Australian political party assistance under fire

According to the National Audit Office (ANAO), Australia’s main political parties – Liberal and Labor – have run shoddy overseas party-building programs.

ANAO’s report argues the three year old Australian Political Parties for Democracy Program needs clearer lines of accountability and more M&E. The parties have not always used funds as promised in grant applications, according to ANAO. The audit further recommended “a performance measurement framework combined with public reporting of the extent to which the Program is meeting its objective of ‘strengthening democracy internationally.’”

ANAO’s report is critical of the program’s organizational structure in general and the process by which it was set up.

The overall program can receive up to $2m annually. Since 2005, the parties have spent $3m of a disbursed $4.2m.

The program is not related to the Australian Electoral Commission’s election assistance work, which gets most of its money from non-governmental sources.

h/t to Rick Hasen for pointing out the Australian Democratic Audit.

Repairing Iraq’s party system

As I write, democracy assistance groups are helping lawmakers develop an electoral system for Iraq’s 18 governorate councils. Some creative electoral engineering could take the sectarian sting out of Iraq’s party system. One proposal worth serious thought is using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) with open endorsements in governorate-wide districts.

Reuters last week claimed that “Iraq’s local elections could reshape power structure.”

Major players — such as the movement of populist Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and Sunni Arab tribal groups — will be competing for the first time and are expected to make gains at the expense of those now in power.

“New alliances will form, old ones will fall. Everything will change. It will redraw the political map of Iraq,” said a senior Shi’ite government official on condition of anonymity.

Really, Reuters means reshaping a balance of power, not an underlying power structure. A party system that continues to revolve around sects will not help consolidate Iraqi democracy. Luminaries from Lipset to Lijphart have taught that stable democratic politics are about more than race, religion or language.¹ The challenge is to get Iraqi elites talking about more than sectarian interest. What candidates need are incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Campaigns need to be about what’s-in-it-for-me: jobs, schools, roads and, as a colleague quipped, a shawarma machine in every kitchen.

Thankfully, beltway rumor has it that the chosen system will be candidate-centric. This is a major step away from the closed-list PR systems that blew open Pandora’s box in 2005.

That leaves us with a few basic options:²

First-past-the-post: As long as parties don’t control who gets on the ballot, this system might work. Yet the number of votes needed to win is fairly high, meaning current parties likely would fare best, unless there were numerous candidates in each district, in which case outcomes would be wildly unpredictable. Ultimately, the lack of reliable census data would make fair apportionment virtually impossible.

Open-list PR: Basically, the system modifies list PR so that voters control who ends up being a party’s most popular parliamentarian. While it gets around the apportionment problem, it is unlikely to change much. The list logic would preserve current parties, the logic of party discipline would remain the same, and we would expect the most popular person under such circumstances to be a sectarian leader.

STV: For all its virtues, this is not appropriate for the context. Illiteracy and innumeracy are likely to cause widespread voter error. The only way to get around the apportionment problem is to use one big district in each governorate. Can we really ask Iraqis to rank up to, say, 200 candidates?

Bloc vote: Two words. Palestine 2006.³

SNTV: With open endorsements, of course. If the parties controlled who got on the ballot, there would be little chance for a shawarma machine in every kitchen. The system would stimulate hyper-personalistic campaigns, party fragmentation and pork-barrel politics at its finest. On one hand, these are ugly dynamics. On the other, they’re just what are needed to break the grip of sect on Iraq’s party system.

Using SNTV in governorate-wide districts would obviate the apportionment problem. If each council were the cube root of its respective governorate’s population, council sizes (and district magnitudes) would hover around 100, meaning each candidate would need about only one percent of votes to win.⁴

Open endorsement SNTV is not a magic bullet. Its efficacy depends on federal-governorate linkages, ballot access rules and the (in)abilities of current parties to coordinate in local contests, to name just a few variables. Iraq nonetheless faces a tradeoff. As long as its electoral rules stimulate disciplined, programmatic parties, sect is likely to be the dominant cleavage. Legislative politics will remain zero-sum with negative implications for the country’s future. On one hand, electoral engineers can reinforce the nasty equilibrium that is Iraq’s party system. On the other, they can try to force it open by stimulating fragmentation and clientelism.

1. ADDENDUM 4/17: Some have read this sentence as my suggestion that the “luminaries” advocate pork-inducing systems in order to activate non-sectarian cleavages. That is not my intention. I drew on the “luminaries” for their emphasis on the importance of such cleavages.
2. Of course, varying factors like endorsement control, pooling, ballot access restrictions, and less feasibly, district magnitude give us far more permutations.
3. For two interpretations of this disaster, see F&V and FairVote.
4. Using data from FairVote.

Russia Election Watch

Russia is gearing up for its election season this winter. The Duma, Russia’s legislature, will stand for election in December and Russia is set to elect a new president in March. As I’ve noted on the DP before, democracy in Russia is on life support. Regional governors are no longer elected, the activity of civil society organizations have been curtailed by new laws and registration requirements, long-standing parties have been denied registration, and the independent media has slowly been consumed by the Russian state or Kremlin allies.

While there is little doubt that the upcoming elections will fail to meet international standards and the results will strengthen the Kremlin’s hand, much can be gleaned from the process. The manner in which these elections are carried out will tell outsiders to what extent the Kremlin will go to solidify its hold on power.

Furthermore, the Putin-succession process adds to the drama of the election season. While some observers think that Putin’s recent announcement that he would agree to head the party list for United Russia may indicate Putin’s intention to redirect power to the prime minister’s office, I doubt that is likely to occur. I still believe that Vladimir has a few more twists and turns up his sleeves in the coming months.

I’m going to try and post some interesting stories related to this process during the next few months. While I can’t promise daily commentary, I’ll try to at least link to interesting stories in the press and posts from other blogs.

There are a few interesting stories today that are worth pointing out:

• Carnegie’s Morning Brief links to a NYTimes story detailing the Kremlin’s attempt to further extend government control over the Internet. The take away from this article, besides increased state control, is the extent that the Kremlin is using “pro-Putin” youth group to counter opposition groups, even in blog coverage of protest events.
• In the lead up to the parliamentary elections, the Russian government has reached an “agreement” with food producers and retailers to institute a freeze on prices. Inflation and price increases in basic foodstuffs in recent weeks has made the Kremlin uneasy. After all, when your legitimacy is tenuous when basing your legitimacy on circuses and bread, and the bread is too expensive.
• Pro-Putin demonstrations have recently taken place across the country. The events, allegedly organized by state officials, are urging Putin to stay on as president after his second term ends in March. The take-away: the extent of the cult of personality around Putin is strong. Don’t be surprised to see a “grass-roots” movement seek to change the constitution or pressure Putin’s successor to step down.
• Eleven parties have been approved by the Election Commission to contest in the December elections. Three parties were barred because of problems with the membership signatures turned into the Election Commission for registration. The take-away: eleven parties is a significant amount. Given Russia’s new PR electoral system with a 7% threshold to enter the Duma, this could lead to an utter sweep by United Russia, the pro-Putin party of power. A recent opinion poll stated that approximately 66% of voters plan to vote for United Russia in December.
• Lastly, the Russian Election Commission announced that Russia will invite international observers for the December 2 parliamentary elections. The invitations will be sent out this week and the delegation is expected to reach 400 people. The take-away: While it is good that Russia is finally inviting the monitors, it is too late for any meaningful oversight to be implemented. Obersvation missions typically have a smaller group that observes and analyzes the pre-election evironment and election process months in advance of election day. Additionally, this mission will be signiciantly smaller than previous missions. For the 2003 parliamentary elections the OSCE sent 400 observers alone. The 400 this time will include observers from the OSCE and the Nordic Council, along with the shame election monitoring organizations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States.