Escalation in Iran

No matter what news is reporting, events in Iran are grim.

It started with the now-infamous, cold-blooded murderof Neda Agha Soltan, captured on film for the world to see.

Now, there are reports of mass beatings, use of tear gas and snipers picking off protesters as an intimidation tactic.  For an example of the situation, listen to this interview from two Iranian women who managed to escape.  As they point out, the regime’s thugs do not discriminate between women and men, young and old.  If you stand in their way, you will feel the baton of the state on your head.  In Iran, going to the hospital is akin to walking to your death.  Chances are the authorities won’t even let you make it to the hospital…and if you do, you probably won’t leave.

The regime is also doing its best to control the movements of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader.  Not seen for almost a week, Mousavi posts occasionally on his newspapers website reaffirminghis dedication to challenging the rigged election engineered by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, considered by many the leading Shi’a scholar alive today (perhaps behind only Grand Ayatollah Sistani), also continues to issue statements attacking the regime and Khamenei for their brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators and the theft of the election.

Make no mistake, the situation is getting worse as the government deploys its forces to prevent large gathers and intimidate protests back into the silent acquiescence that defined “Islamic” governance to this point.  The most frustrating aspect of the Iran situation is that there is nothing we can do but hope and pray for the protection of those fighting for their freedom and for a different future.

I don’t know about you, but that does not seem like it is enough.

Gauging Obama’s Reaction to Iran

Chris Hitchens seems to think Obama is being too weak.  Key quote:

That last observation also applies to the Obama administration. Want to take a noninterventionist position? All right, then, take a noninterventionist position. This would mean not referring to Khamenei in fawning tones as the supreme leader and not calling Iran itself by the tyrannical title of “the Islamic republic.” But be aware that nothing will stop the theocrats from slandering you for interfering anyway. Also try to bear in mind that one day you will have to face the young Iranian democrats who risked their all in the battle and explain to them just what you were doing when they were being beaten and gassed. (Hint: Don’t make your sole reference to Iranian dictatorship an allusion to a British-organized coup in 1953; the mullahs think that it proves their main point, and this generation has more immediate enemies to confront.)

I must admit, I am sympathetic to the argument.  The regime has shown that, no matter how non-interventionist Obama behaves, they will still claim that the West is at the root of the riots (apparently Britain is the real veiled enemy this time…though the U.S. is not spared).

The question that Hitchens dodges, however, is the credibility of those claims.  By refusing to jump into the debate, isn’t Obama actually discrediting  the “tired slogans” of the regime?  If it is apparent to all (including those inside Iran) that the U.S. is in no way acting against the regime, don’t the charges against the West begin to sound like the baseless propaganda it actually is?  That, I think, is the best argument for Obama’s measured stance.  What Obama is essentially doing is revealing the regime as a bunch of liars who create myths to support their power.

On the other hand, I am not at all sympathetic to the argument that we must walk a fine line since we have to negotiate with them afterwards.  Regardless of our actions, the Iranian government in power will pursue what it sees to be its interests.  If that means negotiations with the Great Satan, then so be it.  If that means sticking it to the West, then say bye-bye diplomacy.  President Obama could go to Iran and hug Ahmadinejad and Khamenei right now…but I promise you, if a few weeks later the regime does not like what he is asking for, his calls will go unanswered.

Let us also not forget that Iran is not walking a fine line with the U.S.  They kill our troops in Iraq, they instigate violence in Lebanon and Palestine to suit their needs.  Their strategy is tuned to achieve two goals: unsettle the U.S. and gain regional power.  If they can stab us in the back while shaking our hand, why is it that we fear doing the same?  The argument is: “well, they won’t talk to us if we don’t play nice.”  My response is, “they’re not playing nice and they’ll only talk to us if it is in their interest.  That will not change if Obama says ‘we are with those demonstrating for their rights and freedom’”  From what I know of the Cold War, that was how the game is played back then too.  Kill your enemy at night, talk to them in the morning.

I promise you, that is the strategy of the Iranians.  Hitchens is right: when will we wake up?

Small Changes and Revolution

This David Brooks article reminds me of one of Michael Totten’s posts at the beginning of the demonstrations and protests.

In both, the authors highlight the importance of small changes in attitude, such as people not fearing the IRGC or basiji or the wearing of green by the riot police “monitoring” the demonstrations.

Both authors conclude that when those small changes in attitude occur, you know something big is happening.

Brooks:

Small gestures unify a crowd and symbolize a different future, like the moment when Mir Hussein Moussavi held hands with his wife in public.

Ryszard Kapuscinski:

We don’t know whether the policeman and the man on the edge of the crowd already realize what has happened. The man has stopped being afraid – and this is precisely the beginning of the revolution. Here it starts. Until now, whenever these two men approached each other, a third figure instantly intervened between them. That third figure was fear. Fear was the policeman’s ally and the man in the crowd’s foe. Fear interposed its rules and decided everything.

Now the two men find themselves alone, facing each other, and fear has disappeared into thin air. Until now their relationship was charged with emotion, a mixture of aggression, scorn, rage, terror. But now that fear has retreated, this perverse, hateful union has suddenly broken up; something has been extinguished.

The most important changes are not those that we can see, like the dissipation of fear, but they are crucial to the survival of such movements.  I hope that what we witnessing is the dying gasps of that fear.

Who are the Basiji?

The Basiji’s have received a lot of media attention as of late.  Yet, the majority of the analysis that I’ve seen has not truly described the organization.  Fortunately, Jon Lee Anderson at the New Yorker wrote a small but accurate analysis a few days ago about the origins and purpose of the basij.

Key section:

Instead, bearded plainclothes militiamen have been attacking and harassing the demonstrators in Tehran this past week. These are Basijis, members of a civilian paramilitary organization founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. It was conceived of as a civilian auxiliary force subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards, and so it has functioned over the past three decades. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, fervent Basijis volunteered to serve on the front lines. For a time, very young Basijis were encouraged to offer themselves for martyrdom by clearing minefields with their bodies in what became known as “human waves”—literally walking to their deaths en masse so that more experienced soldiers could advance against the enemy…

In peacetime, the corps lets the Islamic regime employ violence as a form of social control while retaining some plausible deniability; scruffy bearded men in civilian clothes are not, after all, uniformed soldiers. The Basij is now said to have some 400,000 active members nationwide, with perhaps a million more reservists; in some ways, their relationship to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is also their commander in chief, recalls the one between Nicolae Ceausescu and the loyalist miners trucked in from the Romanian countryside to strong-arm pro-democracy protestors. From 1997 to 2005, during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the Basij showed its usefulness again, by attacking students at demonstrations. Some students were killed. The protests died out.

…During the past four years, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president and the reform movement dormant, the Basij has not been needed as shock troops. Instead they have made their presence felt by periodically throwing up traffic barricades on the streets of Tehran and stopping cars to smell the breath of drivers for evidence of illegal alcohol consumption, or to question couples about their marital status. These Basijis are usually scruffy working-class men, and thus bring an element of notional “class struggle” to the otherwise pragmatically lived lives of the citizens of the Islamic republic. Not surprisingly, among more educated and affluent Iranians, they are almost unanimously despised.

Now, the basij are once again being used as shock troops, praying on straggling protesters, invading University dorms, intimidating families of protesters, and controlling the streets of Iran to try and limit the size of the demonstrations.

Khamenei Doubles Down…and the Crackdown Starts

In his speech the other day, Supreme Leader Khamenei reemphasized that Ahmadinejad won the election.  Period.

He also warned that any bloodshed would be the responsibility of the protesters.  In Iran, that is an implicit threat that there WILL be bloodshed if the protests do not stop.  Hopefully the affect of that speech is to push protesters who were just out against the vote rigging/against Ahmadinejad to being against the system.  Khamenei’s attachment to Ahmadinejad and the ultra-conservative movement might be what it takes to completely delegitimize the “Islamic Republic” in the eyes of most people – and might plant the seeds of a revolution (which I do not consider this to be yet – though a coup d’etat from within does seem appropriate).

The danger is that Khamenei’s speech will cause Mousavi to do what Khatami did in 2005 – back down and tell the demonstrators to return to their homes.  The question remains: is Mousavi willing to topple the regime?  The answer will become evident in the coming days.

While many claim the movement is much larger than Mousavi, the movement is depending on Mousavi’s leadership and bravery to motivate a wider audience and create larger marches.  Should he defect, I am almost positive that the protests, demonstrations and marches will end as well.

Today, violence is increasing according to reports.  The basiji are out in huge numbers prowling the streets, viot police are controlling most of the large intersections and surrounding universities to stop students from joining the protests.  The imminent crackdown that we’ve mentioned earlier (and that Guardian and Michael Totten caught on to) is happening now.

Say a prayer (if you believe in that) or do whatever you can.  The protesters will need everything we can offer them.

1979 Redux?

There is an interesting, ongoing conversation online between bloggers, academics and policy wonks over who will “win.”  There are two camps in this argument: 

The first believe that the experiences of the current regime (Ahmadineja, Khamenei, etc) during the 1979 Revolution prepare them for what is happening now.  These experiences, proponents argue, suggest that the regime will survive because they know EXACTLY how revolutions occur.  The signs of an upcoming crackdown to prevent such a revolution are increasing (see here, here and here) and the regime has all the guns.  These facts (experience, weaponry and willingness to use it) make the chance of an opposition victory small.

The second camp argues that, while the regime has experience with revolutions, so too do the demonstrators and opposition leaders (Mousavi, Karroubi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, etc).  In fact, these individuals were integral in bringing down the Shah in 1979, making them more able to successfully pull off another revolution against the current government (see here and here).  In addition, the method of pursuing the demonstrations, including silent marches, days of mourning, and shouts of “Allah o Akbar” from rooftops, makes it hard for the regime to mobilize its armed forces and security apparatus against the people.

I hope the protesters win out but I am afraid they won’t.  Sorry that’s not very useful, but it’s the truth. 

What tilts me towards thinking they have a chance (of at least getting rid of Ahmadinejad), is the fact that current Iranian culture glorifies victimization.  As a result, beating or killing people rarely succeeds in quieting the crowds (see my earlier post for a similar point or Juan Cole’s analysis here).  Rather, making the protesters the victim of government oppression simply reinforces their belief that they must stand up against the government. 

It’s a terrifying way to think about the situation, but I don’t think it’s wrong.  Reza Aslan points out  how martyrdom, and the mourning of those martyrs in a culture such as Iran’s, affects a revolution (and how it worked in 1979):

….you have these massive mourning rallies, where you mourn the deaths of those who were martyred in the cause of freedom. And these things tend to get a little bit out of control, they often result in even more violence by the security forces and even more deaths, which then requires another mourning rally which is even larger, which then requires more violence from the government, and this just becomes an ongoing snowball that can’t be stopped.

The Guardian reported that today’s marches were bigger than the last.

Irony is Wonderful (Iran)

Click here to see how large the protests today were.

Of course, I read some speculation on Twitter that one possible reason for the enormous number of people protesting is the unemployment rate (generally agreed to be somewhere between 17% to 22% by experts). 

Unemployment among Iranian youth and women is even higher than general unemployment (some sources claim that over 30% of Iranian youth and women are unemployed).  And Mousavi had a great deal of support among these two groups before he was elected (or so it was reported).

Suppose you were unemployed and blamed that fact on Ahmadinejad’s (mis)handling of the economy.  What would you do? (Hint: watch the video).