Who is on What Side in Iran?

Amir Taheri has a great article on the Iranian “movers and shakers” and where the splits are occurring.

Definitely worth reading if you are trying to understand Iran.

The ultimate conclusion, in my opinion, is that no one knows and that what we’re seeing is a “tie” between the opponents and hardliners.  A tie, however, goes to the regime since they control the guns, the majority of the IRGC, the technology to stop opposition activity and organization, and the basij.

Who are the IRGC? (And more on the Basiji).

Al Jazeera has an interesting video about the Revolutionary Guard and the basiji (who are part of the Revolutionary Guard).

For those interested in understanding the Islamic side of the Iranian security forces, the clip is a decent primer.

(Here is the link to my previous post regarding the basiji).

The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980′s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980′s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Winning the Hearts and Minds of the IRGC

Laura Secor has an interesting analysis over at the New Yorker.  She contends that the protesters are using tactics to make it hard for the IRGC and the basiji’s, charged with protecting the Islamic Republic, to attack them.  In her words:

The purpose of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij is the defense of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader. Rarely have the true believers in the militias been forced to consider the possibility that these two functions might come into conflict. Such a moment may have arrived. It is one thing to unleash brutal force on crowds that insult the Leader or Islam. That was how the members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij could defend their assault on demonstrators at Tehran University in 1999. But now, in the name of Ahmadinejad’s controversial presidency, they are being asked to violently disperse fellow Iranians who are chanting religious slogans, carrying Korans, and calling for the lawful counting of their votes. Whether or not the rumors of splits at the top of the Revolutionary Guards’ hierarchy are true, the rank and file is not necessarily monolithic.

As the above shows, the rank and file IRGC now find themselves between an Ayatollah and a hard place.  If they crackdown on the protesters on behalf of Ahmadinejad, could they possibly be selling out the Islamic Republic?  I agree with her that it’s crucial for the demonstrators/opposition to neutralize the IRGC, however, her analysis fails to mention that the IRGC is particularly wedded to the current regime economically.

Under Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the IRGC received more no-bid grants and control over the economy than ever before.  That doesn’t even include the millions the IRGC receives from the government under the nuclear enrichment program.  Even should there be an ideological conflict regarding the interests of the Islamic Republic, the financial interests of the IRGC commanders (and often mid-level officers) is very clear.

Considering this fact, the real question is: how well trained is the IRGC? Will they follow orders (since the upper brass is financially invested in the current regime) or will each member think for himself?