IRV for the United Kingdom?

The British House of Commons yesterday approved a bill authorizing an electoral reform referendum by 365 to 187 votes. That bill now must pass the House of Lords before the present parliament expires. If the Lords do as the Commons have, a referendum on the alternative vote (AV, also known to Americans as instant runoff voting, or IRV) will be due by October 2011.

More from the UK Electoral Reform Society; ERS’ Twitter feed; the Twitter feed of FairVote, ERS’ sister organization in the US; a FairVote blog post; and a spirited discussion in the comments of Fruits and Votes on the merits of AV for minor parties.

Institutionalist observers have speculated a lot on Labor’s self-interested reasons for finally pursuing electoral system reform in the United Kingdom. See, for example, Fruits and Votes once again on earlier, broken promises to do the same. One line of thinking holds AV is a compromise that Labour can use to buy Liberal Democrat support for a minority government after elections this year, which are expected to go badly for Gordon Brown’s government. Another line of thinking sees the potential for preference-trading among LDP and Labor supporters to boost the parties’ shared seat total.¹ ERS’ official position can be summarized thus: it’s not proportional representation, but AV is a step in the right direction.

Notably, according to the BBC, Parliament rejected 476-69 a LDP proposal for an earlier referendum on proportional representation by the single transferable vote.

1. Note, however, that some British observers have projected AV to benefit the Tories instead. What’s more, any such effect would be moot, as electoral system change would come long after this spring’s elections.

Can the Democracy Index cause election reform?

There is much ado in the blogosphere this week about the Democracy Index. Briefly, Yale law professor Heather Gerken has proposed ranking US states by level of quality of election administration. Her proposed index includes framework-based indicators (i.e. voting equipment integrity and registration procedures) as well as implementation indicators (i.e. time spent waiting to vote).¹ Rick Hasen calls the book “highly recommended,” and it has drawn the attention of AEI, the Pew Center on the States and Brookings, among others.

Many believe the index will create incentives to reform election management procedures. While Gerken’s project portends the systematic gathering of useful data, I am less convinced by claims about its capacity to foment reform.

According to the authors, the index should advance change in three ways: giving policymakers an empirical basis for standards development, informing voters so they can hold politicians accountable, and making states want higher rankings. This last point is getting the most play.

According to Gerken:

[The index] should work for the same reason that college rankings have such a dramatic effect on university decision making: no one wants to be at the bottom of the list.

Ed Foley offers further thoughts on the university rankings analogy:

Building upon a similar call by my Moritz colleague Dan Tokaji for the collection of reliable statistics relevant to policy judgments about election administration (as Gerken graciously acknowledges), the piece seeks a hard-number formula that would embarrass states with low scores. This embarrassment, in turn, would generate momentum for reform that would feed on itself in a cyclical “race to the top,” as low-scoring states leapfrog over previously higher-ranking ones, which having now slipped in the rankings would undertake initiatives to reestablish their superiority, and so forth.

Anyone familiar with how similar numerical rankings exert competitive pressures on law schools (and universities generally) to improve their performances according to the criteria used to determine these rankings, a phenomenon Gerken herself invokes in support of her proposal, knows the power of these numbers and thus the truth of Gerken’s insight.

Andrew Gelman shares this optimism:

What makes Gerken’s proposal particularly appealing is its feature of using open sharing of information to create incentives for states and localities to improve their electoral systems, by setting up specific targets that voters can follow.

Because the average voter’s expected benefit from election reform is relatively low, election management quality rankings will not work the same way that university rankings do. Consumers choose universities² according to their rankings, but voters are unlikely to move to higher ranked states. First, the cost of exit is too high. Second, even if it were not, voters almost certainly choose where to live for other reasons: economic conditions, climate, proximity to family, et cetera.

Democracy rankings are similarly unlikely to cause voters to vote out politicians who are not progressive about electoral reform. Most people simply care more about other issues. Even in good economic times, taxes and gay marriage will be higher priorities than maximizing the ease of voting or, for that mater, the competitiveness of a state legislative district.³

Finally, thinking that states – or the politicians in them who actually make decisions – will maximize state rankings overlooks the extent to which election administration is politicized. In an ideal United States, the default would be for government to maximize everyone’s ability to vote. In a world without 100% turnout or valid ballot rates, however, affecting those rates often has partisan implications.⁴ Consider Bush v. Gore, which permitted Florida officials to stop counting votes to the benefit of George W. Bush. Or Ohio 2004, when officials set unreasonable paper weight requirements for voter registration forms. Or recent broils over voter ID, persistent opposition to more universal voter registration, and the Rhode Island governor’s repeated refusal to let high school students pre-register. In close elections, control of the system is control of the outcome. Most politicians maximize partisan control, not democracy scores.

That said, I share the passion of Prof. Gerken and the other commentators for data and research-based advocacy. I also share her passion for raising election reform in voters’ preference orderings. If the index does effect reform, though, it likely will be through those rare but crucial public officials whose charisma and agenda-setting ability sometimes result in fairer elections.

1. Andrew Gelman notes how it also could incorporate minor parties’ concerns about issues like ballot access.
2. Especially law schools, where rankings heavily influence the prospects for job interviews after graduation.
3. California voters’ passage of independent redistricting may seem an exception. However this did not depend on “throwing the bums out,” as the reform (narrowly) passed at referendum.
4. ADDENDUM 4/6/09: Simon Jackman has a good post arguing that compulsory voting is the main reason for Australia’s high-quality election architecture. Quote: “In short, if the state wants to make something compulsory, then it has to make compliance easy, and that is essentially one of the chief things the AEC does, and does pretty well.”

STV in British Columbia?

Just a quick note to record the upcoming May 12 referendum on the single transferable vote in British Columbia. The pro side is running a good website at www.stv.ca. Here is the government’s page.

This is BC’s second referendum on electoral reform. In 2005, STV came within 2.3 points of winning, and majorities in 77 of 79 ridings (districts) supported it. The provincial government had set the threshold for passage at simple majorities (50% + 1) in at least 60% of BC’s ridings and a 60% supermajority province-wide. The same thresholds will apply this time. However the government is funding more extensive voter education, including recognized for and against groups.

The first referendum spawned this useful flash animation on how STV works.

District magnitudes will range from two to seven, with most in the four- to five-seat range. Surplus transfers will be fractional. Voters will not be required to use all rankings. It does not appear that the referendum will affect the number of members of the legislative assembly (MLAs); instead this number appears to be a function of population.

This is on the ballot because the province, like Ontario, convened a Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform. Under that reform model, people not connected to politics meet, learn about electoral systems, decide whether they want reform, and adjudicate among the options. Some see the citizens’ assembly as a way to achieve electoral reform where self-interested lawmakers otherwise would not pass such legislation.

STV for Wash., DC

My op-ed with Rob Richie in today’s Washington Times:

Electoral rules may be boring, but Tuesday’s D.C. Council election saw them fail. While Congress designed the District’s system to let voters in the minority elect a winner, it misfired on Nov. 4. Now that the council is effectively single-party, it’s time to implement a system that guarantees the intended outcome…

Yes on Cincinnati issue 8

Most TDP readers know that Cincinnati will vote on proportional representation (STV/choice voting) in November. This is an historic and crucial reform opportunity.

The Cincinnati Better Ballot Campaign runs a website worth sharing. If someone you know lives in Cincinnati, pass it along.

Hawaii joins National Popular Vote

Hawaii’s state legislature has overridden the governor’s veto of the state-based plan to elect the president by national, popular vote, according to a Common Cause news release. That means the compact now has four member states accounting for 50 total electors: MD, IL, NJ and the Aloha state.

Until now, the only states to ratify NPV have had united, Democratic governments. Otherwise it has died on Republican governors’ desks or in Republican legislatures. Hawaii is the first state to break the pattern – sort of.

See plan co-author Rob Richie’s comment on NPV’s background and prospects from the perspective of a movement leader. Just because Hawaii only breaks the pattern “sort of” doesn’t mean we can’t have a normal presidential election by 2012. After all, electoral reform is about defying the model predictions.

“What-if games” and the VT IRV veto

Last week, Vermont governor Jim Douglas vetoed legislation to elect the state’s congressional delegation by instant runoff voting.

The New Yorker’s Hendrik Hertzberg wrote a good critique of Douglas’ veto message. Hendrik is probably right that partisan calculations decided the matter, but the governor gave other reasons. Some were factually incorrect (e.g. the current system is 200 years old). Others were tired spin (e.g. bastardized understandings of “one person, one vote” that IRV somehow violates).

One novel argument stood out:

Moreover, voters should not be asked to cast their ballots based on a wide range of hypothetical, theoretical or imaginary outcomes.

I take it to mean: IRV raises the information costs of strategic voting. Douglas earlier had fed this argument to the Burlington Free Press, which editorialized against IRV on March 25:

While backers tout instant runoff voting — IRV for short — as a way to increase the voters’ say, what it really does is mess with the process of marking the ballot, forcing people to vote in both a real election and, as the governor said, a hypothetical one [...] Many voters might play the “what if” game in choosing whom to vote for when there is more than two candidates in the race, but that kind of conjecture has no place on the official ballot.

While technically correct under certain conditions, this is a bad argument against reform for at least three reasons. One, those conditions are rare. Two, no voting system is strategy-proof. Three, strategic voting is less important under IRV than under plurality.

Why do governors even bother explaining vetoes of election reform bills?

IL signs onto National Popular Vote

Illinois’ governor today signed the interstate compact to elect the President by national, popular vote.

Illinois is the third state to ratify the agreement, joining New Jersey and Maryland. NPV’s website reports the compact now accounts for one-sixth of the electoral votes needed to bring it into effect.

Here is what the governor said:

“This nation is built on the principle ‘for the people, by the people.’ By signing this law, we in Illinois are making it clear that we believe every voter has an equal voice in electing our nation’s leaders.”

The case for Nader

Ralph has decided to run again, and he’s getting a beating for it. The argument goes like this: Green-leaning candidates “take” votes away from Democrats. This particular election is so critical that “we” can’t afford to lose. Nader therefore should do the “right” thing and withdraw.

I want to make the case for Nader’s candidacy. This is not an endorsement of the man or his program. His decision to run urges consideration of structural ‘democracy problems’ in America. 2008 may be more critical than 2004, 2000, 1932, 1896 or even 1796, but that doesn’t mean we should ignore our democracy problems. Run-of-the-mill condemnation of Nader reflects a choice to do just that.

The Democratic Party would benefit from three reforms that Nader’s run brings to mind. A direct election for President would decrease third party “spoiler” impact by taking the emphasis off battleground states. Remember Florida 2000. Second, instant runoff voting would translate most votes for Greens into votes for Democrats. Third, proportional representation would undo the conservative bias in Congressional elections that inheres in the nexus of our partisan geography and winner-take-all elections. In a sense, PR would unpack the packedness of those population-dense districts Democrats tend to inhabit.

The absence of each reform is a democracy problem. The electoral college¹ silences voters in “safe” states and sometimes crowns the wrong winner. Plurality elections force voters to support candidates they don’t like and candidates to pay lip service to those voters, lest they defect to a spoiler like Nader. And the only real diversity of opinion in our two-party Congress comes from members’ personal predispositions. These old institutions diminish democracy for everyone.

If bad institutions hurt more people than Democrats, why the concern with Democrats? They are the likely agents of change. Politicians don’t improve institutions out of commitment to democracy. Reforms are self-interested. Nader’s candidacy underscores Democrats’ overall vulnerability in the present party system-cum-electoral system. As the vulnerable camp, with majorities in both houses and a prospect for united government in 2009, Democrats are best positioned to effect electoral reform.

Yet they don’t take their vulnerability seriously. Hence the case for Nader.

Two scenarios confront the Democratic Party. One is to learn the hard way. Nader costs the Dems another election, they make the institutions-outcomes connection, and they become a party of reform. The other option: skip step one, make the connection, and become a party of reform.

To blame Nader is to shoot the messenger. The conversation should be about lasting solutions. Browbeating Greens to depress their turnout, if doable at all, is not a lasting solution.

1. No caps; it’s a common noun.