IRV for the United Kingdom?

The British House of Commons yesterday approved a bill authorizing an electoral reform referendum by 365 to 187 votes. That bill now must pass the House of Lords before the present parliament expires. If the Lords do as the Commons have, a referendum on the alternative vote (AV, also known to Americans as instant runoff voting, or IRV) will be due by October 2011.

More from the UK Electoral Reform Society; ERS’ Twitter feed; the Twitter feed of FairVote, ERS’ sister organization in the US; a FairVote blog post; and a spirited discussion in the comments of Fruits and Votes on the merits of AV for minor parties.

Institutionalist observers have speculated a lot on Labor’s self-interested reasons for finally pursuing electoral system reform in the United Kingdom. See, for example, Fruits and Votes once again on earlier, broken promises to do the same. One line of thinking holds AV is a compromise that Labour can use to buy Liberal Democrat support for a minority government after elections this year, which are expected to go badly for Gordon Brown’s government. Another line of thinking sees the potential for preference-trading among LDP and Labor supporters to boost the parties’ shared seat total.¹ ERS’ official position can be summarized thus: it’s not proportional representation, but AV is a step in the right direction.

Notably, according to the BBC, Parliament rejected 476-69 a LDP proposal for an earlier referendum on proportional representation by the single transferable vote.

1. Note, however, that some British observers have projected AV to benefit the Tories instead. What’s more, any such effect would be moot, as electoral system change would come long after this spring’s elections.

US Election Day’s unsung races

Beyond several “off-year” and special elections with or without predictive significance for major future races, there were several ballot measures or elections today involving STV/IRV, including:

• One on a new IRV implementation (at time of writing, it looks good);
• One on a new STV implementation (at time of writing, it doesn’t look good;
• One on whether to keep IRV;
• One advisory vote on whether to keep IRV;
• One first-time use of IRV;
• Three uses of IRV for the second or more times;
• And two uses of STV in the same town, continuing an almost 70-year run with the system.

Over the last decade, we’ve accumulated quite a set of referenda on these systems. That set does not include legislative votes (probably several) or statewide referenda (one). It would be interesting to identify patterns in support for these measures.

Preference voting for El Sal?

The other day I had the opportunity to attend a talk by Juan Carlos Sanchez from the Foundation for the Study and Application of Law (FESPAD), a civil society organization that seeks to reform El Salvador’s electoral system.

He opened by arguing, quite bluntly, that El Salvador has “one of the worst electoral systems in Latin America.” To demonstrate this, he pointed to a number of specific facets of the system, such as the lack of absentee voting, the politicization of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the laissez-faire approach to parties and campaign regulation, and feckless mechanisms for enforcing the rules of the game.

What struck me most about Mr. Sanchez’s talk was what he did not address: the actual processes by which voter preferences are translated into political representation.

El Salvador utilizes a system of closed-list proportional representation (CLPR), a system known for encouraging strong, often programmatic, yet sometimes deeply ideological and polarized parties, not unlike those found in El Salvador. Briefly, a closed list allows the party leadership to select candidates with little or no input from the electorate, while proportionality provides opportunities for parties to garner substantial representation without necessarily having to reach across the political aisle or even into the center aisle in order to acquire district-wide majorities or pluralities. While it must be recognized that the two main parties – Arena and FMLN – have made considerable strides in moderating themselves since the days of the civil war, they nevertheless remain deeply divided, so much so that many question the degree to which they will respect the legitimacy of a loss in the upcoming presidential election.

Of course, in a country where civil war wounds have not yet fully healed, and where substantial socioeconomic disparities remain a potent political reality, it would be misguided to attribute full blame for the country’s polarized politics to its electoral institutions. Yet, it seems reasonable to begin to question the degree to which this system may be exacerbating, or at least failing to ameliorate, the nature and dynamics of existing political divisions.

To be sure, PR has its virtues and it has been proposed as a means to alleviate the effects of deeply divided societies in a number of contexts. However, such proposals are almost always tied to the caveat of parliamentarianism and the assumption of more than two relevant political parties - two additional factors that would presumably contribute a more conciliatory executive, legislative coalition building and, by extension, a more consociational political atmosphere.

This model, however, does not reflect the political realities of El Salvador, where holdover Cold War manichaeism and deep class divisions have encouraged the emergence of two dominant parties, which are currently involved in a bitter, winner-take-all struggle for the powerful presidency.*

With this background in mind, I asked Mr. Sanchez whether anyone has ever recommended a move away from CLPR, towards a system that provides incentives for existing parties to moderate the selection of their candidates, and for individual candidates to soften their rhetoric, such as the Alternative Vote (AV) or the Single Transferable Vote (STV) (the latter would seem a more likely option for a country already accustomed to proportionality and multi-member districts). The virtue of these systems is that they allow voters to select not only their first choice, but their second, third, or however many candidates decide to run. If their first choice does not receive enough votes to win a seat, their second choice candidate then receives their vote. For this reason, AV and STV systems are both referred to as forms of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). This can create strong incentives for parties and candidates to attract votes outside their traditional base by moderating their platforms, campaigns, and rhetoric, as they begin to recognize the value of being voters’ “next-best choice.” Given that upwards of 14 percent of the electorate remains undecided going into tomorrow’s presidential election, it seems plausible that there may be a significant underrepresented “center,” whose voice could serve as a force of moderation if amplified through one of these preferential systems.

To Mr. Sanchez’s knowledge, despite the near-universal recognition of the need for a less polarized political dynamic, no one has made such a recommendation. In fact, he confessed that he - ostensibly one of the foremost domestic experts on reforming the Salvadoran electoral system – was unaware of any electoral alternatives for diminishing polarization.

This response surprised me, and I was thus wondering if anyone out there reading this with knowledge of El Salvador or electoral systems has any insight with respect to this issue, especially since our computer time at the hotel is rationed, and opportunities for even basic research are extremely limited. Has anyone proposed a preferential model for El Salvador? Might it help temper the country’s polarized politics? Is it even a plausible option? To what degree are current power holders’ interests tied to existing procedures? Are there potential unintended consequences that one should consider? Might a simple shift from CLPR to open-list PR offer a less drastic means of achieving greater moderation, or might this have the opposite effect? Perhaps what is really needed is a focus on reforming the executive branch vis-a-vis other organs of the state, whether this means a move toward parliamentarianism or simply a curtailment of executive authority.

So many questions. With any hope, the conduct of the parties and their supporters during and after tomorrow’s election will make them all seem a little less relevant.

*The president of El Salvador is selected through a two-round system, which in other contexts has been credited for the success of more moderate candidates (according to the same logic of the aforementioned IRV systems). However, in tomorrow’s election, because none of the smaller parties have put forth candidates, it is understood that there will be no opportunity for a second round of voting.

Preferential voting is not too difficult

Several political scientists have advocated for preferential voting systems as conflict management devices in divided societies.¹ The most common criticism I hear is that they are too complicated. I do not believe this, at least where literacy rates are reasonably high.

Recent American experience with ranked voting systems shows that a little voter education goes a long way. Burlington, VT just held its second ever instant runoff voting election. Of 8,980 total ballots, only four were invalid. That’s a 0.04 percent error rate. Less fatally, only one voter did not use all five of his/her rankings, according to Rob Richie.²

Here is an example of the ballot voters used.

1. Donald Horowitz has advocated instant runoff voting/alternative vote. Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds have variously advocated and highlighted the single transferable vote.
2. UPDATE: Actually, the voter did not specify a first choice.

“What-if games” and the VT IRV veto

Last week, Vermont governor Jim Douglas vetoed legislation to elect the state’s congressional delegation by instant runoff voting.

The New Yorker’s Hendrik Hertzberg wrote a good critique of Douglas’ veto message. Hendrik is probably right that partisan calculations decided the matter, but the governor gave other reasons. Some were factually incorrect (e.g. the current system is 200 years old). Others were tired spin (e.g. bastardized understandings of “one person, one vote” that IRV somehow violates).

One novel argument stood out:

Moreover, voters should not be asked to cast their ballots based on a wide range of hypothetical, theoretical or imaginary outcomes.

I take it to mean: IRV raises the information costs of strategic voting. Douglas earlier had fed this argument to the Burlington Free Press, which editorialized against IRV on March 25:

While backers tout instant runoff voting — IRV for short — as a way to increase the voters’ say, what it really does is mess with the process of marking the ballot, forcing people to vote in both a real election and, as the governor said, a hypothetical one [...] Many voters might play the “what if” game in choosing whom to vote for when there is more than two candidates in the race, but that kind of conjecture has no place on the official ballot.

While technically correct under certain conditions, this is a bad argument against reform for at least three reasons. One, those conditions are rare. Two, no voting system is strategy-proof. Three, strategic voting is less important under IRV than under plurality.

Why do governors even bother explaining vetoes of election reform bills?

Santa Fe joins the ranked voting ranks

Santa Fe, NM voters on March 4 overwhelmingly approved instant runoff voting for municipal elections. The margin was 65-35.

A charter amendment for public financing also won, but the margin there was only 61.4-38.6.

Most people adhere to the “never gonna happen” theory of electoral systems reform. In relative terms, the public financing movement (aka “clean elections”) receives boatloads of cash annually. Yet here’s an example of how the impossible – changing the voting system – can be more popular than the slightly less impossible – “getting the money out of politics.”

Here’s a list of who uses/will/wants to use IRV. In 2002, San Francisco was the only jurisdiction on that list.

I don’t know the comparable list for public financing. Anyone?

GU election commission mysteriously postpones result

Who won the Georgetown Student Association presidency this week? We won’t know until Tuesday.

“The Election Commission has received several inquiries and complaints about this year’s election. In order to follow up and investigate each claim adequately, the Election Commission has decided, in accordance with the Student Association bylaws, to delay the announcement of results until early next week,” said Election Commissioner Maura Cassidy (COL ’08) in an e-mail.

The Election Commission declined to comment further on specific complaints.

What were the complaints? Why the wait? Is it technical failure? Fraud? Did someone spend too much money and now needs to be disqualified? This is not a model for transparent election administration.

IRV on the ballot in Santa Fe

Santa Fe, NM voters will decide March 4 whether to use instant runoff voting in municipal elections. The campaign website is here.

The area’s major daily, the Santa Fe New Mexican, has come out against Amendment 5.

Amendment 5 is for “instant runoff,” or “ranked-choice” voting.: Make your first choice, second choice, third choice, etc. This would, at last, ensure majority-elected politicians, más o menos — but it depends on well-run elections using special computer programs. We say wait and see how it works in huge numbers of other cities — and, for now, vote against.

Fear of technology is a bad reason to sideline principles like majority rule that the editors otherwise support – especially since the number of US cities successfully using IRV grows each year.

The campaign needs help. If you’re in the region, you can get involved (or donate) through this site.

Georgetown undergrads use IRV again

The Hoya reports that Georgetown University undergrads will use instant runoff voting to elect their president (and VP) for the second time. The GU Student Association implemented IRV last year.

“This year, the campaign field is one of the most crowded ever,” Election Commission member Maura Cassidy (COL ’08) said.

It’s hard to tell whether that’s because students are responding to the incentive to run. Nevertheless there are eight contending slates.

Candidates run as two-person tickets for president and vice president. Effectively, this is a single winner election.

The GUSA also uses IRV for student senate elections. There are 23 single-member “districts” corresponding to living arrangements. According to their site, last year’s reforms included:

geographical representation for the Senate – too few students know their Student Association Senator. by creating districts based on where you live, rather than what grade you’re in, we hope that students will have more day-to-day interaction with their representative to the Student Association

It would be interesting to know:

• what’s being done in terms of voter education
• what proportion of voters (will) have skipped rankings
• what proportion of voters (will) have used the same ranking more than once
• what proportions of voters (will) have used what proportions of their rankings

Duplicate rankings would be the most fatal error, followed by skipped rankings. High rates would indicate need for more vigorous voter education.

How the Iowa caucuses mirror preferential voting

Now that Putin has stolen an election and the Venezuelans will keep democracy, TDP can return to more important topics.

The Iowa caucuses are a peculiar institution. Seen globally, primary elections are anomalous enough. Yet Iowa’s delegates to the parties’ nominating conventions are chosen by people walking around a room and revealing their preferences to everyone else. Two features of the Iowa caucuses strikingly mirror the logic of preferential voting systems: iterative preference flows and strategic coordination among rivals.

My old friend at FairVote wrote this overview of how the caucuses work. In a nutshell, candidates must achieve threshold levels of support to win delegates. “Support” or “votes” are the number of people standing in a part of the room that represents a given candidate.

When candidates fail to reach the threshold, deal making and cajoling begins, and things get complicated. In 2004, Dennis Kucinich and John Edwards agreed that if either of them failed to reach threshold in any precinct, their supporters would line up with the other…

In other words, rival candidates bargain for second choice support. When one is eliminated, voters walk across the room, casting “votes” for successive preferences.

Equally interesting is that, depending on the size of the precinct, the threshold to win delegates is about 15-20%. That means the caucuses use a rough form of quota-based proportional representation in which each candidate winning delegates (i.e. “seats”) is analogous to an effective party.