Iran.

Before I write anything, an apology to readers…this post might be a bit scattered as there is simply way too much information right now and I’m finding it hard to write dispassionately about recent events.  I’ll write some background, followed by why the election numbers are questionable.  Then I’ll describe the sequence of events and where we are now.

Background: Over the weekend, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad “won” re-election to the Presidency with 60%+ of the overall vote in the first round.  Needless to say, in the weeks leading up to the election, most observers thought it would be a close race that needed to go to the second round (where the field is narrowed to two contenders).  As the Islamic regime says it happened, Ahmadinejad won 60+%, Mousavi won 32%, with Karroubi and Razaei winnin about 1% each.  On top of the sheer fabrication of those numbers, the “official” tally showed Ahmadinejad winning in ALL of Iran’s provinces (even the hometown of Mousavi – an Azeri – and Karroubi - an ethnic Lur).  Right. 

Why the numbers aren’t right: While some suggest that Ahmadinejad might have won the election anyway (I doubt it, but it’s possible), the sheer percentages in the provinces and regions is unbelievable.  For more on that, look here for the best analysis available on the numbers.  Another suggestion by some Iran observers is that only “upper class” or “middle class” rich people are rioting and that the poor support Ahmadinejad and put him into office.  I disagree with that completely but will leave it to Juan Cole and Michael Totten/Laura Secor to dispute the claim since they do it better than I could.

What happened next: Unfortunately, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, came out and certified the election count…twice.  That, in and of itself, was very odd.  Traditionally, the Interior Ministry releases the results, the Guardian Council certifies them and then the Supreme Leader approves the winner.  Why did they skip these steps? I don’t know…but they did.

As a result, people took to the streets (and they’re still there, by the way).  And when I say people, I mean millions (at least from according to sources here, here and here).  All across Iran.  Just as an aside, here are some of the chants going around: “We will fight, we will die, we will get our votes back”; “Down with the Dictator”.  Also, in a move reminiscent of the 1979 Revolution, people are going to their roofs and chanting “Allah u Akbar” (God is Great).

Glimmer of Hope?: Some in the West, though I guarantee you not in Iran, took heart when the Supreme Leader called on the Guardian Council to “look into the results.”  While it sounds great, it means almost nothing.  To understand why, you must understand the Guardian Council.  This body, intensely powerful in Iran, runs the elections in every conceivable way: they determine who can run, they determine what campaign slogans/advertisements are allowed, they conduct the election engineering and they certify the election results.  Unrelated to elections, the Guardian Council is also empowered to veto any legislation coming from the Majlis (Parliament).  The Guardian Council is composed of 12 clerics.  Six are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader and six are appointed by the Head of Judiciary, who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader.  In essence, the Supreme Leader controls 12 of 12 seats.  (Here is Gary Sick talking about the likelihood of the Guardian Council nullifying the elections).

Another source of hope is the fact that Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former President and one of the founders of the Islamic Republic, has joined the opponents of the regime in contesting the election.  Rafsanjani, in no way a “revolutionary” and still a believer in Islamic governance, is the head of the Assembly of Experts.  Why is that a source of hope?  Well, the Assembly of Experts has the power to appoint and remove the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.  If he manages to get enough support from the 84 member Assembly, he could conceivably remove Khamenei, nullify the election, and call for a recount.  Put me down as skeptical of this plan succeeding.  While Khamenei and his cohort were not wise in the method in which they rigged the election, he demonstrated one crucial point in his activity: keeping his power is the most important factor for Khamenei. 

There is simply no way Khamenei, not to mention the IRGC and Ahmadinejad, would allow Rafsanjani to pull this off if they thought he could get enough votes.  I would go so far as to say they would kill him first.  But it won’t come to that.  Some might wonder, “well why not?”.  Simple: he can’t get enough votes because the IRGC, which controls the majority of the economy at this point (construction, military weapons, nuclear program, etc), also has a strong voice among the “experts” on the Assembly of Experts.  I should say again, this is simply my opinion, so take it for what it is worth.

Ahmadinejad enters with his words of wisdom:In a way only Ahmadinejad could, Ahmadinejad downplayed the importance of the protests and declared that Iran is “the most stable country in the world” and that the protests are like the demonstrations of fans after a soccer match. 

Meanwhile, rumors were flying that Mousavi was under house arrest.  Whether that was true, is unclear.  Mousavi did show up at an election rally on Monday, however, suggesting that he was either released as a result of public pressure or was never under house arrest.

Where are we now?What is known is that the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards or Pasdaran) and the basiji (basically roving bands of thugs with clubs, machetes and guns that are ultra-loyal to the regime) have been authorized to use live fire in the crowds…and that people have died.  Numbers vary, but I would estimate somewhere between 10 and 20 (from unconfirmed sources) with hundreds having disappeared (look here, here or here).  That’s not to mention the high-level reformists who have been arrested.

Additionally, there are reports that IRGC and basiji are ransacking University’s, kidnapping students and destroying the computers in Esfahan, Tabriz and Tehran (the capital).  Also, people using Twitter are saying that the government is blocking cell phones, text messaging, facebook, Gmail, and confiscating satellites and jamming radio signals.  Jamming the radio signals, blocking cell phones and Internet sites is normal fare for the Iranians.  Even going and stealing satellite dishes has happened in the past.  Apparently, however, this is on a more massive scale than ever before.

With regards to the U.S. response – which is much less important than what is happening on the ground – I am torn.  I think that Obama has a tough line to walk.  As many commentators have noted, we don’t want to make this about us and offer Ahmadinejad a “political football” to use against the demonstrators (by calling them puppets of the Great Satan).  So, declaring the election fraudulent probably isn’t a good idea.  On the other hand, it would probably mean a lot to those protesting to know that people are with them.  I think Obama’s response last night was perfectly fine…though I might have liked to see a little more “we are all Iranians” type talk – leave aside the criticism of elections but let Iranians know we’re with them.

HAPPENING NOW: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who was originally meant to succeed Khomeini to the position of Supreme Leader until he voiced concerns over the Islamic propriety of the role, has made a statement here.  Basically says Ahmadinejad’s victory is a lie.  As the second-most important figure in Shia Islam alive (behind Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq), this is a huge development and a much needed boost for the opponents of Ahmadinejad I am sure.

What to do about Mauritania?

According to Article 40 of the Constitution:

Article 40 [Interim Presidency]

(1) In the case of a vacancy or an incapacity declared to be absolute by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate shall become the interim President of the Republic for managing current business. The Prime Minister and the members of the government considered as having resigned, shall assure the managing of current business. The interim President may not discharge them from their functions. He may not have recourse to the people through a referendum nor dissolve the National Assembly.
(2) Unless a case of force majeure is declared by the
Constitutional Council, the election of the new President of the Republic will take place within three months from the declaration of vacancy or absolute incapacity.
(3) During the interim period, no constitutional modifications may be instituted either by referendum or by parliamentary means.

So, there is a constitutional out from the current crisis if the military agrees to return to the barracks and to reinstate the president.  The international community should keep this in mind as policy makers determine how to handle the situation.

Coup in Mauritania

The AP is reporting that a military coup has taken place in Mauritania. Most people are not familiar with this spacious (about the size of Texas and New Mexico combined) West African nation of 3 million people, but after a coup in August 2005, the military junta called for elections in what was to be the beginning of a transition towards democracy. Here’s some background info:

On August 3, 2005, a coup by elite military forces ended the 20-year-old autocratic regime of President Maaouiya Ould Taya. Promising a democratic transition, the Junta, calling itself the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (CMJD), oversaw elections on the municipal, legislative, and presidential levels, as well as a successful national referendum to reform the 1991 Constitution. On April 19, 2007, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi became the first democratically elected president of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Political parties were legalized in 1991, but the political system was dominated by Taya and his political party, the Republican Democratic and Social Party (PRDS), until the 2005 coup. During this period, the Parliament was perceived as highly ineffectual. Parties had a reputation for self-aggrandizement and independents were often empowered in their stead. During the transition, the CMJD signaled its intention to consult with the political parties to set the rules that would lead Mauritania toward democracy. The parties took advantage of this opportunity, for example, by harnessing the power of collective action in order to successfully lobby the CMJD to change aspects of the electoral law.

Mauritania’s institutional design, which is set forth in the French-inspired Constitution, provides a tenuous starting point for a young and fragile democracy. The Constitution calls for a semi-presidential structure featuring a powerful president (term limit: 2/ 5-years) who appoints a prime minister (PM) and cabinet. While the Constitution endeavors to facilitate the interdependence of the executive and legislative branches, the opposition may not be able to exercise these functions if it does not form the majority coalition in the National Assembly (NA; the lower house of Parliament). This unequal distribution of checks and balances renders the political system prone to hyper-presidentialism, whereby a small group of individuals is able to retain executive powers through the selective dissemination of government posts, state resources, patronage, and the like.

Preventing hyper-presidentialism requires strong opposition politics, which, in turn, requires opposition parties to use their collective strength to check the government. However, the electoral system generates incentives that promote contradictory behaviors that make stable alliance formation difficult. Parliamentary elections encourage party fragmentation by pitting parties head-to-head in districts where a candidate must receive a majority vote to avoid a second-round. Since there are no threshold requirements or restrictions on who can win and be sat in Parliament, many seats are filled by local chieftains and family heads, who, due to their privileged position, have little reason to join nationwide political party. Presidential elections, on the other hand, encourage coalition building, but only after first promoting fragmentation. Anyone, party affiliated or not, can run for president, and last year’s election attracted 18 candidates. With so many candidates, a second round, pitting the top two vote-winners against one another, is almost inevitable. These two candidates must then battle for the support of the leading vote-getters who did not make the cutoff, entering a negotiating process that has significant consequences for the form and structure of the governing and opposition coalitions. Such incentives do not make for stable alliances (68 different alliances have been made), particularly in a nascent setting in which political actors do not yet have a grasp of their level of support in society and many actors are still vying for power.

While opposition politicians and parties are aware of the threat of hyper-presidentialism, other, often more pressing, incentives stymie the growth of the party system and the development of government-opposition politics. Politicians’ first priority is getting results. Mauritanians are poor and the current food crisis has made life harder for many. They have high expectations for democracy, stoking fears that they will turn their backs on democracy if their lifestyles do not quickly improve. Moreover, the potential reawakening of the military – if multiparty politics does not function effectively – provides an imminent danger. With these exigencies incentivizing policy to the detriment of process, the opportunity for the government to consolidate its power – either formally or informally – over Parliament is ripe.

To be sure, process has not been ignored in its entirety. Some new laws (like that on political opposition) and laws under consideration (like the Rules of Procedure, which NDI has spearheaded) aim to consolidate government processes and delineate the functions of different branches and agencies. However, serious challenges to the implementation of these laws could render them ineffectual: the paucity of resources and capacity within Mauritania’s public sector.

The public sector lacks sufficient resources to support the obligations of a modern government. The NA is the most underfunded of the government bodies; parliamentary commissions and groups do not have offices, while many parliamentarians and their staffs lack computers, photocopiers, and even phones. There is no parliamentary library or archive, or a translation service for MPs who may speak and read the principle languages of business (Arabic and French) to varying degrees. This scarcity of resources prevents the Parliament from fulfilling its role as a source of legislation, thus depriving it of one of its most essential duties. Instead, most MPs rely on legislation and information passed down to them by the government, thus abetting the power imbalance. For the public administration, the resource deficit facilitates the lax implementation of statutes and policies, allowing the infiltration of politics into its work and the replacement of formal rules that cannot be followed with informal rules that can.

Moreover, the public sector lacks human capacity. Since the CMJD took power, a number of government organs, including independent electoral and human rights commissions, an ombudsman, and inspector general’s office, and regulations, such as a law requiring elected and high-ranking officials to disclose their public assets, have been established. Their intention, at least in theory, is to check the government and ensure a balanced and competitive playing field. However, the staffs tasked with operating these bodies and implementing regulatory policies lack the capacity to implement their mandates. Morale within the bureaucracy is low. For most national level politicians, moreover, tasks like reading budgets and drafting legislation are new. On the local level, a substantial proportion of politicians are illiterate. Support staffs for politicians at all levels of government are similarly inadequately qualified, oftentimes having obtained their positions for reasons other than merit. As a result, politicians oftentimes rely on, for example, the Ministry of Finance, for answers to their technical questions.

Nepal redux

I’m following news on Nepal for a project. The country is divided – politically and administratively – between Maoists and an alliance of seven parties led by the Nepali Congress.

Radio Australia has a concise summary of what’s going on:

The impoverished Himalayan nation has twice been scheduled to hold elections on its political future, but these polls have been postponed due to Maoist demands that the electoral system be reformed and the monarchy abolished.

The Maoists have threatened to take up arms again if their demands are not met.

The EU has threatened to cut off foreign aid, according to the above.

Nepal’s Interim Constitution is a Declaration of Independence from the monarchy, and it specifies how the “elections on its political future” are to be run:

(3) The Constituent Assembly shall consist of the following four hundred twenty five members, out of which four hundred and nine members shall be elected through Mixed Electoral System and sixteen members shall be nominated, as provided for in the law:-

(a) two hundred and five members shall be elected from among the candidates elected on the basis of First-Past-the-Post system from each of the Election Constituencies existed in accordance with the prevailing law before the commencement of this Constitution.

(b) two hundred and four members shall be elected under the proportional electoral system on the basis of the votes to be given to the political parties, considering the whole country as one election constituency.

(c) sixteen members to be nominated by the interim Council of Ministers, on the basis of consensus, from amongst the prominent persons of national life.

Now there is discussion of using MMP. Women of the Dalit community want 13% of seats reserved to them.

Looking at a survey by IDEA, uncertainty about their seat share drives Maoists’ desire to maximize proportionality using list PR. How much could MMP mitigate those fears? It depends on the distribution of voters across districts, which is hard to determine.

The survey indicates that the CPN (Maoist) is an emerging force but it is also a the most significant misfit among the political forces of Nepal. Out of 4,089 respondents, 934 identified themselves as being ‘close to a political party’. However 15 per cent of those who were close to a party said they were closer to the CPN (Maoist). 34 and 32 per cent associated themselves with the NC and the UML respectively.

It is too early to predict election results as 52 per cent respondents said either ‘I will decide later’ or ‘I will not tell right now’ to the question ‘Which party will you vote in the upcoming CA elections?’ Some had however already decided who they wanted to vote for. 13 per cent said they would vote for the NC while 11 per cent said that they would vote for the UML and CPN (Maoist) each.

The Carter Center’s mission in Nepal urges elections sooner than later.