The Death of the “Islamic Republic”, Part 1

A week ago, Jack asked me a question in response to a post.  Jack essentially wanted to know if the “Republic” part of the “Islamic Republic of Iran” should be removed considering the events surrounding the election.

My immediate response to Jack was: well, it shouldn’t be called “Islamic” or “Republic” anymore (and it shouldn’t have been for a while).

In responding, however, I knew I had very little evidence to support my claims (primarily on the “Islamic” side).  Thus, I waited and collected a series of articles that support my position.  In order to spare us all a very long post, I am dividing this into two parts.  First, I address some of the relevant history that will help to explain the seemingly “sudden” transformation of Iran from an Islamic to a police state.  In the next post, I will use current events to support my claim that Iran is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.”

I should preface all this by saying that I am in no way surprised by the governments shift from a semi-legitimate state to a security state.  I do not claim to have had any idea the elections would have led to such rallies (or that the government intended to so crudely steal the election – though my intuition told me the regime didn’t want to deal with another Iranian-style glasnost/perestroika that they would have to again reverse a la Khatami and would thus ensure Ahmadinejad’s victory).  It was apparent, however, that a reclassification of the Iranian regime has been needed for quite some time.  In fact, the recent overt transformation of the Iranian regime into a police state is the logical outcome of Khomeini’s decision in 1989 to “nominate” (when really it was a forgone conclusion) Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader.

Allow me to explain.  The Iranian Constitution created after the revolution specified that the Supreme Leader must be an Ayatollah – meaning that he educate himself in the Koran, a process that takes several years, if not decades.  While initially far more democratic and open, Khomeini amended the Constitution several times throughout the 1980′s to institute the system of government in place today – a democratic system mirrored and presided over by a more powerful and undemocratic Islamic system.

Khomeini’s preferred choice to succeed him as the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, lost favor with Khomeini after voicing concerns over the governments treatment (murder, arrest, torture) of political opponents and dissidents.  Khomeini, in fact, “suggested” that Montazeri leave politics and focus on teaching students in the holy city of Qom.  Following Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini chose Khamenei, a disciple and erstwhile supporter and implementer of the governments tactics during his tenure as President of Iran throughout the 1980′s, to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Unfortunately, Khamenei lacked the religious credentials required in the Constitution for the position.  As a Hojjat-ol-Islam (a lower-ranking cleric – think the different between a priest and a bishop), Khamenei was barred from assuming the post of Supreme Leader.  To ensure the survival of his hybrid system of governance, Khomeini used his influence with the religious scholars of the Guardian Council (and those in Qom) to have Khamenei appointed as an Ayatollah in a year.  This allowed Khamenei to bypass the traditional requirements to achieve the title and standing of Ayatollah, infuriating much of the clergy.  The resulting fallout severely weakened the Islamic legitimacy of the Iranian state and politicized the position of Supreme Leader to a much greater extent than under Khomeini.  In particular, among the clergy, dissent became more apparent as the Islamic scholars began to express concerns about the Islamic government tainting Islam with politics of the state.  In essence, the succession of Khomeini showed that politics and “governance” were more important, in Khomeini’s opinion, than religion credentials.   

In order to maintain (and enhance) his power, Khamenei thus began to rely further on the security apparatus of the state, particularly the basiji and the IRGC.  Fast forward to today, and the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinjad, a former IRGC commander, a former basij and, in 2005, widely popular in the country among both those groups and the conservative base, served to strengthen the alliance between (and the reliance of) Khamenei and the IRGC/basiji.

Escalation in Iran

No matter what news is reporting, events in Iran are grim.

It started with the now-infamous, cold-blooded murderof Neda Agha Soltan, captured on film for the world to see.

Now, there are reports of mass beatings, use of tear gas and snipers picking off protesters as an intimidation tactic.  For an example of the situation, listen to this interview from two Iranian women who managed to escape.  As they point out, the regime’s thugs do not discriminate between women and men, young and old.  If you stand in their way, you will feel the baton of the state on your head.  In Iran, going to the hospital is akin to walking to your death.  Chances are the authorities won’t even let you make it to the hospital…and if you do, you probably won’t leave.

The regime is also doing its best to control the movements of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader.  Not seen for almost a week, Mousavi posts occasionally on his newspapers website reaffirminghis dedication to challenging the rigged election engineered by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, considered by many the leading Shi’a scholar alive today (perhaps behind only Grand Ayatollah Sistani), also continues to issue statements attacking the regime and Khamenei for their brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators and the theft of the election.

Make no mistake, the situation is getting worse as the government deploys its forces to prevent large gathers and intimidate protests back into the silent acquiescence that defined “Islamic” governance to this point.  The most frustrating aspect of the Iran situation is that there is nothing we can do but hope and pray for the protection of those fighting for their freedom and for a different future.

I don’t know about you, but that does not seem like it is enough.

Winning the Hearts and Minds of the IRGC

Laura Secor has an interesting analysis over at the New Yorker.  She contends that the protesters are using tactics to make it hard for the IRGC and the basiji’s, charged with protecting the Islamic Republic, to attack them.  In her words:

The purpose of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij is the defense of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader. Rarely have the true believers in the militias been forced to consider the possibility that these two functions might come into conflict. Such a moment may have arrived. It is one thing to unleash brutal force on crowds that insult the Leader or Islam. That was how the members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij could defend their assault on demonstrators at Tehran University in 1999. But now, in the name of Ahmadinejad’s controversial presidency, they are being asked to violently disperse fellow Iranians who are chanting religious slogans, carrying Korans, and calling for the lawful counting of their votes. Whether or not the rumors of splits at the top of the Revolutionary Guards’ hierarchy are true, the rank and file is not necessarily monolithic.

As the above shows, the rank and file IRGC now find themselves between an Ayatollah and a hard place.  If they crackdown on the protesters on behalf of Ahmadinejad, could they possibly be selling out the Islamic Republic?  I agree with her that it’s crucial for the demonstrators/opposition to neutralize the IRGC, however, her analysis fails to mention that the IRGC is particularly wedded to the current regime economically.

Under Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the IRGC received more no-bid grants and control over the economy than ever before.  That doesn’t even include the millions the IRGC receives from the government under the nuclear enrichment program.  Even should there be an ideological conflict regarding the interests of the Islamic Republic, the financial interests of the IRGC commanders (and often mid-level officers) is very clear.

Considering this fact, the real question is: how well trained is the IRGC? Will they follow orders (since the upper brass is financially invested in the current regime) or will each member think for himself?

Small Changes and Revolution

This David Brooks article reminds me of one of Michael Totten’s posts at the beginning of the demonstrations and protests.

In both, the authors highlight the importance of small changes in attitude, such as people not fearing the IRGC or basiji or the wearing of green by the riot police “monitoring” the demonstrations.

Both authors conclude that when those small changes in attitude occur, you know something big is happening.

Brooks:

Small gestures unify a crowd and symbolize a different future, like the moment when Mir Hussein Moussavi held hands with his wife in public.

Ryszard Kapuscinski:

We don’t know whether the policeman and the man on the edge of the crowd already realize what has happened. The man has stopped being afraid – and this is precisely the beginning of the revolution. Here it starts. Until now, whenever these two men approached each other, a third figure instantly intervened between them. That third figure was fear. Fear was the policeman’s ally and the man in the crowd’s foe. Fear interposed its rules and decided everything.

Now the two men find themselves alone, facing each other, and fear has disappeared into thin air. Until now their relationship was charged with emotion, a mixture of aggression, scorn, rage, terror. But now that fear has retreated, this perverse, hateful union has suddenly broken up; something has been extinguished.

The most important changes are not those that we can see, like the dissipation of fear, but they are crucial to the survival of such movements.  I hope that what we witnessing is the dying gasps of that fear.