Friedman cites the Freedom House index for 2008. Attention to where and why ratings fell reveals a more complex causal narrative.

Military interventions in democratic politics drove down ratings in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Faulty, stolen or generally unfree elections affected the Comorros, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Russia.

Political violence rocked Sri Lanka, Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Insurgency or generally rising insecurity eroded freedom in the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Afghanistan.

Media crackdowns drove down ratings in Georgia, Mali, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela and, arguably, the Solomon Islands, where governing authorities refused to address criticism related to a cabinet appointment.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and organization increased in Burma, Lesotho and Venezuela.

Whether by violence, intimidation or dubious institutional reengineering, executives eroded checks and balances in Malawi, Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Egypt.

Overt opposition crackdowns took place in Congo-Kinshasa, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Corruption and the entrenchment of economic oligarchies diminished freedom in Chad, Latvia, the Philippines, Tunisia, Burma, Madagascar and Somalia.

In Switzerland, the election of overt racists merited demotion.

Government paralysis earned negative points in Lebanon.

The infiltration of state and military by drug cartels drove down ratings for Guinea-Bissau.

While Freedom House’s executive summary does mention oil in two other places, only in Chad does it cite falling transparency in the “management of oil revenues.”

Next year’s report no doubt will cite eroding executive-legislative relations in Russia, a(n attempted?) stolen election in Zimbabwe, and whatever dubious constitutional amendments, opposition crackdowns, exiles and media shutdowns the remainder of 2008 brings. It will be interesting to see how Chinese ‘foreign aid’ packages and the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation figure in.

Overall, freedom declined in 38 nominal democracies. The dominant sources of backslide were corruption, media and opposition crackdowns, state weakness, deliberate election mismanagement and entrenchments of executive power.

Oil dependence is a big problem for the US and even the rest of the world, but it is not the principal driver of “democratic recession.” Alongside more structural problems of uneven economic development and state capacity are growing gaps between flagship democracies’ missions to spread freedom and their wills and means to do so. On one hand, emphasis on stability is replacing their post-Cold War emphasis on democratization. On the other, aid conditionality loses efficacy as rising authoritarian states like China and Russia reach out to Africa and Central Asia.

If democracy is to boom in the last seven months of 2008, the old democracies need to (1) renew their commitment to democratization and (2) cooperate to balance the soft power of authoritarian alternatives.

the Duma passed an amendment to the mass media law that adds slander to the list of unmentionables such as revealing state secrets, supporting terrorism, advocating pornography, and promoting violence. The law doesn’t use the word “slander” but redefined it with “intentionally false information,” which, of course, is just about anything. Perhaps more important than the vague, elastic language is the fact that the amendment gives the Ministry of Justice the power to issue warnings to media outlets for publishing slanderous and libelous material. Two warnings in twelve months allows Justice to shut the media outlet down pending trial.

As Sean also notes, this come on the heels of a recent newspaper being shut down for publishing a story detailing an alleged affair between Putin and a former Russian Olympic Gymnast turned Duma MP. Putin denied the probably false rumor, but the newspaper was shut down days later because of “funding problems.” It is not hard to imagine that this amendment may even be in response to the irresponsible story of a single paper, but I guess the Duma has a duty to protect the integrity of the state Putin.

While Russia has had loose “libel laws” that allowed individuals to sue media organizations for what they print, this is a marked step in a direction towards legalized state coercion of the media – although they already own (partially or in full) most of the television and radio outlets.

This event also dovetails nicely with Freedom House’s recent annual report of Global Press Freedom in the World. Freedom House found, unsurprisingly, that the freedom of the Russian press had declined. (The draft text, maps and pretty charts are available here.)

This report was drafted before this amendment was passed. Putin’s Russia is surely in a sad state when a Freedom House report is out of date before it’s even off the presses.

“The U.S. should never retreat from its role as a defender of human rights, one whose support struggling democratic activists around the globe have looked to for decades,” said Ms. Windsor. “While adherence to democratic principles and respect for human rights cannot always be the sole foreign policy consideration for the U.S. in its bilateral relations, they can and should always be a key element of U.S. relations with all countries. The U.S. should demonstrate a preference for democracy whenever it can.”

Windsor’s comments come in light of remarks President Bush made this week in support of his good friend, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, calling him a partner in the promotion of democracy.  Pervez, a military general who took power in 1999 as a result of a coup, has been a consistent recipient of praise and support from President Bush for his cooperation with America’s global war on terror.  Unfortunately for America’s credibility abroad, he has also been a consistent autocrat, who has made no serious attempt to bring about a return of democratic government in his country.

Windsor’s comments bring this serious disjuncture between rhetoric and policy into clear focus, as she points out a continuous lack of commitment to promoting democracy and human rights that is manifested in our foreign policy stances on Azerbaijan, Cuba, and Egypt – three countries in which security, economic, or ideological interests have caused us to look the other way. 

 In words reminiscent of President Bush describing America’s commitment to freedom in his second inaugural address, Jennifor Windsor extolls policymakers to renew their commitment to that noble ideal, which has been cheapened by America’s recent inconsistencies in applying it:

“In our dealings with foreign governments and their citizens, we should never allow our core values of human rights and democracy to fall off the table. Instead of ignoring this commitment because it appears to be too difficult, we should renew our efforts and consider new and innovative ways to help those who need it most.” 

Reports have Other Russia’s turnout between 2,000 – 3,000 people in Pushkin Square, while Police turnout numbered around 9,000. Garry Kasparov, the nominal leader of Other Russia which is a loose coalition of opposition groups, was arrested, charged with “shouting anti-government slogans in the presence of a large group of people.”

Although Other Russia received permission at the last minute to hold a rally, it was unable to acquire permission to hold a march. After the rally in Pushkin Square, part of the rally contingent attempted to march down one of Moscow’s main streets. Citing the illegal nature of the march because of lack of permit, the Russian government ordered the gathering to be dispersed. The response by the police was swift. Over 200 marchers (and apparently bystanders) were quickly arrested or beaten my the police. Although the cohesion of Other Russia is questioned, there is no doubt that the Kremlin is concerned about growing opposition to its policies and moves to tighten political competition.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a fascinating process of political change. To say the least, the situation in Russia is complex. The unsustainable chaos that characterized the political environment of the early 1990s resulted in an ineffective reform process, which tainted democracy in much of the Russian public. Democracy, as pushed by Western advisers and economic liberals, became associated with gridlock, corruption, oligarch enrichment, and chaos.

While no one would argue that Russia ever met the criteria of a “liberal democracy”, the extent of political competition that occurred through the 1990′s was genuine. Parties, politicians, ideas, and policy platforms competed in a fairly open political environment. Since the transition from Yeltsin, Russia has gradually slide from its strong-presidential system toward the “managed” democracy farce that Putin heads. This change has been gradual as the government has sought to slowly restrict the political arena by implementing regulations limiting speech, hindering the ability of civil society organizations to form and placing hurdles for political party formation.

This strategy has been complemented by a corresponding group of pro-Kremlin oligarchs to gain control of media outlets and bankrolling pro-Putin parties in elections. A perfect example of this dual creep is the recent NYTimes article covering a new policy implemented by the new owners of Russia’s largest independent radio network that 50 percent of all news coverage be “good news.”

To say the least, the current state of Russian politics is complicated. While there still is a strong desire of the Russian population to participate in the selecting of their leaders, Putin continues to ride a wave of popular approval. His approval has been buoyed by the strong economic growth accompanying continued high energy prices and the resulting strong economic growth. However, the moves to limit political contestation can lead to longer-term problems for the ruling elite as they become increasingly isolated from popular opinion and the impetus it can serve to change ineffective and unpopular policies.

So where does this leave the West and its efforts in democracy promotion? First, the West will have to acknowledge and adapt to operating in a hostile environment. The West is no longer working in the immediate post-Soviet environment where almost each state had a nascent, unstable government, which are hungry for foreign aid, be it political, economic or technical. Sixteen years later, new political systems and regimes are entrenched in the former Soviet states. Some have made democratic transitions, but the majority exist in the gray area between liberal democracy and autocratic regimes. These new non-democratic regimes have consolidated support bases that have an interest in maintaining the status quo. In order to prevent the potentially destabilizing influence of of democracy promotion, these governments have implemented legal regimes that create a difficult, if not hostile, environment in which most democracy promotion activities take place.

Second, new strategies and approaches must be developed for working in such environments. I do not sure if it means pursuing confrontational strategies similar to those used against regimes like those in Belarus. Most likely these blunt programs will be counterproductive in states like Russia, which are strategically important and hold significant international sway in issues important such as Iran. However, there needs to be a renewed effort speak truth to and support democratic forces in non-democratic states, even if they are strategically important.

The prospects of this occurring are dim. A recent report by Freedom House highlights the sharp decline in US support for Human Rights and Civil Society. Russia is specifically mentioned in the report’s analysis. I’ll hopefully be addressing this report and broader US strategy in an upcoming post.