A few things on Morocco

My pal Shadi Hamid at Democracy Arsenal, who is trying his best to become an ex-pal, recently posted some comments on the political situation in Morocco. Among his points are that the main obstacle to democracy in Morocco problem is the King, and that the PJD is simply going to be more pro-regime with new Sec-Gen Abdelilah Benkirane. Along the way, he calls U.S. democracy efforts “cosmetic” and singles out a particular program working with the Moroccan Parliament… which happens to be a program I am familiar with (Shadi – why don’t you come to Morocco and see what these programs are really about? Or are you afraid that once you leave the Mashrik for the Maghrib you’ll never go back…).

Indeed, the greatest hindrance to democracy is the institution of the Monarchy, no matter how liberal a particular king may be. Sure, the country has been changing, as one of your readers suggests, but not a single ounce of power has shifted hands in the past 9 years. The presence of the Monarchy, which can only be criticized by some people on some occasions when they do not cross a vaguely pronounced line, and the political institutions it has set up, prevent real opposition from taking shape.

The “serious effort” required to make structural changes in Morocco is possible. Change often requires crisis, so imagine the U.S. attacks Iran. If the supply of oil is cut short and Morocco’s energy prices soar, food prices continue to soar, and more revelations of makhzenian lands being sold for well below market prices come to bear, then we have the recipe for a political opportunity. When opposition parties find it in their interest to confront the sources of power, they will do so. Of course, getting to that point is difficult…

From my standpoint, you are partially correct about Benkirane: he’s an ultra-social conservative who is Read the rest of this entry »

Authoritarian upgrade and electoral institutions

Writing for Brookings, Georgetown’s Steven Heydemann notes that Arab authortiarian regimes are upgrading their survivability toolkit with implications for democracy promotion approaches.
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The Arithmetic of Authoritarianism.[i]

(This piece has been since been revised for the purposes of clarity.)

Two weeks have passed since the Moroccan elections and, to my surprise, the Interior Ministry has posted the electoral statistics on the Internet. To be sure, this is a step in the direction of transparency. It remains, however, that as world leaders complement the Kingdom for its progressiveness, the stark truth of a flawed electoral process must not be overlooked. It is hardly too early to suggest that these relatively “free and fair” elections have failed to generate a legislature with the capacity to govern responsibly (to put the mis’oul in the mis’ouleen).

In these elections, Morocco demonstrated that rigging elections can be done without stuffing ballot boxes and intimidating voters. Rather, the Interior Ministry ensured a friendly outcome by designing an electoral system that would prevent competing parties from obtaining enough parliamentary seats to exert the institution’s powers and thereby govern. The overall impact of such a “balancing” act is to reinforce societal divisions and, ultimately, the status quo power structures.

For those of us who do not follow Moroccan politics, Morocco has a weak Parliament with few decision-making powers. Since its instillation in the mid-1960s, the Parliament has functioned mainly as a mechanism to divvy up state resources and co-opt potentially threatening political actors. The Parliament also works to ensure that no single social force can muster the credibility to challenge the authority of the King and the makhzen, an elite institution of rules, procedures, and individuals that serve the Monarchy and the extant power structure. While the King has recently expressed his desire for the Parliament to play an increasing central role in the affairs of the state, such a wish is hardly sufficient to reverse what has already been done. The Parliament’s powerlessness and corruption have become institutionalized.

The Moroccan political system features what can be classified as a closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral system. PR systems of various types are often employed in countries in which excluding particular societal forces can drive these groups to work toward overthrowing the entire political system. By handing out seats in roughly the same proportion to the popular vote attained by each party, PR systems usually emphasize inclusiveness – perhaps even giving the 10^th ranked candidate a seat in the legislature, which allows small parties to compete – over other qualities, such as alliance building.

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تفسيرالنظام السياسي في المغرب

لاحظ الدكتوران أودنل وشمِتر في كتابهما عن الانتقالات من الحكم المطلق الاستبدادي في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية، أن الحكام الاستبداديون قد عانوا من قلة المصداقية. فافتقر هؤلاء الرؤساء والملوك والزعماء إلى كفاءة “الترويج نفوسهم كحلولِ مشاكلٍ تتعلق بالترتيب السياسي للمستقبل الطويل المدى وكما احسن نماذج ممكنة لمجتمعاتهم.” [1] لم تعد المبررات النفسية مُقنِعةً كما قد كانت في السنوات قبل الحرب وخاصة بالمقارنة مع الحكومات الديمقراطية البرلمانية في أوروبا وأمريكا اللتين قد انتصرا على الألمانيين. مدركين ذلك، قام الحكام الاستبداديون بأن يَعِدون بمستقبلٍ ديمقراطيٍ بل قبل قد يتسلموا بأي شيء من السلطة، من الضرورة أنهم يحاربون من مجتمعاتهم بعض الأفكار الشعبية “المتخلفة” Ùˆ”يحضرون” شعبهم ويحفظون على “الخصوصيات” الثقافية. أُتسم لهذه جهود تغطية الفراغ الديموقراطي الاستبدادي ب”انفصامٍ اديولوجيٍ” وقد أصبحت “كعبَ أخيلِ” الاستبداديين.

من هذه الناحية, ليس المغرب استثناءً. فقد أخذ الملك محمد الخامس يتمسك الخطاب الديمقراطي Read the rest of this entry »