Is This the Beginning of the End of the Pakistani State?

I don’t know, to be honest, and a lot depends on how Pakistan’s government responds to Taliban aggression, but this article in the NYT does not make me very hopeful.  It appears that Pakistan is inviting the disloyal opposition into government, an equation that resulted in the collapse of the German and Italian states before WWII.  After a brief background on the situation, I will explain the connection.

According to the authors, the Taliban, having successfully “won” the Swat Valley from the government, are becoming more confident and more assertive.  It also appears that the Taliban has figured out that instigating class warfare , and promising to address the grievances of the poor, is a successful method to mobilize an army in Pakistan, a largely feudal society.  The story of Buner in the NYT article, a region where the citizens historically fought off the Taliban, is particularly disheartening.  The people who stood up against the Taliban in 2007 now feel betrayed by a military unwilling or unable to contain the threat, an incompetent and corrupt government, and a police force too afraid to maintain law and order.  As a result, they’re not fighting anymore – and the Taliban are taking over.

Since signing the peace deal with the government, the Taliban and various other jihadist organizations, have worked together to kill, intimidate and exile any potential opponents in Swat and several other regions.  Sadly, the peace deal that handed over control of the Swat Valley also pardoned the Taliban and their supporters for their crimes, such as killings, theft of property, intimidation and destruction of girl’s schools.  With such a deal, it’s no wonder they’re at it again, killing opponents, intimidating police and implementing “Islamic” courts to uphold Sharia law.

Be that as it may, why tie this to the collapse of the state?  Perhaps this is just what the Taliban said – they wanted control over the Swat Valley…

I know that comparisons to WWII are overused, and for my part I will try to avoid broad generalizations; however I feel that history has a lesson for us in relation to Pakistan.  In both Italy (Mussolini) and Germany (Hitler), the governments in power invited the disloyal opposition into government.  For clarity’s sake, the disloyal opposition refers to opposition groups or parties that seek to replace government institutions and structures with their own.  In Germany, Hitler replaced a democracy with a totalitarian police state.  Mussolini likewise removed a democratic government and replaced it with an authoritarian fascist government.  In both cases, the two men intended to remove the current government and replace it with their own.  Even so, the governments underestimated their support or overestimated their ability to control the rogue organizations.  Well, you know how that turned out.

Pakistan‘s experience thus far with the Taliban is very similar.  In each province they occupy, they establish their own courts and governing councils.  To the extent possible, the Taliban also attempts to sweep away the official Pakistani government.  Is there any question that they wish to replace the current Pakistani government – not just officials, but governance system – with their own?

Another similarity between the cases of Germany/Italy and Pakistan today is that the Taliban are creating violence in the provinces and then offering to solve the problem for the government as a leverage to extract concession in negotiations.  The displayed unwillingness or inability of the government to clamp down on the activity only improves their negotiating position vis-à-vis the government.  Said another way, the Taliban and their followers create disorder and then present themselves as the only solution for ending that disorder – oh, that is if the government hands over control of the provinces in question.  Mussolini and Hitler did exactly the same thing in Italy and Germany – they used their organizations to create disorder, kill opponents and instigated riots.  Then, as representatives of the group, they went to the government promising to end the violence and disorder for inclusion in governance.  The government obliged them by offering a seat at the governing table in return for “ending” the violence.

The strategy didn’t work then and it doesn’t appear to be working now.  As Hitler/Mussolini did then, the Taliban are now taking their victory and using it as a recruiting tool to spread their influence and establish themselves as a legitimate opposition organization with the end goal of taking control of the state.  The longer the Taliban are allowed to mobilize supporters, fan out across the country, kill or intimidate opponents and to establish their own parallel governance institutions, the harder it will be for the Pakistani government to put an end to it if (when?) they recognize the threat.

In ending I should note that there remains some hope.  While the Taliban have been very successful in mobilizing people in rural areas where the feudal structure creates more apparent and easily preyed upon grievances, several articles mention that the Taliban are a far cry away from being able to topple a large urban centers, such as Peshawar. But I feel that is just a matter of time if action isn’t taken.  Pakistan’s large cities are home to miles upon miles of slums and shanty-towns.  In my view, these areas, which host  large numbers of people, seem prime for class warfare manipulation and mobilization.  A lot depends on individual agency – for instance, are people willing to accept the Taliban or will they stand against them.  Unfortunately, the events in Pakistan over the last month do not inspire confidence.

Well, I guess I didn’t end on hope.  Sorry, I tried.

Siege in Lahore Points to Challenges in Pakistan

The Obama administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to take heed of observations echoed by many South Asia specialists. In Pakistan, the administration has tentatively bet on Zardari’s civilian administration to lead efforts to battle extremism within Pakistani territory. The aid package of $1.5 billion per annum for 5 years focuses on development rather than military aid. This is a welcome change given Musharraf’s proclivity for military spending. However, as most development practitioners note, setting realistic conditionalities and metrics is a difficult task, one made more difficult by the sheer size of the development challenge in Pakistan.

Secondly, the US is aiming to bring in other powers in dealing with the region’s problems. In Pakistan, the US is hoping that military posturing between India and Pakistan can be reduced so that the Pakistani military can focus on the militant threat within its own borders. This requires making headway in Kashmir, which did enjoy a relatively calm cease fire until it expired last year. However, the military has long been an independent actor in Pakistan, and shifting its raison d’être is sure to have staunch opposition. The military continues to operate as a state within a state in Pakistan, which may lead to an awkward marriage between promoting economic development and reducing military funding.

Yesterday’s police academy standoff in Lahore exemplifies the gravity of the problem in Pakistan. On the one hand is the Pakistani government’s impotence, on the other is the resistance that increased US actions sparks. While the security forces prevailed relatively quickly and decisively, the militants may still have their way in undermining the government and terrorizing the state in the long run.

The realization that the issues in the region cannot be dealt with by military means alone is a positive developments, but, in this writer’s opinion, the prospects remain bleak in Pakistan.

Sharia for Peace?

This week the Pakistani government in the NWFP agreed to a truce with the Taliban in the Swat Valley.  In exchange for a permanent cease fire the provincial government has agreed to the imposition of Sharia Law. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has yet to sign off on the deal, but thus far the price of the cease fire looks to be Taliban control in Malakand, Shangla, Buner, Dir and Chitral, which adds up to roughly 1/3 of the NWFP.

On the one hand, this seems to legitimize Islamists in the NWFP and further undermines an already brittle Pakistani state capacity. Critics fear that ceding the territory to the Taliban will create another haven for terrorist activity and the Pakistani’s inability to defeat militants will only embolden their activities.  Indeed, this pact seems to legitimize what has already been happening in the province, namely Islamabad’s continuing inability to exert control and rule of law in its tribal areas.

It is also important to note the historical experience of Swat, Chitral and Dir,  which officially joined the Pakistani state as “Malakand” in 1969. Historically, tribal law was the source of the judicial system in these areas. The imposition of the ineffective Pakistani judicial system led to calls for a return to tribal/Sharia law. By 1994, the Tehrik-Nifazi Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) movement was formed under a slogan calling for a return to Sharia Law. Swat elected a secular party in 2008, but militant elements began assassinating the party’s political leadership.

The best hope seems to be that the cease fire and acquiescence to the demand for Sharia will isolate the “Taliban” elements in the province unwilling to adhere to the ceasefire. In a visit to Washington today Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Quereshi, called the truce a “local solution to a local problem.” However, the imposition of Sharia could ultimately prove to be too costly for Pakistan’s statehood.

A brief NYT documentary captures some of the risks that ordinary inhabitants of Swat face….

Britain doubling aid to Pakistan=change?

The BBC has reported that Britain has doubled aid to Pakistan to nearly $1 billion over the next three years. The three main recipient are the areas of education, poverty reduction, health care, including the North West Frontier. 

It remains to be seen whether a new strategy will help build state capacity in a climate of political uncertainty. Pressure continues to mount against President Musharraf but the lack of legitimate political alternatives, the continued struggle with militants in the NWFP, the troubles along the Afghan border and continued nationalist sentiments in areas such as Balochistan leaves the prospects for a strong Pakistani state bleak.

While increased aid is certainly needed, it remains to be seen whether aid initiatives will change the status quo…

Pakistanis irked at U.S. administration’s support for Musharraf

Today’s New York Times article examines the growing frustration in Pakistan due to the Bush administration’s consistent support for President Musharraf. Despite the popular vote signaling a desire for change, the administration continues to support Musharraf as a key ally for US policy.

It is not unreasonable for security interests to trump those of democracy. However, the centrality of democracy promotion in political rhetoric necessitates that action backs up the rhetoric. Pakistan is a clear example of an opportunity to visibly stand by those calling for democracy, an opportunity to defy the perception that America only acts in its strategic interest.

As the article points out, the notion that Musharraf can rely on the military is becoming less certain. If the opposition majority becomes a reality, and if it becomes clear that General Kayani, not Musharraf, commands the loyalty of the military, then the US needs to be sure it stands on the side of democracy and not dictatorship. To avoid increasing resentment, and to stem the fading legitimacy of democracy promotion rhetoric, this shift should start sooner rather than later.

Resetting U.S. Pakistan Policy

President Bush put all of his eggs in the Musharraf basket and the Pakistani people have smashed that basket right in his face by wholeheartedly rejecting Musharraf’s political party. President Bush undermined U.S. standing in the world and our security by believing that the best way to fight Islamic extremism and terrorists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region was unquestioningly supporting President Musharraf and funneling billions of dollars to the Pakistani military without oversight. The results of the Pakistani parliamentary elections have left the Bush administration with a lot of egg on its face.

As the State Department scrambles to get its bearings in the fluid Pakistani political environment, it is important for us to consider three things. First, why did the Pakistani government allow these elections to be carried out in a relatively unfettered manner? Second, what are the likely outcomes? Third, what should the priorities of the U.S. government moving forward in terms of security and democracy promotion? Read the rest of this entry »

A good day for democracy in Pakistan

I am leaving Pakistan in a few hours and I can honestly say that I am glad came. The election was a clear success and exceeded nearly everyone’s expectations. This may seem like a bold statement so let me justify it. First, President Musharraf mobilized the military and the police to allow for a peaceful election even though he knew it was likely to spell the end of his political career. Indeed, voters soundly rejected Musharraf’s regime. Second, voters broadly accepted the results. Thus, by and large, Pakistanis view the election to be a legitimate one. For those of you who are still skeptical, the Karachi Stock Exchange gained 3% today and the Rupee appreciated slightly against the Dollar. This is a clear vote of confidence from investors. Yesterday was a good day for Pakistan and a good day for democracy. The Pakistanis deserve a break and it seems as if they have received one.

On a personal note, the folks at Democracy International did an outstanding job and I would like to sincerely thank them for their efforts. The tight time line and the security situation made this an incredibly difficult election to monitor credibly. Nevertheless, they did their best to ensure this could happen and they succeeded. I am proud to have been a member of the delegation.

Finally, I must stress that these are my thoughts, not the position of Democracy International.

Election Day in Pakistan

The polls have closed in Pakistan and election day was relatively peaceful. Thankfully, none of the DI teams encountered any serious problems (however I heard that our security detail had to extract teams from Multan and Peshawar when their polling stations became violent). Nevertheless, it would be a stretch to say that the election was free and fair. While I saw no outright fraud, the voter rolls are hopelessly inaccurate and it is not at all clear who will observe the physical transfer of the ballots to the official counting stations. Thus, while election day seemed to go off well, there was significant manipulation before the election and post-election vote rigging remains a possibility.

Despite the relative election day calm, Pakistan is far from out of the woods. First, the country may still erupt when the government announces the results. Second, it is still far from clear how the elections will affect President Musharraf. Third, and most important, the election is not going to resolve the problem of widespread terrorist attacks. Although most of the violence recently had occurred around political rallies, the terrorists have a long-term plan; their attacks are much more about destabilizing the country than affecting the outcome of this particular election.

I also think I have an answer for why the terrorist strikes seem so random and have begun to understand the political strategy within which these attacks are occurring. There is a fair amount of sympathy for these groups in the northern part of the country, especially along the border with Afghanistan. The attacks in that part of the country seem to be targeted at those who do not sympathize with their goals. This is in-line with the political strategies of Hamas and Hezbollah that I discussed in a recent post. Outside of this region, the attacks are far more random and their goal seems to be to undermine people’s belief that the government can protect them. According to some of the experts I have talked to, the terrorist groups know they are vastly unpopular outside the northern part of the country but don’t care since they have support there. Thus, the best guess is the terrorist groups will continue their strategy to discredit the government in order to achieve their long-term goal of taking over the country. It will take far more than an election to change this dynamic.

Washington Post slams DI’s efforts in Pakistan

The Washington Post’s Robin Wright has an article on our observation team that seems a bit unfair. It’s true that this was a last-minute mission. However, this is the fault of the State Department: they wanted an observation team to give legitimacy to the election and when IRI refused at the last minute, they scrambled to find someone who would do it. There is no doubt that our presence is nothing more than symbolic but it’s the US government that wants the symbolism, not DI. Moreover, DI didn’t push for this election, the US government did. No one on our team thinks we can do anything remotely close to a legitimate observation (especially given the security situation) and her implication that we think we can is just plain wrong. The folks at DI have done an excellent job staffing this mission at the last minute and to dump US government policy failures with regards to Pakistan into the lap of DI seems to me to misplace the blame. Moreover, her belittling of DI is downright unfair. Eric Bjornlund and Glenn Cowan faced difficult challenges in building their firm and it has become a success, contrary to expectations. Eric and Glenn have too much class to ask for an apology for this screed but they deserve one.

What to watch for in Pakistan

Commentators are putting faith in Pakistan’s election on Monday.¹

Mort Kondracke of Roll Call stresses the stresses the importance of Pakistan’s parliamentary elections on Monday, which will determine if the U.S. ally will move towards democracy or authoritarianism… Paul Wiseman of USA Today suggests that this exercise of democracy could result in the weakening of President Pervez Musharraf’s hold on the country…Thus, Wiseman reports that the United States stands to lose as well in the election.

If Barak is right, that faith is misplaced.

Second, the election is not going to be free and fair; the bar is a credible election. I think credible means an outcome that does lot lead to more chaos than currently exists.

We can make reasonable assumptions about the outcome of this election. The important question is how key actors – the Taliban, those calling themselves Taliban, the military, an enraged public – will respond in the aftermath.

1. The POMED does a faithful, reliable and comprehensive job aggregating news on Middle East democratization and foreign aid. Put their blog in your newsreader.