Facing the Democracy/Security Distinction

The conflict in Georgia returns us to the familiar topic of democracy losing out to security considerations. It is argued that Western powers—most especially the United States—lacked the will and means to defend Georgia’s fledgling democracy in its moment of peril.

The debate is not new; in a much different context, Jeane Kirkpatrick famously argued that the Carter administration erred in its focus on “human rights” at the expense of national security.

Does the democracy/security distinction remain appropriate? Robert Kagan does not think so. Kagan contends that the division between democracy promotion and national security has been erased by the shift in foreign policy demanded by the attacks of 9/11.
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Russia ate NATO’s carrot

With Russian troops now within 25 miles of Tbilisi, the U.S. has stepped up its tough talk on Russia.  But regardless of how the military situation plays out, the democracy agenda has been dealt a serious blow.

Press Conference

Today, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice gave a joint press conference with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.  Saakashvili decried looting and what he referred to as “ethnic cleansing” by Russian forces and irregulars.  He also made grim reference to a report released yesterday by Human Rights Watch blaming 11 civilian deaths and several injuries on the Russian use of cluster bombs, which Saakashvili called “an inhuman weapon.”  [In the interest of full disclosure, the United States does not renounce the use of cluster bombs.]

Saakashvili called the Russian invasion an effort “to kill Georgian democracy, and to end the independence of Georgia.”  He defiantly added, “Russia has lots of tanks, but no tank is enough to crush the will of a free people.”

The Response of International Institutions

For her part, Secretary Rice demanded that Russia respect the ceasefire agreement signed today, and withdraw its forces from Georgia.  (At the time, they were a mere 25 miles away.)  She also called on the international community to hurry to provide observers and a peacekeeping force, which would deny Russia an excuse to stay.  The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) began to take steps that would up its current number of observers in Georgia from 200 to 300, but this would require all 56 member-states to sign off.

Meanwhile in Washington, President Bush delivered a strong condemnation of Moscow at the White House.  In it, he said the U.S. would work with members of the G-7 to resolve the crisis, thus seemingly kicking Russia out of the G-8 club with one word.  This would follow on the heels on Monday’s conference call among foreign ministers of the G-8 sans Russia.  This kind of diplomatic response is a sure step in the right direction, but a sign that the West is nowhere near prepared to bare its teeth.  No surprise there – if it were, this would never have happened.

HEY!  Who ate our carrot?

Which leaves one questioning the relevance of NATO.  Before the Russian invasion, Georgia was actively trying to join NATO.  The U.S. was pressing other members on its behalf, without success.  In a world where Russia is expected to keep quietly to itself, the U.S. could offer the prospect of NATO membership as an inducement to states to implement democratic reforms.  Reforms would gradually take place, and the entire eastern European neighborhood would benefit from having more democratically inclined neighbors in it. 

But now the calculus is quite different.  With the real Russia unmasked for all the world to see, joining NATO becomes much more serious business for all parties concerned, for several reasons.  First, with the United States tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, an American promise to come to the aid of aggrieved European allies looks – for the foreseeable future – a lot like an empty threat.  This means that even as countries like Georgia and Ukraine want NATO membership with increasing urgency, it stands to do them less and less good.  They could bend over backwards to implement reforms – right up until the Russians marched in.

Second, even if we had a free hand, our security policy would likely trump our democracy policy, as it has many times before.  In a rush to extend NATO membership, the United States would be willing to overlook democratic gains – or lack thereof.

Third, even if we had a free hand and prospective members suddenly became advanced consolidated democracies, a Russian menace decreases the likelihood that any of our other NATO partners want to risk war with Russia by entering into an alliance.

All of this spells trouble for the democracy agenda.  

The Conflict in Georgia

Before just recently, you might not have heard much from Russia.  Our post-Cold War world had more than its share of troubles, to be sure.  But the Russians, at least, weren’t supposed to be invading neighboring states.

Oops.

As anyone who watches the news is aware, Georgia is in big trouble right now.  The truce brokered by French President Sarkozy on Tuesday (under which both sides return their forces to positions held prior to last week) apparently isn’t taken by Russia’s government to mean that its forces must cease advancing on Georgian cities.  With Wednesday’s occupation of Gori (only 40 miles from the capital city Tbilisi) which effectively cut the country in half, and President Bush’s announcement that the U.S. would begin flying humanitarian aid into the capital, the situation took on an appearance reminiscent of the Berlin Airlift.

The Berlin airlift was a multinational effort in response to the Soviet Union’s blockade of Berlin.  Oxford University fellow Robert Service, in his excellent A History of Modern Russia (2002), describes it as follows:

In the same month [June 1948] there were diplomatic clashes among the Allies when Stalin announced a blockade of Berlin.  The German capital, which lay in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, had been divided into four areas administered separately by the USSR, the USA, Britain and France.  Stalin was responding to an American attempt to introduce the Deutschmark as the unit of currency in Berlin, an attempt he regarded as designed to encroach on the USSR’s economic prerogatives in the Soviet zone.  His blockade, he expected, would swiftly produce the requested concessions from the Western powers.  But no such thing happened.  After several weeks he had to back down because the Americans and [their] allies airlifted food supplies to their areas in the German capital.  Neither side in the dispute wished to go to war over Berlin, and tensions subsided.  (p. 310)

Today, we are faced with a strikingly similar situation.  Russia views Western ties with Georgia as meddling in its back yard.  In the eyes of Vladimir Putin & Co., NATO’s September 2006 decision to enter into a period of “intensified dialogue” with Georgia (not a guarantee of membership, but a step in that direction) is, at best, a diminution of Russian influence in the Caucuses, and, at worst, a threat to Russian security.

So Moscow seems to be pursuing a strategy that harkens back to 1948 Berlin: cut off supplies.  By isolating Tbilisi, Moscow may be trying to force its democratically elected government from power.  In response, the U.S. has demanded that “all lines of communication and transport, including seaports, roads and airports” remain open to deliveries and civilian travel.

Even in the post-Cold War era, this strategy is nothing new for the Russians. 

In January 2006, unexplained simultaneous explosions on the Russian side of Georgia’s northern border cut off energy supplies into Georgia for several days during the cold of winter.  This came during a period of tense relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

In July 2006, as punishment for selling an important oil refinery in Lithuania to a non-Russian company, a Russian pipeline operator closed the pipeline servicing that refinery.

In July 2008, in response to the Czech Republic’s decision to allow American radar equipment within its borders as part of U.S. efforts to build a missile defense system, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev expressed his displeasure ominously: “We will not be hysterical about this, but we will think of retaliatory steps.”  Three days later, the supply of Russian oil into the Czech Republic began to dwindle.

When one takes both oil and natural gas into account, Russia is the biggest energy exporter in the world.  Bigger than Saudi Arabia.  With Soviet ideology a relic of the past, and much of Europe, including NATO members, heavily reliant on Russian energy imports, Russia’s kleptocrats are learning that international free-market capitalism may be more useful in projecting force than communism ever was.

It has been argued convincingly that in developing countries oil and democracy don’t mix.  We may now be about to witness what kind of resistance oil-addicted established democracies put up against an established, oil-producing, militarily strong state, with imperialist designs.

Georgia result

Via IFES, the AP reports “a nearly complete vote count from Wednesday’s election indicates Saakashvili’s party will hold about 120 of the Parliament’s 150 seats.”

Last week I wrote that electoral “reforms” in Georgia were not actually reformist. While March legislation lowered the threshold for entering parliament from 7 to 5 percent, simultaneous decreases in the total number of seats and proportion of them elected under PR would be new hurdles for small parties. Reform, in other words, would benefit Saakashvili, not his opponents.

Now the main opposition party is threatening to boycott its mere 14 seats. Coverage of protests keeps pointing at fraud, but the electoral rules appear to have been the main source of opposition squeeze.

Glancing at preliminary results from the nominal tier, the ruling United National Movement is the clear leader in most districts. Yet it frequently has less than a majority, and other parties sometimes have sizable vote shares. In the list tier, the UNM is reported to have won 61 percent of votes.

Recall that one “reform” reduced the share of PR seats from 100 to 75. If one considers that no election was held under original provisions for the 150-member parliament, “reform” actually reduced the PR share from 150 of 235 seats at the 2004 election to 75 of 150 today.

The net effect of “reform” was less proportional representation and more first-past-the-post, regardless of what Saakashvili did to the PR threshold. That’s how he’s winning 80 percent of seats on 61 percent of votes.

Georgia votes: lower threshold but lower magnitude

RFE/RL optimistically reports that Georgian president Saakashvili has reduced the threshold from 7 to 5 percent for the list tier of that country’s parliamentary elections. Of course, today’s elections are for a much smaller parliament with far fewer seats elected under PR rules than in 2004. Despite the optimism, this probably will result in a smaller opposition seat share.

Since winning reelection, a seemingly humbled Saakashvili has taken pains to show that he understands the mood of both the electorate and the opposition, enacting a series of electoral reforms his supporters say are meant to boost confidence in the elections.

What “humbled” Saakashvili was his “close call in [a] snap presidential election four months ago,” according to the news service. Yet he won with over 53 percent, 18 points ahead of the runner-up. Such is his standard for competitiveness.

As usual, the details of the new system depend on the source. The overall picture since 2004 is fewer seats in general and fewer elected proportionally.

According to the electoral law, last updated 17-12-07, 50 members are elected in single-member districts and 100 are elected from party lists (Art. 91). The threshold was 7 percent, and seat allocation is by Hare quota with largest remainder (Art. 105).

IFES’ Election Guide says the 2004 elections proceeded with 75 single-member districts, 150 list seats and 10 seats reserved to “displaced persons.” Via ACE Project, the same organization says this is the system in place. The 2008 Election Guide entry, however, reports a 150-seat parliament with 75 list and 75 district seats. That is consonant with RFE/RL’s report and others.

Angus-Reid has a good description of the politics of the electoral law. Saakashvili’s allies in parliament approved the 75-75 system on March 21, with opposition leaders balking in favor of the 50-100 system, which is the one on the books as published.

Reuters, via the Washington Post, says opposition leaders accuse the president of “rigging” the elections. More problematic than outright fraud, it seems, is a lack of basic agreement (even clarity?) on the details of seat allocation.

It flies in the face of cynical reason to think the president would increase opposition prospects in response to his own electoral “close call.” More important than reducing the threshold to 5 percent, an opposition-inclusive reform, is reducing the PR tier from 150 to 75 seats, which is opposition-exclusive. A glance at the 2004 results-by-region at Electoral Geography shows why. Saakashvili’s National Movement polled an average 69.4 percent. The median share for his party was 71.8 percent. The overall effect of “reform,” I suspect, will be to further weaken opposition. The more small districts, the more seats for Saakashvili. Reducing average district magnitude is what matters here. Lowering the threshold is an empty gesture.

Do States of Emergency Come in Threes?

Georgian President Saakashvili, after facing days of protests, declares a state of emergency.

The country’s principal opposition news outlet, Imedi TV, went off the air at night amid reports that a special forces unit had entered the station’s offices. The phones of the television station did not answer calls, and government officials could not be immediately reached to answer questions about the station’s evident shutdown.

No word yet if Saakashvili instituted the state of emergency in order to prevent the country from coming under control of Islamic extremists located in the Northwest Province of Pakistan.

Democracy Daily Briefing – 8.7.07.

BREAKING: Georgia Accuses Russia of Bombing

The Government of Georgia (GoG) accused Russia of bombing a rural village 40 miles north of Tiblisi, the Georgian capital. According to the GoG, two Russian bombers entered Georgian airspace and dropped an air-to-surface bomb near the village of Tsitelubani. Luckily, the bomb did not explode. The Russian air force denies the accusation. The targeted village lies on the border of South Ossetia, a region of Georgia seeking autonomy and supported by Russia.

Ivory Coast President Announces Elections by Year’s End

During a televised national address, President Gbagbo announced that he would seek to hold presidential elections by December. The Ivory Coast is effectively divided between the government administered south and the rebel controlled north. Progress has been slow since a peace deal in March, but some see the potential elections as a way out of the prolonged crisis. However, there are serious concerns about whether legitimate elections can take place in such an environment and whether they will meet international standards.

Second Round of Congolese Elections Fail to Meet Standards

Parliamentary elections last week in the Republic of Congo failed to meet international expectations. The first round of voting was held in June and received criticism from domestic and international observers. While polls were scheduled to open at 7am, voting in the capital of Brazzaville did not start until 10am. Voters who claimed to have cast ballots for the opposition in the first round said there names were now absent from the voter rolls.

New PM in East Timor Greeted with Riots and Violence

After weeks of political deadlock following tight parliamentary elections in June, Xanana Gusmao was selected as the new prime minister in East Timor. No party won a majority of seats in the parliament and a political stalemate resulted between the two leading political figures, Mr Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri. The impass was broken when the current PM threw his support behind Gusmao.

Kazakhstan Makes Case for OSCE Presidency, Opposition Claims Sham Elections

At an OSCE meeting this week, the Government of Kazakhstan (GoK) reported progress towards consolidating a democratic form of government as an attempt to preempt opposition to the scheduled Kazakh presidency of the OSCE in 2009. Parliamentary elections scheduled for August 19th have brought renewed focus on the state of Kazakh democracy. These elections are taking place two years ahead of schedule because of recent constitutional changes. Opposition parties claim that they are struggling against an undemocratic electoral system as they are prohibited from organizing political rallies, their commercials are banned from television, and unfair state-controled media coverage which focuses negative coverage on opposition groups.