Islam and Democracy, Question Mark

The Economist has an interesting, though somewhat superficial, survey of the current relationship between Islam and Democracy in practice and theory.  It is worthy of a read.

Democratosis?

In this week’s New York Times Magazine, Noah Feldman writes about Democratosis, an American political disease characterized by our politicians’ excessive use of the rhetoric of liberal democracy.   Feldman argues that democracy is a good thing except that its focal point as a foreign policy tool can backfire do to the hypocrisy that this entails.  He suggests a “chastened version of the democratization doctrine – one that makes no exceptions for friends while also recognizing that building durable institutions may do more good than holding snap elections.”   

I don’t disagree with either of these arguments per se, but some clarifications are warranted.  Firstly, whenever I see a reference to Iraq in an article about democracy promotion, I become a little queasy (although, Feldman may not be guilty of any crime here).   In Iraq we are nation building.  We are NOT promoting democracy.  While in nation building we try to build institutions from – essentially – ground zero, in democracy promotion, we encourage institutional capacity building and provide skills training so that parliamentarians, for example, can read a budget.  For an example, check out NDI’s Morocco Democracy Online references section, where they have translated manuals on all-things-democracy into Arabic.   

For Feldman’s part, it seems that he believes the Bush administration’s democratic diarrhea.  He writes:

“Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, sometimes sounding suspiciously like an apostate from the democratization cause, argued in a recent speech for the necessity of using realist methods – including short-term alliances with despots – to pursue idealistic goals such as the establishment of more democracy.”

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Bush? A Dissident?

According to the Peter Baker’s article “As Democracy Push Falters, Bush Feels Like a ‘Dissident’” in the Washington Post, Bush’s democracy promotion efforts have been hampered by the ole’ Washington bureaucracy. The first six paragraphs of Baker’s article set up the argument that Bush’s plan to “spread democracy around the world… has [been] bogged down in a bureaucratic and geopolitical morass.” Baker states that officials within the administration, including Cheney have “undermined” the president’s “grand project.” He describes the crux of the problem as translating “vision” into “thorny policy.” In conclusion, democracy promotion is tainted by its association with the Bush administration he suggests, citing a Republican presidential candidate’s response to whether he agreed with Bush’s vision: “Absolutely not, because I don’t think we can force people to accept our way of life, our way of government.”

Of course, democracy promotion has very little to do with forcing anyone to accept our way of life or our way of government. If it were, democracy promotion would be called democracy compulsion and that is not what it is or what it was meant to be. In fact, the above quotation has little to do with democracy promotion and a lot to do with regime change and the U.S.’s experiences in Iraq. But regime change is not democracy promotion, so let’s not help our friends in the Kremlin, other autocrats, and aspiring autocrats by perpetuating a myth that suggests otherwise.

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American Support a “Kiss of Death”

In a pivotal by-election last Sunday in Lebanon’s Metn district, former president Amin Gemayel unexpectedly lost a close race to a relatively unknown opposition candidate with ties to Hezbollah.  In today’s New York Times, Hassan Fattah analyzes this surprising loss, seeing it as a rebuff against American intervention in the politics of the Middle East, a trend that can be seen in recent gains by Islamist and radical parties throughout the region.  This result should not be a surprise given that US foreign policy in the Middle East has consistently exacerbated existing divisions across the region, radicalizing many Muslims with otherwise moderate geopolitical outlooks.  It seems that US policymakers are surprised, however, when their steadfast support for democracy in the region is seemingly rejected by majorities of voters again and again.  After all, how can anybody reject democracy and freedom?

The answer, according to Mr. Fattah, is that recent electoral outcomes in Iraq, Palestine, and now Lebanon, that have favored parties opposed to American intervention in the region, are the product of the US trying to have their cake and eat it too.  In each of these recent elections, America was simultaneously supporting both the democratic system and individual candidates or factions, which casts doubt on the US’s true intentions, but more importantly it implies that democracy is only as good as the ideology of those that are ultimately elected and whether that ideology is acceptable to American interests.

In addition to tainting the very idea of democracy with support for individual candidates and parties, American foreign policy in Iraq, and elsewhere, has “embolden[ed]the ruling majority to resist compromises,” thereby undermining the fundamental tendency of democratic government to allow for a give-and-take that results in policies acceptable to everyone but favored by no one.  This is perhaps the most nefarious consequence of US support for specific factions while trying to support democracy more broadly in the Middle East, because it calcifies a set power relationships based on artificial, external supports that undermine the natural moderating tendencies of a democratic system of government.

Ultimately, to be successful in Iraq, to bring freedom and democracy to the Middle East and beyond, and to have any hope of really “winning” the war on terror, the US needs to realize that the potential short-term electoral payoffs that come from supporting a particular set of candidates or parties are far outweighed by the long-term effects of undermining the entire system of democratic institutions.  We need to learn to trust the system that has served us so well to do the same elsewhere.

تفسيرالنظام السياسي في المغرب

لاحظ الدكتوران أودنل وشمِتر في كتابهما عن الانتقالات من الحكم المطلق الاستبدادي في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية، أن الحكام الاستبداديون قد عانوا من قلة المصداقية. فافتقر هؤلاء الرؤساء والملوك والزعماء إلى كفاءة “الترويج نفوسهم كحلولِ مشاكلٍ تتعلق بالترتيب السياسي للمستقبل الطويل المدى وكما احسن نماذج ممكنة لمجتمعاتهم.” [1] لم تعد المبررات النفسية مُقنِعةً كما قد كانت في السنوات قبل الحرب وخاصة بالمقارنة مع الحكومات الديمقراطية البرلمانية في أوروبا وأمريكا اللتين قد انتصرا على الألمانيين. مدركين ذلك، قام الحكام الاستبداديون بأن يَعِدون بمستقبلٍ ديمقراطيٍ بل قبل قد يتسلموا بأي شيء من السلطة، من الضرورة أنهم يحاربون من مجتمعاتهم بعض الأفكار الشعبية “المتخلفة” Ùˆ”يحضرون” شعبهم ويحفظون على “الخصوصيات” الثقافية. أُتسم لهذه جهود تغطية الفراغ الديموقراطي الاستبدادي ب”انفصامٍ اديولوجيٍ” وقد أصبحت “كعبَ أخيلِ” الاستبداديين.

من هذه الناحية, ليس المغرب استثناءً. فقد أخذ الملك محمد الخامس يتمسك الخطاب الديمقراطي Read the rest of this entry »

Morocco’s not Democratizing (To be blunt about it)

Theres a relatively new weekly called the Democracy Digest that Michael Allen is editing for the Transatlantic Democracy Network. Its well worth checking out. This weeks focus is Morocco and its faux process of democratization; a very good overview of the situation there for the non-Morocco expert. I wanted to share a couple of brief comments, but before I do, Id like to point out that Michael Allen is owner of one of the Georgetown Democracy Studies Programs possible tee shirt quotations. At a conference on Tom Melia’s “Democracy Bureaucracy”, Allen said that democracy promotion is the labor of Sisyphus.Indeed, Michael, as we finish up our final papers, the Democracy Studies students share your sentiments.

The Morocco article highlights the existence of red lines that serve to thwart democratization as well as the makhzen, which, in my own conception, is an elaborate system of rules, procedures, and elites that assist the king to execute the royal agenda. Guilain Denoeux, in an article cited in the Democracy Digest piece, talks of the systematic corruption and implicit prohibition of the term corruption that was still in place by the mid-1990s. In his article Islam and the State, Mohammed Tozy writes: …there appears to be a common desire among the parties to reshape the entire institutional space where politico-reloigious competition takes place. A sort of complicity has arisen between the different actors in order to promote the raison detat and to assure control of the civil society.

All this funny stuff is not random. Rather, its indicative of an informal agreement between king and subjects that establishes appropriate vernacular and decorum for the kingdom’s political actors. This social contract was, in the past, represented in the baya, the traditional oath of allegiance, which dons the king “sacred legitimacy.” Tozy said as much in his definition of this “sacred pact…a place in the hierarchy of norms and political actors, a capacity for a transhistorical symbolism, a standard by which laws are made or undone.” The pervasiveness of this informal sector really depletes the formal political system of legitimate authority. As a result, elected officials cannot govern effectively and the king retains all power – which is why I claim “Morocco’s not Democratizing.”

Despite this talk of “sacred authority,” its important not to give the king too much credit for his role as Amir al-Mouminin (Commander of the Faithful). Mohammed VI is hardly an alim (religious scholar), and everone knows it. Abdeslam Maghraoui has convinced me that the baya has become little more than a ceremony bent on convincing the masses that important people bow down to the king so they should too. The king does not possess experiential capital; just the illusion of legitimacy.

The Democratic Digest article suggests that the monarch’s “privileged religious status also acts as a red line against the contagion of radical Islam.” But I’m not so sure that this is the case. Radical Islam is pervasive and the lack of Islamist extremism is, I think, more due to the work of the security services (translation: repression), the existence of opportunities for extremism abroad, and the inclusion of Islamists into the political system.

None of these steps are long term solutions to Islamist extremism; they’re really just buying time. The first two points are fairly self-explanatory, so I’ll once again (see my last post) raise the participation issue. Bringing Islamists into the political system is a good thing, please don’t get me wrong. But electoral politics in autocratic polities do not allow for the full scale of moderating procedures and habits present in democratic systems. If Islamists cannot obtain their goals via the political system, then they are eventually going to decide that participation ain’t worth it. Furthermore, if the supporters of the PJD, the “Islamist” party, do not perceive that they are gaining anything, they will feel marginalized and, most likely, shift their support to more subversive elements. Ill sketch this thought out in more detail in sha’ allah, but that’s just a little food for thought until I finish my finals.

Democracy Promotion: A Vignette

It is finals season for us over here at the Democratic Piece, so content may be a bit light over the next week or two.

As I procrastinated tonight and avoided working on my final papers, I stumbled across this three piece Washington Post article series about democracy promotion from 2005. I originally missed this piece, so as they say on NBC during reruns “If you haven’t seen it, it’s new to you!”

This piece, a Pulitzer Prize winner in 2006, gives a pretty good introduction to the field of democracy promotion. Granted democracy promotion is a niche field, but I get a blank stare every time I tell my family, friends and acquaintances what I am studying and what I want to do with my life. Democracy promotion really is a misunderstood and under appreciated part of US foreign policy.

While there are some nit-picky issues I would raise about the article, I think it does a good job of providing both a micro and macro view of the field. The article provides a glimpse into the daily life, mindset and experiences of those working on the ground, especially in countries that are at times hostile to the idea of democracy. Furthermore, Finkel’s piece, perhaps inadvertently, gives some context to some important issues that define the field: Read the rest of this entry »

Research Assistant in Arab Politics

The Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is seeking a research assistant in Arab politics. Candidate should have knowledge of current political developments in the Arab world and familiarity with relevant research methods and sources. The candidate must speak Arabic fluently and read with ease Arabic sources, including scanning several newspapers daily for relevant information. The research assistant will work closely with senior research members of the Middle East program. Bachelor’s degree required; Master of Arts optional. This position is based in Washington, DC.

To apply, please send a letter of interest and resume to: Human Resources–RA-AP, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC 20036. Fax: 202-939-2377. E-mail: HR@CarnegieEndowment.org. EOE.

Misleading Americans One By One…

In this weekend’s Week in Review (4/15/07), Craig S. Smith wrote an article under the heading of “Islam and Democracy” entitled “North Africa: Under Attack, and Relying on Repression”. Aside from the headline, it’s quite sympathetic to North African regimes and oddly evasive when it comes to Islamists. This article is embarrassing; I’m embarrassed to admit enjoying the New York Times. A couple of examples before I get to the main point:

The first sentence refers to “… North Africa’s secular social veneer…” I’m not sure what this means. Secular? In North Africa? Even many of the leftists are not “secular” in North Africa. “Secular” is a curse to most North Africans. While there is a “secular elite”, this phrase only describes a very small fraction of the population. Perhaps particular wealthy districts of wealthy cities have a “secular social veneer”, but this is not an accurate description of the reality across North Africa.

Shortly thereafter, Smith states:

“Every country on the continent’s northern rim, from Egypt to Morocco, has outlawed extreme Islamist parties that would be likely to win large parliamentary blocs — if not majorities — were they allowed to participate in free and fair national elections. (Libya bans political parties altogether.)”

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