US Institute of Peace event on Iran’s Regime and Opposition Movement

The US Institute of Peace will be holding an event on February 1 from 10 am to 12 pm (Eastern) entitled “A Revolution Undone?: Regime and Opposition in Iran. “ It will explore how the evolving clash between regime and opposition affects the stability of the Islamic Republic, on the one hand, and its foreign relations, on the other. It will feature former Iranian parliament member, Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, as well as scholars such as Georgetown’s own Daniel Brumberg (Acting Director of USIP’s Muslim World Initiative) and Robin Wright (prominent journalist and author on Iran and the Middle East), among others.

USIP will be webcasting the event while maintaining live chat and Twitter discussions during the webcast. (Twitter hashtag: #usipiran). It promises to be an exciting talk. I’ll be moderating the online discussion and putting questions from the online audience to the panel.

You can find information about the event at: http://www.usip.org/events/revolution-undone

BDM Predicts Whether Iran Will Build the Bomb

A recent NYT magazine article profiles Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s work, including a recent game tree predicting whether Iran will have the bomb. Spoiler alert…..his answer is no.

Could his work be relevant in our understanding of democratic regime change or are there too many preferences to account for?

Iran Update

While the huge protests and clashes between security forces and protestors have receded, the movement started by reform candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi is not finished.

Here is just a brief round-up of recent news and evidence that we haven’t seen the last of the green clad crowds (I am bolding those that should receive particular attention):

The Guardian Council certifiedthe election.  There is no surprise here.  But as the article point out, Khamenei has now attached his future to that of Ahmadinejad.  Great analysis here:

One positive outcome of this election debacle is that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has now tied himself to Mr Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement. Every uptick in unemployment is a knock against the current power structure. Every bit of inflation is a reminder of the system’s flaws. These are things Iranians deal with everyday, and they are more personal and affecting than the country’s relations with America or Israel. So the American administration should quietly do what it can to foment the economic undoing of the regime, but otherwise get out of the way. Because in many ways, the regime is already digging its own grave.

The Jerusalem Post is reportingthat six Mousavi supporters were publicly hanged.  This is not confirmed, but the Iranian government has often used public demonstrations (stoning, beatings, etc) as a method to keep the populace compliant.

More reports of election tampering continue to come out of Iran (for example, the pictures and reports here show, definitively, that not all was kosher).

The stories here and here are heartbreaking.  These two 18 year old kids, one brutally raped and beaten, and another killed (three shots to the chest), join Neda as examples of the Iranian governments brutality.

Conservative cleric Haddi Ghaffari rips Khamenei for his behavior over the election.  Ghaffari is by no means reformist, pragmatist or liberal.  He is further right than Rafsanjani and was instrumental in the creation of Hezbollah.  It will not be easy for the regime to paint him as a “puppet of the West.”

Khatami. Mousavi and Karroubi are becoming noticeably harsher in their public comments.  Look here and here.

Solid article here from Roger Cohen with some fascinating reporting.  It has been interesting to see his change in mindset throughout the entire “Velvet coup” and his realization of the real purpose of elections in Iran.  His final suggestion is to isolate Iran and let them writhe.  I am inclined to agree, though I am not sure to what end.  Isolation will not slow their nuclear pursuits and there is no way to crash the Iranian economy (such as oil blockades) without doing huge harm to the world economy and other American interests.  (That also ignores the fact that China and Russia probably would not allow it).  On the other hand, negotiations are moot now.  The regime’s message is clear: “we are committed to increasing our regional influence through subversion of other governments and achieving nuclear power status.  Oh, and we hate America.”

As Thomas Friedman wrote a few weeks back: let’s get the leverage before we start the talking.  The only way to get Iran’s government to alter course is through leverage and power.  Otherwise, you will just be wasting your time, legitimating a despicable regime and betraying the hopes of a generation of Iranians who stood up for a better life.

(Side note - I know I still owe you “The Death of the ‘Islamic Republic’ – Part II.”  I promise to have it up by this weekend.  Enjoy your Fourth of July!)

Who is on What Side in Iran?

Amir Taheri has a great article on the Iranian “movers and shakers” and where the splits are occurring.

Definitely worth reading if you are trying to understand Iran.

The ultimate conclusion, in my opinion, is that no one knows and that what we’re seeing is a “tie” between the opponents and hardliners.  A tie, however, goes to the regime since they control the guns, the majority of the IRGC, the technology to stop opposition activity and organization, and the basij.

Who are the IRGC? (And more on the Basiji).

Al Jazeera has an interesting video about the Revolutionary Guard and the basiji (who are part of the Revolutionary Guard).

For those interested in understanding the Islamic side of the Iranian security forces, the clip is a decent primer.

(Here is the link to my previous post regarding the basiji).

The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980’s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980’s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Escalation in Iran

No matter what news is reporting, events in Iran are grim.

It started with the now-infamous, cold-blooded murderof Neda Agha Soltan, captured on film for the world to see.

Now, there are reports of mass beatings, use of tear gas and snipers picking off protesters as an intimidation tactic.  For an example of the situation, listen to this interview from two Iranian women who managed to escape.  As they point out, the regime’s thugs do not discriminate between women and men, young and old.  If you stand in their way, you will feel the baton of the state on your head.  In Iran, going to the hospital is akin to walking to your death.  Chances are the authorities won’t even let you make it to the hospital…and if you do, you probably won’t leave.

The regime is also doing its best to control the movements of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader.  Not seen for almost a week, Mousavi posts occasionally on his newspapers website reaffirminghis dedication to challenging the rigged election engineered by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, considered by many the leading Shi’a scholar alive today (perhaps behind only Grand Ayatollah Sistani), also continues to issue statements attacking the regime and Khamenei for their brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators and the theft of the election.

Make no mistake, the situation is getting worse as the government deploys its forces to prevent large gathers and intimidate protests back into the silent acquiescence that defined “Islamic” governance to this point.  The most frustrating aspect of the Iran situation is that there is nothing we can do but hope and pray for the protection of those fighting for their freedom and for a different future.

I don’t know about you, but that does not seem like it is enough.

Tom Friedman: Multitasker

Tom Friedman’s most recent article provides the solution to three problems: Iran, the environment and energy dependence. 

Key excerpt:

The Obama team wants to pursue talks with Iran over its nuclear program, no matter who wins there. Fine. But the issue is not talk or no talk. The issue is leverage or no leverage. I love talking to people — especially in the Middle East — on one condition: that we have the leverage. As long as oil prices are high, Iran will have too much leverage and will be able to resist concessions on its nuclear program. With oil at $70 a barrel, our economic sanctions on Iran are an annoyance; at $25, they really hurt.

“People do not change when you tell them they should; they change when they tell themselves they must,” observed Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy specialist. And nothing would tell Iran’s leaders that they must change more than collapsing oil prices.

Mr. Obama has already started some excellent energy-saving initiatives. But we need more. Imposing an immediate “Freedom Tax” of $1 a gallon on gasoline — with rebates to the poor and elderly — would be a triple positive: It would stimulate more investment in renewable energy now; it would stimulate more consumer demand for the energy-efficient vehicles that the reborn General Motors and Chrysler are supposed to make; and, it would reduce our oil imports in a way that would surely affect the global price and weaken every petro-dictator.

I, personally, am on board with a gas tax as opposed to the ridiculous Waxman-Markley “cap-and-trade” (more accurately described as the “cap” and hand-out-accoding-to-political-constituency) bill.

Even if you don’t agree, you have to give him credit for the creativity:

An American Green Revolution to end our oil addiction — to parallel Iran’s Green Revolution to end its theocracy — helps us, helps them and raises the odds that whoever wins the contest for power, there will have to be a reformer.

Gauging Obama’s Reaction to Iran

Chris Hitchens seems to think Obama is being too weak.  Key quote:

That last observation also applies to the Obama administration. Want to take a noninterventionist position? All right, then, take a noninterventionist position. This would mean not referring to Khamenei in fawning tones as the supreme leader and not calling Iran itself by the tyrannical title of “the Islamic republic.” But be aware that nothing will stop the theocrats from slandering you for interfering anyway. Also try to bear in mind that one day you will have to face the young Iranian democrats who risked their all in the battle and explain to them just what you were doing when they were being beaten and gassed. (Hint: Don’t make your sole reference to Iranian dictatorship an allusion to a British-organized coup in 1953; the mullahs think that it proves their main point, and this generation has more immediate enemies to confront.)

I must admit, I am sympathetic to the argument.  The regime has shown that, no matter how non-interventionist Obama behaves, they will still claim that the West is at the root of the riots (apparently Britain is the real veiled enemy this time…though the U.S. is not spared).

The question that Hitchens dodges, however, is the credibility of those claims.  By refusing to jump into the debate, isn’t Obama actually discrediting  the “tired slogans” of the regime?  If it is apparent to all (including those inside Iran) that the U.S. is in no way acting against the regime, don’t the charges against the West begin to sound like the baseless propaganda it actually is?  That, I think, is the best argument for Obama’s measured stance.  What Obama is essentially doing is revealing the regime as a bunch of liars who create myths to support their power.

On the other hand, I am not at all sympathetic to the argument that we must walk a fine line since we have to negotiate with them afterwards.  Regardless of our actions, the Iranian government in power will pursue what it sees to be its interests.  If that means negotiations with the Great Satan, then so be it.  If that means sticking it to the West, then say bye-bye diplomacy.  President Obama could go to Iran and hug Ahmadinejad and Khamenei right now…but I promise you, if a few weeks later the regime does not like what he is asking for, his calls will go unanswered.

Let us also not forget that Iran is not walking a fine line with the U.S.  They kill our troops in Iraq, they instigate violence in Lebanon and Palestine to suit their needs.  Their strategy is tuned to achieve two goals: unsettle the U.S. and gain regional power.  If they can stab us in the back while shaking our hand, why is it that we fear doing the same?  The argument is: “well, they won’t talk to us if we don’t play nice.”  My response is, “they’re not playing nice and they’ll only talk to us if it is in their interest.  That will not change if Obama says ‘we are with those demonstrating for their rights and freedom’”  From what I know of the Cold War, that was how the game is played back then too.  Kill your enemy at night, talk to them in the morning.

I promise you, that is the strategy of the Iranians.  Hitchens is right: when will we wake up?

Winning the Hearts and Minds of the IRGC

Laura Secor has an interesting analysis over at the New Yorker.  She contends that the protesters are using tactics to make it hard for the IRGC and the basiji’s, charged with protecting the Islamic Republic, to attack them.  In her words:

The purpose of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij is the defense of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader. Rarely have the true believers in the militias been forced to consider the possibility that these two functions might come into conflict. Such a moment may have arrived. It is one thing to unleash brutal force on crowds that insult the Leader or Islam. That was how the members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij could defend their assault on demonstrators at Tehran University in 1999. But now, in the name of Ahmadinejad’s controversial presidency, they are being asked to violently disperse fellow Iranians who are chanting religious slogans, carrying Korans, and calling for the lawful counting of their votes. Whether or not the rumors of splits at the top of the Revolutionary Guards’ hierarchy are true, the rank and file is not necessarily monolithic.

As the above shows, the rank and file IRGC now find themselves between an Ayatollah and a hard place.  If they crackdown on the protesters on behalf of Ahmadinejad, could they possibly be selling out the Islamic Republic?  I agree with her that it’s crucial for the demonstrators/opposition to neutralize the IRGC, however, her analysis fails to mention that the IRGC is particularly wedded to the current regime economically.

Under Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the IRGC received more no-bid grants and control over the economy than ever before.  That doesn’t even include the millions the IRGC receives from the government under the nuclear enrichment program.  Even should there be an ideological conflict regarding the interests of the Islamic Republic, the financial interests of the IRGC commanders (and often mid-level officers) is very clear.

Considering this fact, the real question is: how well trained is the IRGC? Will they follow orders (since the upper brass is financially invested in the current regime) or will each member think for himself?