to specific dates.  The BBC has a good summary of events in the last few days here.

Musharraf’s promises have had two major effects:

1. They have drawn the wind from the sails of some opposition figures who claim that Musharraf is only interested in maintaining his own power at the expense of Pakistani democracy.  While they might be right (and I’m inclined to think that they are), it has suddenly become harder to rally their supporters in blatant defiance of the ban on demonstrations in place since saturday.
2. They have eased the pressure on the US and its allies to make good on their rhetorical support for democracy with genuine action.  Now that Musharraf has made vague moves toward fulfilling the conditions set out by President Bush and Secretary Rice this week for continued US support (don’t delay elections, lift emergency restrictions, and take off the uniform), there is less immediacy on the Bush administration (from Congress, the media, Europe, etc.) to withdraw aid or rhetorical solidarity from Musharraf.

While the president is walking his fine line, however, trouble is brewing in Rawalpindi.  The town, located about 30 miles from Islamabad, is scheduled to be the location of a major opposition rally (in defiance of the emergency order) tomorrow, led by former Prime Minister Bhutto.  The rally had been scheduled prior to Musharraf’s declaration of emergency rule, and was supposed to be a ‘historic welcome‘ for Bhutto as she returned from exile.  It may still be historic, but it will be far from welcoming.  Additionally, Bhutto has threatened to call out her supporters in a long march from Lahore to Ismalabad to protest the extra-constitutional rule of Musharraf. 

For now, we’ll have to wait and see what happens in Pakistan tomorrow.

In his monthly column in Sunday’s Washington Post, the Carnegie Endowment’s Robert Kagan argues that free elections should come first in the struggle against autocracy.  My colleague here at the Democratic Piece, Danny Adams, posted his thoughts on this issue earlier this week, arguing that in many ways this approach makes a lot of sense.  Naturally, democracies need elections.  While I agree with his assertion that the “priority should be democracy first, not only development,” I think Kagan misses the broader point: ‘elections first’ is often just as bad of a policy choice as focusing solely on economic development.

Kagan’s argument mirrors the Bush administration’s strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq: if you have elections, democracy will follow.  I think it is safe to say at this point that having elections first in each of these countries was at the very least unhelpful in moving either country toward sustainable democratic government.  Without a stable security situation, developed political parties, and a set of institutions that allow the elected government to effectively govern, elections can often do more to solidify a certain set of interests rather than lay the foundations for democracy.

Kagan points to Russia as an example of a ‘resilient autocracy’ whose rulers have been strengthened rather than undermined by its increased integration into the world economy.  Certainly this seems to be the case in Putin’s oil-rich Russia.  He forgets, however, the period shortly following the fall of the Soviet Union when Western governments were promoting democracy equally as much as economic liberalization and development in Russia.  While there is debate on how democratic Russia actually was between 1993 (first Duma election) and 1999 (Putin comes to power), it cannot be conveniently forgotten that elections did come first in Russia, and in many ways they contributed to the current backsliding we see there.

If we’ve learned anything from the past two decades of democracy promotion efforts, in which elections have played the starring role, it’s this: elections have consequences that do not always have a positive impact on a country’s transition to democracy.  We need to learn from our past mistakes and realize that, while necessary, elections don’t always come first.

A Russian court ruled that the headquarters for the Union of Russian Journalist must close for at least three months. This is of course an extremely suspicious move ahead of the parliamentary elections next month. Some suspect this action occurred because the Union permitted opposition groups to use its facilities for press conferences.

Every day Russia becomes more of a sham.

The Russian Election Commission announced the specifics for the international election observation missions permitted to cover the upcoming December 2, 2007 Duma elections. Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor has a good breakdown of the minutia.

Russia will allow a total of 400 election observers. This is a significant reductions from the approximately 1,200 observers they allowed for the 2003 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, invitations were not sent out until this week. In 2003 the invitations were sent out in September, a full three months before the election took place. This allowed for observers to conduct a preelection assessment of the electoral environment. These teams were able to gage factors that can impact the outcome of an election that are not necessarily reflected in the vote count. Issues such as access to media, the ability of various parties to campaign, use of official position and powers to carry out campaign work, and the production and auditing of voter lists are all important aspects of an election that can not be adequately assessed in the course of a month.

Another major issue in this announcement is that the OSCE’s election observation team will be limited to 50 people. That is down from approximately 400 in 2003. The other 450 observers will be form a host of different international organizations and countries. Also, observation groups will be prohibited from making any comments regarding the electoral process or outcome until all of the votes have been counted and an official result has been announced.

So the Kremlin says.

Last week the EU and Russia sat down for a regular summit. Russia made a surprising announcement during the course of the event: Russia would begin to fund think tanks in Europe to protect human rights and promote democracy. The new think tank organization may be located in Brussels or another European capital.

Asserting that the EU and US regularly provide funds to civil society organizations in Russia, the Kremlin argued that their establishment of an Russia-funded organization would be natural outgrowth of Russia’s development as a modern state.

Right…

The institute may focus on the treatment of Slavic populations in the EU, especially in the Baltic states.

The increasing sophistication of the use of “soft power” by Russia is impressive. This development is related to the story that emerged last week about Russia’s proposal for a new set of standards for OSCE election observation missions. Needless to say, these new standards would do nothing more than tie the hands of the OSCE to make the election observation branch more toothless than it is already.

The gaming continues as the authoritarian states of Eurasia adapt. How will Europe, and the United States, respond?

Russia is gearing up for its election season this winter. The Duma, Russia’s legislature, will stand for election in December and Russia is set to elect a new president in March. As I’ve noted on the DP before, democracy in Russia is on life support. Regional governors are no longer elected, the activity of civil society organizations have been curtailed by new laws and registration requirements, long-standing parties have been denied registration, and the independent media has slowly been consumed by the Russian state or Kremlin allies.

While there is little doubt that the upcoming elections will fail to meet international standards and the results will strengthen the Kremlin’s hand, much can be gleaned from the process. The manner in which these elections are carried out will tell outsiders to what extent the Kremlin will go to solidify its hold on power.

Furthermore, the Putin-succession process adds to the drama of the election season. While some observers think that Putin’s recent announcement that he would agree to head the party list for United Russia may indicate Putin’s intention to redirect power to the prime minister’s office, I doubt that is likely to occur. I still believe that Vladimir has a few more twists and turns up his sleeves in the coming months.

I’m going to try and post some interesting stories related to this process during the next few months. While I can’t promise daily commentary, I’ll try to at least link to interesting stories in the press and posts from other blogs.

There are a few interesting stories today that are worth pointing out:

• Carnegie’s Morning Brief links to a NYTimes story detailing the Kremlin’s attempt to further extend government control over the Internet. The take away from this article, besides increased state control, is the extent that the Kremlin is using “pro-Putin” youth group to counter opposition groups, even in blog coverage of protest events.
• In the lead up to the parliamentary elections, the Russian government has reached an “agreement” with food producers and retailers to institute a freeze on prices. Inflation and price increases in basic foodstuffs in recent weeks has made the Kremlin uneasy. After all, when your legitimacy is tenuous when basing your legitimacy on circuses and bread, and the bread is too expensive.
• Pro-Putin demonstrations have recently taken place across the country. The events, allegedly organized by state officials, are urging Putin to stay on as president after his second term ends in March. The take-away: the extent of the cult of personality around Putin is strong. Don’t be surprised to see a “grass-roots” movement seek to change the constitution or pressure Putin’s successor to step down.
• Eleven parties have been approved by the Election Commission to contest in the December elections. Three parties were barred because of problems with the membership signatures turned into the Election Commission for registration. The take-away: eleven parties is a significant amount. Given Russia’s new PR electoral system with a 7% threshold to enter the Duma, this could lead to an utter sweep by United Russia, the pro-Putin party of power. A recent opinion poll stated that approximately 66% of voters plan to vote for United Russia in December.
• Lastly, the Russian Election Commission announced that Russia will invite international observers for the December 2 parliamentary elections. The invitations will be sent out this week and the delegation is expected to reach 400 people. The take-away: While it is good that Russia is finally inviting the monitors, it is too late for any meaningful oversight to be implemented. Obersvation missions typically have a smaller group that observes and analyzes the pre-election evironment and election process months in advance of election day. Additionally, this mission will be signiciantly smaller than previous missions. For the 2003 parliamentary elections the OSCE sent 400 observers alone. The 400 this time will include observers from the OSCE and the Nordic Council, along with the shame election monitoring organizations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States.