The Democratic Piece

The BBC reports that Russia and China, among others, have voted against Zimbabwe sanctions in the UN’s Security Council. There’s probably no surprise here: the vote gives both countries the chance to exert their power in opposition to the hopes of their western opponents, the US and the UK. It also undermines calls within the UN for (1) restraint to political violence by the Zanu PF, and (2) respect for democratic outcomes. As powers that regularly undermine democratic processes, Russia and China gain much by casting doubt over the primacy of democratic governance in the lofty forum that the Sec Council affords.

I stumbled across an interesting post from Sean’s Russia Blog detailing a new amendment to Russia’s media law that passed late last week that expands the ability of the Kremlin to go after media outlets. Sean writes:

the Duma passed an amendment to the mass media law that adds slander to the list of unmentionables such as revealing state secrets, supporting terrorism, advocating pornography, and promoting violence. The law doesn’t use the word “slander” but redefined it with “intentionally false information,” which, of course, is just about anything. Perhaps more important than the vague, elastic language is the fact that the amendment gives the Ministry of Justice the power to issue warnings to media outlets for publishing slanderous and libelous material. Two warnings in twelve months allows Justice to shut the media outlet down pending trial.

As Sean also notes, this come on the heels of a recent newspaper being shut down for publishing a story detailing an alleged affair between Putin and a former Russian Olympic Gymnast turned Duma MP. Putin denied the probably false rumor, but the newspaper was shut down days later because of “funding problems.” It is not hard to imagine that this amendment may even be in response to the irresponsible story of a single paper, but I guess the Duma has a duty to protect the integrity of the state Putin.

While Russia has had loose “libel laws” that allowed individuals to sue media organizations for what they print, this is a marked step in a direction towards legalized state coercion of the media - although they already own (partially or in full) most of the television and radio outlets.

This event also dovetails nicely with Freedom House’s recent annual report of Global Press Freedom in the World. Freedom House found, unsurprisingly, that the freedom of the Russian press had declined. (The draft text, maps and pretty charts are available here.)

This report was drafted before this amendment was passed. Putin’s Russia is surely in a sad state when a Freedom House report is out of date before it’s even off the presses.

Another upcoming event of interest, courtesy of our friends at Georgetown U’s Professionals in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Affairs:

Medvedev’s Russia: Political and Economic Perspectives Under The New Administration will be held on Wed. April 9th, from 11-1pm at the Copley Formal Lounge on campus. This is a very timely event, with president-elect Dmitry Medvedev slated to be inaugurated on May 7th.

The conference panel includes Andrei Illarionov of the Cato Institute, former chief economic adviser to Vladimir Putin (2000-2005); Trevor Gunn, SFS Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University; Edward D. Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow; and Andrei A. Piontkovsky of the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC and Executive Director, Strategic Studies Center, Moscow.

For those at the low end of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, lunch will be provided. Please RSVP with your name and organization to rsvp@preea.org.

I am truly spoiled this week by a glut of in-depth Russia coverage by major U.S. daily newspapers.

Earlier I posted about about the series that the NYTimes started this week. It really must be my lucky week; the Christian Science Monitor (CSM) is also starting a series on “The Putin Generation.” The series is examining the lives, views, and involvement of the youth generation that grew up after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of their earliest memories have been shaped not by the horrors of the Soviet regime, but the chaotic decade under Yeltsin that was plagued by economic turmoil and deteriorating standards of living and Russian standing in the world. There is a great slide show that accompanies this article.

As I mentioned before, to understand why and how the Putin appeal is at the heart of this experience. The Kremlin harnessed this appeal to mobilize youth both within the United Russia party and as a phalanx of foot soldiers to counter opposition groups.

The first CSM piece is really insightful. It is based largely on the reporters interviews with Kirill Shchitov, one of the young, ardent supports of Putin. Their discussions are telling. Money quote:

“We support the political course that Putin started,” says Shchitov, an avid reader who draws inspiration from Peter the Great – “a real example of being proud of your country.” He also likes Stalin, a ruler who could solve any problem – including the defeat of Hitler – “by strict measures.” And he admires Franklin D. Roosevelt for, he says, making the United States a strong nation. And now, Putin.

The perceived humiliation of the Russian population has been used by the Kremlin to stoke a resurgent nationalism. In doing so, the Kremlin has referenced the challenges that the Soviet Union / Russia overcame in World War II. Part of this process has involved rewriting Russian history and partial rehabilitating Stalin’s rule as a period of “principled focus and determination” with some unfortunate zealousness.

Relying on youth organizations to protect and further a movement can have benefits, but also large potential pitfalls. Youths, caught up in the rhetoric and promises of a wooing leader, can become disillusioned when the promised future doesn’t materialize. It’s a risky strategy, but so far it has appeared to be effective, when coupled with the blatent abuse of administrative state resources, for the Kremlin in terms of stamping out opposition movements. I hope they realize that they are playing with fire - once started it can be an effective tool for many goals, but it can also burn you out of house and home.

This weekend I posted a quick note about a NYTimes article detailing the authoritarian government being established by Putin and his supporters within the Kremlin and around the country. The NYTimes has taken an interesting approach to this article by creating a Russian translation and opening a live journal account to host a discussion about the article. Needless to say, the responses have been strong.

A few of my quick thoughts about the article. As I mentioned earlier, I am happy that this series of articles is being written by the NYTimes because it puts the whole picture of what is happening politically in Russia into a somewhat “whole picture” context. Too often, the articles detail with one particular aspect of the Kremlin’s closure of the political space, such as the government crackdown on civil society or the administrative obstacles erected to prevent actual opposition candidates and parties. That being said, some of my comments here may be addressed in follow-on pieces of the series.

First, one of the bid missing section is this article is the lack of discussion regarding the reemergence of the use of psychiatric facilities to detain, hide, torture, and drug opposition activists (here and here, among others). Repeatedly, opposition activists have been detained by local police and federal security agencies and forcibly committed to psychiatric institutions. At these institutions, they have been chained to bed and drugged against their will. A chilling thought and a homage to the Soviet practice.

Second, the article doesn’t mention enough the use of Kremlin “NGO’s” to provide pressure against opposition groups. These cadres of youths are intended to intimidate and counter-protest any groups which disagree with the Kremlin. In the NYTimes defense, they did write a strong article on the topic a few months ago.

Third, there was no mention of the farcical results from the recent parliamentary election in some of the most “unstable” regions. As I’ve mentioned here before (here and here),the official results are absurd. In addition, some of the most interesting challenges to Putin’s electoral facade have been wagged in Ingushetia - where allegedly more than 99% turnout with more than 95% supporting Putin’s party. Local groups have begun to collect signatures from individuals stating that they did not participate in the elections, seriously challenging the regional governor’s fraud to please Putin.

Last, and I want to note that I do think the article does this to an degree, but an important facet of Putin’s regime is that he does not actually control each political detention. Many of these are carried out by regional mayors, governors, prosecutors, or security agencies zealously seeking approbation from the Kremlin. While the blood and abuse by not be directly ordered from the Kremlin, Putin is responsible for the environment in which these acts are carried out and, importantly, never prosecuted. Even more so now that Putin took on the responsibility and power to appoint governors and super-federal administrators. Since these officials can no longer answer to the Russian people, Putin is the only one that can put a check on their transgressions.

Also, the article does a good job to note that Putin’s rise has been facilitated by the turbulent Yeltsin years and the stability brought on by high energy prices. However, we should not be seduced by the stability and be tricked into believing that the lives of Russians are getting “better.” Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss provide an insightful article in the last issue of Foreign Affairs which frisks the claims of the “authoritarian model” being promoted by Putin and his celebrants.

Finally a large, U.S. newspaper is doing a detailed series on Putin’s regime and the manner in which it operates to preserve itself.  I don’t have a lot of time right now, but I recommend everyone read this good piece by Clifford Levy. Too often the articles on Russia and Putin’s growing authoritarian control focus on a single narrow topic like civil society or journalists.  Get a cup of hot coffee and settle in to read this.

The use of security and intelligence services to monitor domestic populations is always a tricky issue for a democracy. In recent months, we in the U.S. have been wrestling with the degree to which the government can enlist the intelligence services to monitor domestic communications.

This week a bombshell was dropped in the Russian media. Alexander Novikov, a activist in the United Civil Front civil society group which opposes the authoritarian policies of Putin’s government, revealed that he was an informant for the FSB (formerly the KGB in the Soviet Union). According to his statements, he has been providing information to the FSB for more than two years regarding the planned activities and inner workings of the United Civil Front.

If these claims are true, the FSB would have clearly broken at 1995 law that forbids domestic intelligence services to spy domestic civil society organization that are not illegal. According to Mr. Novikov, he was paid approximately $200 per month to provide regular reports regarding the groups activities and insight into the leadership structure of the organization.

Apparently Mr. Novikov decided go public because he began to sympathize with the United Civil Front and their struggle against the Kremlin:

Gradually, Novikov began to sympathize with the opposition activists he was spying on, which sparked arguments with his FSB handlers, who called the activists “sick people” and “idiots,” he said. “I told them, ‘If these people are sick, why do you beat them? Why do you attack them with clubs?’” Novikov recalled.

Although I doubt this story will get much additional coverage in the Russian media besides the initial story in Novaya Gazeta, events like this should demonstrate to the Russian people that the Janus-faced Putin regime is hollowing out the soul of their society. Stability and freedom are not mutually exclusive. Russians can have their rights protected and succeed economically. The false strength provided by high-energy prices can not last. At some point, as the energy prices fall, so to will the scales from the Russia’s eyes as they realize the new monster they’ve helped to create by their acquiescence.

There’s still room at PREEA’s video conference tomorrow with students from the Moscow Institute for International Economic Relations. From PREEA:

Georgetown students have an opportunity to converse with their Moscow counterparts about US-Russia relations, politics and economics, in the Russian and English languages. Participants will include Fulbright scholars from several countries and researchers from the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Very timely given the geopolitical implications of Kosovo’s secession yesterday. 11 AM, Russian Cultural Center, 1825 Phelps Place NW, Washington D.C. RSVP by e-mail to rsvp@preea.org.

The OSCE has again pulled out of monitoring elections in Russia. During partliamentary elections in December, the OSCE refused to send monitors because the Russian government place too many restrictions and did not process visa requests in a timely manner to make observation meaningful. The OSCE announced today that they will not monitor again, because of similar restrictions.

This is a good move by the OSCE, as it was back in December. Any type of half-ass monitoring that the Kremlin could strong arm the OSCE into carrying out would only add legitimacy to the process. Now, the OSCE needs to work with the European parliaments to make sure they do not send their own observation team of “notables.” This undermined the “Western” boycott of election monitoring. Furthermore, the OSCE needs to work hard to publicize instances of alleged election fraud in the international arena when brought by the domestic civil society groups. Just because they aren’t able to work fully on the ground, doesn’t mean the OSCE can’t serve a constructive role in the process.

In December the Kremlin informed the British Government that branches of the British Council in St. Petersberg and Yekaterinburg would have to close at the start of the year. The British Council is a UK-funded organization that promotes cultural exchanges and is located in UK embassies and consulates in more than 110 countries around the world. I recommend checking out their website linked above to examine the menacing work that they carry out. They even have a page detailing their recent problems with the Russian government.

It appears that the British Government will stand firm and refuse to voluntarily close the office, forcing the Russian government to take more drastic measures to shut them down. The Russian government has already threatened to bring tax violation cases against the group and refuse to provide visas to British Council staff.

This is the first time that I can remember that a Western government and stood up to the Kremlin’s attempts to bully organizations that it does not agree with. How this feud develops will tell us a lot about the extent to which the Kremlin will go to remove foreign organizations it deems unfriendly and if a stronger stance against the Kremlin when they attempt to kick out organizations is fruitful.

The expulsion of the British Council’s offices outside Moscow are largely tied to a decline in diplomatic relations between the Kremlin and the British government following the assassination of Litvinenko. Many suspect that the Russian government or a rouge element of the Russian state acting in what was assumed to be Putin’s wishes is responsible for Litvinenko being killed by an exposure to Polonium-210, a highly radioactive material that resulted in his slow, painful death. After the Kremlin blocked any serious inquiry into potential elements in Russia, a series of diplomatic retaliations has followed.

UPDATE:  Robert Amsterdam has some great analysis on this story today.