Iran Update

While the huge protests and clashes between security forces and protestors have receded, the movement started by reform candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi is not finished.

Here is just a brief round-up of recent news and evidence that we haven’t seen the last of the green clad crowds (I am bolding those that should receive particular attention):

The Guardian Council certifiedthe election.  There is no surprise here.  But as the article point out, Khamenei has now attached his future to that of Ahmadinejad.  Great analysis here:

One positive outcome of this election debacle is that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has now tied himself to Mr Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement. Every uptick in unemployment is a knock against the current power structure. Every bit of inflation is a reminder of the system’s flaws. These are things Iranians deal with everyday, and they are more personal and affecting than the country’s relations with America or Israel. So the American administration should quietly do what it can to foment the economic undoing of the regime, but otherwise get out of the way. Because in many ways, the regime is already digging its own grave.

The Jerusalem Post is reportingthat six Mousavi supporters were publicly hanged.  This is not confirmed, but the Iranian government has often used public demonstrations (stoning, beatings, etc) as a method to keep the populace compliant.

More reports of election tampering continue to come out of Iran (for example, the pictures and reports here show, definitively, that not all was kosher).

The stories here and here are heartbreaking.  These two 18 year old kids, one brutally raped and beaten, and another killed (three shots to the chest), join Neda as examples of the Iranian governments brutality.

Conservative cleric Haddi Ghaffari rips Khamenei for his behavior over the election.  Ghaffari is by no means reformist, pragmatist or liberal.  He is further right than Rafsanjani and was instrumental in the creation of Hezbollah.  It will not be easy for the regime to paint him as a “puppet of the West.”

Khatami. Mousavi and Karroubi are becoming noticeably harsher in their public comments.  Look here and here.

Solid article here from Roger Cohen with some fascinating reporting.  It has been interesting to see his change in mindset throughout the entire “Velvet coup” and his realization of the real purpose of elections in Iran.  His final suggestion is to isolate Iran and let them writhe.  I am inclined to agree, though I am not sure to what end.  Isolation will not slow their nuclear pursuits and there is no way to crash the Iranian economy (such as oil blockades) without doing huge harm to the world economy and other American interests.  (That also ignores the fact that China and Russia probably would not allow it).  On the other hand, negotiations are moot now.  The regime’s message is clear: “we are committed to increasing our regional influence through subversion of other governments and achieving nuclear power status.  Oh, and we hate America.”

As Thomas Friedman wrote a few weeks back: let’s get the leverage before we start the talking.  The only way to get Iran’s government to alter course is through leverage and power.  Otherwise, you will just be wasting your time, legitimating a despicable regime and betraying the hopes of a generation of Iranians who stood up for a better life.

(Side note - I know I still owe you “The Death of the ‘Islamic Republic’ – Part II.”  I promise to have it up by this weekend.  Enjoy your Fourth of July!)

Gauging Obama’s Reaction to Iran

Chris Hitchens seems to think Obama is being too weak.  Key quote:

That last observation also applies to the Obama administration. Want to take a noninterventionist position? All right, then, take a noninterventionist position. This would mean not referring to Khamenei in fawning tones as the supreme leader and not calling Iran itself by the tyrannical title of “the Islamic republic.” But be aware that nothing will stop the theocrats from slandering you for interfering anyway. Also try to bear in mind that one day you will have to face the young Iranian democrats who risked their all in the battle and explain to them just what you were doing when they were being beaten and gassed. (Hint: Don’t make your sole reference to Iranian dictatorship an allusion to a British-organized coup in 1953; the mullahs think that it proves their main point, and this generation has more immediate enemies to confront.)

I must admit, I am sympathetic to the argument.  The regime has shown that, no matter how non-interventionist Obama behaves, they will still claim that the West is at the root of the riots (apparently Britain is the real veiled enemy this time…though the U.S. is not spared).

The question that Hitchens dodges, however, is the credibility of those claims.  By refusing to jump into the debate, isn’t Obama actually discrediting  the “tired slogans” of the regime?  If it is apparent to all (including those inside Iran) that the U.S. is in no way acting against the regime, don’t the charges against the West begin to sound like the baseless propaganda it actually is?  That, I think, is the best argument for Obama’s measured stance.  What Obama is essentially doing is revealing the regime as a bunch of liars who create myths to support their power.

On the other hand, I am not at all sympathetic to the argument that we must walk a fine line since we have to negotiate with them afterwards.  Regardless of our actions, the Iranian government in power will pursue what it sees to be its interests.  If that means negotiations with the Great Satan, then so be it.  If that means sticking it to the West, then say bye-bye diplomacy.  President Obama could go to Iran and hug Ahmadinejad and Khamenei right now…but I promise you, if a few weeks later the regime does not like what he is asking for, his calls will go unanswered.

Let us also not forget that Iran is not walking a fine line with the U.S.  They kill our troops in Iraq, they instigate violence in Lebanon and Palestine to suit their needs.  Their strategy is tuned to achieve two goals: unsettle the U.S. and gain regional power.  If they can stab us in the back while shaking our hand, why is it that we fear doing the same?  The argument is: “well, they won’t talk to us if we don’t play nice.”  My response is, “they’re not playing nice and they’ll only talk to us if it is in their interest.  That will not change if Obama says ‘we are with those demonstrating for their rights and freedom’”  From what I know of the Cold War, that was how the game is played back then too.  Kill your enemy at night, talk to them in the morning.

I promise you, that is the strategy of the Iranians.  Hitchens is right: when will we wake up?

Small Changes and Revolution

This David Brooks article reminds me of one of Michael Totten’s posts at the beginning of the demonstrations and protests.

In both, the authors highlight the importance of small changes in attitude, such as people not fearing the IRGC or basiji or the wearing of green by the riot police “monitoring” the demonstrations.

Both authors conclude that when those small changes in attitude occur, you know something big is happening.

Brooks:

Small gestures unify a crowd and symbolize a different future, like the moment when Mir Hussein Moussavi held hands with his wife in public.

Ryszard Kapuscinski:

We don’t know whether the policeman and the man on the edge of the crowd already realize what has happened. The man has stopped being afraid – and this is precisely the beginning of the revolution. Here it starts. Until now, whenever these two men approached each other, a third figure instantly intervened between them. That third figure was fear. Fear was the policeman’s ally and the man in the crowd’s foe. Fear interposed its rules and decided everything.

Now the two men find themselves alone, facing each other, and fear has disappeared into thin air. Until now their relationship was charged with emotion, a mixture of aggression, scorn, rage, terror. But now that fear has retreated, this perverse, hateful union has suddenly broken up; something has been extinguished.

The most important changes are not those that we can see, like the dissipation of fear, but they are crucial to the survival of such movements.  I hope that what we witnessing is the dying gasps of that fear.

1979 Redux?

There is an interesting, ongoing conversation online between bloggers, academics and policy wonks over who will “win.”  There are two camps in this argument: 

The first believe that the experiences of the current regime (Ahmadineja, Khamenei, etc) during the 1979 Revolution prepare them for what is happening now.  These experiences, proponents argue, suggest that the regime will survive because they know EXACTLY how revolutions occur.  The signs of an upcoming crackdown to prevent such a revolution are increasing (see here, here and here) and the regime has all the guns.  These facts (experience, weaponry and willingness to use it) make the chance of an opposition victory small.

The second camp argues that, while the regime has experience with revolutions, so too do the demonstrators and opposition leaders (Mousavi, Karroubi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, etc).  In fact, these individuals were integral in bringing down the Shah in 1979, making them more able to successfully pull off another revolution against the current government (see here and here).  In addition, the method of pursuing the demonstrations, including silent marches, days of mourning, and shouts of “Allah o Akbar” from rooftops, makes it hard for the regime to mobilize its armed forces and security apparatus against the people.

I hope the protesters win out but I am afraid they won’t.  Sorry that’s not very useful, but it’s the truth. 

What tilts me towards thinking they have a chance (of at least getting rid of Ahmadinejad), is the fact that current Iranian culture glorifies victimization.  As a result, beating or killing people rarely succeeds in quieting the crowds (see my earlier post for a similar point or Juan Cole’s analysis here).  Rather, making the protesters the victim of government oppression simply reinforces their belief that they must stand up against the government. 

It’s a terrifying way to think about the situation, but I don’t think it’s wrong.  Reza Aslan points out  how martyrdom, and the mourning of those martyrs in a culture such as Iran’s, affects a revolution (and how it worked in 1979):

….you have these massive mourning rallies, where you mourn the deaths of those who were martyred in the cause of freedom. And these things tend to get a little bit out of control, they often result in even more violence by the security forces and even more deaths, which then requires another mourning rally which is even larger, which then requires more violence from the government, and this just becomes an ongoing snowball that can’t be stopped.

The Guardian reported that today’s marches were bigger than the last.

Strong, Level-Headed Analysis from Experts

For those following the Iran situation, read over this short piece.  It’s basically the argument, as made by several Iran experts, for why we shouldn’t be calling what is happening in Iran a revolution.

I agree with them for the most part- though I’m not sure the IRGC would sell out Ahmadinejad.  I guess we’ll see.

Color Me Impressed with Obama

As I was writing a third post on the topic of Iran – discussing how we shouldn’t blow Mousavi’s resistance or the demonstrations out of proportion – I saw this interview Barack Obama gave to CNBC.  Read it.

Needless to say, I think he does a great job of explaining the issues, explaining his policy and his actions thus far.  Furthermore, he brings up an important issue: Mousavi is a regime man.  Even had he won, we would still be dealing with a regime whose interests would have it continuing to support Hamas/Hezbollah while also pursuing nuclear capabilities.

He assumes that Mousavi, who campaigned on lessening tensions with the West with regards to nuclear capabilities and funding for terrorism, wouldn’t follow through.  Regardless of whether Mousavi could have delivered, the basic fact is that not much would have changed right away as the regime fought internally. Obama makes an important argument here that we should heed.

Lastly, regarding the crowds: let’s not get our hopes up.  We should remember that the most common slogan chanted at the onset of the protests was “raye man kojast?” (Where is my vote?).  While the focus and purpose of those protests might have shifted after the way the regime responded to the demonstrations, the truth is that the crowd is brought together against Ahmadinejad and his policies, and not so much for democracy.  While those participating in the marches demonstrate great bravery and determination, they are united in their desire for more liberty and voice, not necessarily the toppling of the Islamic Regime.  The “manifesto” being sent around supports this claim; the articles require the removal of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei but call for the appointment of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri to the post of interim Supreme Leader until constitutional reform occurs.

This in no way is meant to reduce the importance of what these Iranians are doing.  I just want to make sure that we’re not making assumptions about what the Iranian people want.  I don’t know, and from what I’ve read on blogs and tweets, they all want different things. Some want “freedom;” some want “democracy;” others just want Ahmadinejad gone.

In another parallel of the 1979 Revolution, we see that Iranians from different walks of life find themselves working together against a common enemy. Then, it was the Shah. Today, in what is not a revolution (yet), the common enemies are Ahmadinejad and (perhaps) Khamenei.  But, as the 1979 Revolution showed, the leadership that emerges after the removal of the government overthrow is almost as important as the leadership people rally against.

I should say, though, that after few more days of basiji attacks and killings, perhaps it will become a revolution that seeks more than the nullification of the elections and the replacement of Khamenei.  The next week will be extemely important in determining where the Iranians take their movement.

How to Help Iranians

Jack has a few pointers here and here.

Also, you can help hack the filters Iran has put up using this tool.

Finally, you can wear Green (the color of Mousavi’s election) or you can change our FB picture to this.

Addition by Jack: The “Cyberwar guide to Iran elections” is essential for anyone wanting to help in the Twitter battle. Not only does it show you how to help. It shows you how to avoid unintended harm. (I’m linking to a mirrored version. The original on BoingBoing.net has gotten so much play that the ISP has suspended BB’s hosting account.)

Iran. Pt 2.

I decided to separate the two blog posts into “past/present” and “future.”

The main question floating around right now is: what do these protests signify?  Where is this all going?

Some claim this is the beginning of a revolution.  Others say that very little will change except that a few people die.  I suppose I am in the middle.

On the one hand, things will never be the same.  Any illusion of popular legitimacy is gone.  The regime has been ousted, or has shown (depending on how you look at it), exactly what it is: a repressive authoritarian government.  Power, not Islamic law or legitimacy, is the name of the game in Iran – and now everyone knows it. 

From a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, this complicates our calculation.  We need to continue pressing ahead with negotiations since military intervention is not a desireable option.  Negotiations, however, will be more politically charged and less stable since the majority of people do not support the government.  

An implicit danger here is that the U.S. is seen by Iranians as supporting or working with the oppressive regime, thereby creating anti-American sentiment among the people.  We have managed the balance before, but it is something we must be aware of in order to counteract.  It is also important to note that in his “victory” speech, Ahmadinejad declared the nuclear issue, “closed…forever.”  His declaration, combined with the willingness of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic regime to completely fabricate the election of Ahmadinejad at the last second and risk such popular dissatisfaction, suggests that the Islamic Republic wishes to “double-down” on Ahmadinejad’s policies of pursuing nuclear weapons (not to mention support of terrorists, denial of the holocaust, etc).  I do not envy the Obama administration on the line they must now walk in dealing with Iran.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic will likely weather this storm.  They have the guns and the willingness to use them – and legitimacy takes a time to fade to the point where toppling the regime is a possibility.  It really comes down to, I suppose, how much violence and death the demonstrators can withstand.  I don’t think anyone knows that answer to that question. 

(Sidenote: I think something that should be emphasized, though I haven’t heard it anywhere, is that the Islamic Republic has very much created a culture where resistance and death are glorified.  In such a society, will the killing of demonstrators discourage or encourage further resistance?  According to the BBC, today’s rally is larger than yesterdays…maybe that’s our answer.)

Another important question we must ask is: will Mousavi push so hard that the regime breaks?  It is important to remember that Mousavi is very much tied to the Islamic Republic.  He was Prime Minister in the 1980’s and was very much involved in the University purges that occured during that time.  He’s obviously changed, but would he be willing to topple the regime? 

President Khatami, the previous reformist President whose policies of increased freedom and equality were reversed by the Islamic republic through force and intimidation, faced a similar decision during his two terms as President from 1997 – 2005.  He backed down and told his supporters not to riot or demonstrate.  He likely understood the amount of bloodshed and pain such a move would have caused…and he still believed in Islamic governance.  Now, however, with the facade of people’s participation ripped away from the regime and satisfaction at an all-time low, is Mousavi willing to do what Khatami would not? 

Or will he, too, call on his supporters to accept the decision of Khamenei and move on?  Would they even listen to Mousavi if he did?

How Iranians duck government censors

Now that it has tossed out foreign journalists, the Iranian government is going after social media.

One tweet calls on all Twitter users blogging #iranelection to change their time zones to Tehran in order to frustrate censors.

Another advises Iranian tweeters to frequently change their usernames.

And there are several tweets noting ways for Iranian Internet users to surf around censors, use Internet cafes undetected, et cetera.

Without making any bets on outcomes, I will say that this is exhilarating.

Following #IranElection on Twitter

This page of tweets from and about Iran’s election is interesting to reload every few minutes. For example, it’s how I learned that the BBC has themed its site in green in solidarity with the opposition.