Tentative conclusions on democracy & governance
RSS icon Home icon
  • Kremlin Rules – Take 2

    This weekend I posted a quick note about a NYTimes article detailing the authoritarian government being established by Putin and his supporters within the Kremlin and around the country. The NYTimes has taken an interesting approach to this article by creating a Russian translation and opening a live journal account to host a discussion about the article. Needless to say, the responses have been strong.

    A few of my quick thoughts about the article. As I mentioned earlier, I am happy that this series of articles is being written by the NYTimes because it puts the whole picture of what is happening politically in Russia into a somewhat “whole picture” context. Too often, the articles detail with one particular aspect of the Kremlin’s closure of the political space, such as the government crackdown on civil society or the administrative obstacles erected to prevent actual opposition candidates and parties. That being said, some of my comments here may be addressed in follow-on pieces of the series.

    First, one of the bid missing section is this article is the lack of discussion regarding the reemergence of the use of psychiatric facilities to detain, hide, torture, and drug opposition activists (here and here, among others). Repeatedly, opposition activists have been detained by local police and federal security agencies and forcibly committed to psychiatric institutions. At these institutions, they have been chained to bed and drugged against their will. A chilling thought and a homage to the Soviet practice.

    Second, the article doesn’t mention enough the use of Kremlin “NGO’s” to provide pressure against opposition groups. These cadres of youths are intended to intimidate and counter-protest any groups which disagree with the Kremlin. In the NYTimes defense, they did write a strong article on the topic a few months ago.

    Third, there was no mention of the farcical results from the recent parliamentary election in some of the most “unstable” regions. As I’ve mentioned here before (here and here),the official results are absurd. In addition, some of the most interesting challenges to Putin’s electoral facade have been wagged in Ingushetia – where allegedly more than 99% turnout with more than 95% supporting Putin’s party. Local groups have begun to collect signatures from individuals stating that they did not participate in the elections, seriously challenging the regional governor’s fraud to please Putin.

    Last, and I want to note that I do think the article does this to an degree, but an important facet of Putin’s regime is that he does not actually control each political detention. Many of these are carried out by regional mayors, governors, prosecutors, or security agencies zealously seeking approbation from the Kremlin. While the blood and abuse by not be directly ordered from the Kremlin, Putin is responsible for the environment in which these acts are carried out and, importantly, never prosecuted. Even more so now that Putin took on the responsibility and power to appoint governors and super-federal administrators. Since these officials can no longer answer to the Russian people, Putin is the only one that can put a check on their transgressions.

    Also, the article does a good job to note that Putin’s rise has been facilitated by the turbulent Yeltsin years and the stability brought on by high energy prices. However, we should not be seduced by the stability and be tricked into believing that the lives of Russians are getting “better.” Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss provide an insightful article in the last issue of Foreign Affairs which frisks the claims of the “authoritarian model” being promoted by Putin and his celebrants.

  • Kremlin Rules

    Finally a large, U.S. newspaper is doing a detailed series on Putin’s regime and the manner in which it operates to preserve itself.  I don’t have a lot of time right now, but I recommend everyone read this good piece by Clifford Levy. Too often the articles on Russia and Putin’s growing authoritarian control focus on a single narrow topic like civil society or journalists.  Get a cup of hot coffee and settle in to read this.

  • Kremlin Revives KGB Tactics to Subvert Civil Society

    The use of security and intelligence services to monitor domestic populations is always a tricky issue for a democracy. In recent months, we in the U.S. have been wrestling with the degree to which the government can enlist the intelligence services to monitor domestic communications.

    This week a bombshell was dropped in the Russian media. Alexander Novikov, a activist in the United Civil Front civil society group which opposes the authoritarian policies of Putin’s government, revealed that he was an informant for the FSB (formerly the KGB in the Soviet Union). According to his statements, he has been providing information to the FSB for more than two years regarding the planned activities and inner workings of the United Civil Front.

    If these claims are true, the FSB would have clearly broken at 1995 law that forbids domestic intelligence services to spy domestic civil society organization that are not illegal. According to Mr. Novikov, he was paid approximately $200 per month to provide regular reports regarding the groups activities and insight into the leadership structure of the organization.

    Apparently Mr. Novikov decided go public because he began to sympathize with the United Civil Front and their struggle against the Kremlin:

    Gradually, Novikov began to sympathize with the opposition activists he was spying on, which sparked arguments with his FSB handlers, who called the activists “sick people” and “idiots,” he said. “I told them, ‘If these people are sick, why do you beat them? Why do you attack them with clubs?’” Novikov recalled.

    Although I doubt this story will get much additional coverage in the Russian media besides the initial story in Novaya Gazeta, events like this should demonstrate to the Russian people that the Janus-faced Putin regime is hollowing out the soul of their society. Stability and freedom are not mutually exclusive. Russians can have their rights protected and succeed economically. The false strength provided by high-energy prices can not last. At some point, as the energy prices fall, so to will the scales from the Russia’s eyes as they realize the new monster they’ve helped to create by their acquiescence.

  • Moscow video conference tomorrow

    There’s still room at PREEA’s video conference tomorrow with students from the Moscow Institute for International Economic Relations. From PREEA:

    Georgetown students have an opportunity to converse with their Moscow counterparts about US-Russia relations, politics and economics, in the Russian and English languages. Participants will include Fulbright scholars from several countries and researchers from the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

    Very timely given the geopolitical implications of Kosovo’s secession yesterday. 11 AM, Russian Cultural Center, 1825 Phelps Place NW, Washington D.C. RSVP by e-mail to rsvp@preea.org.

  • OSCE Will Not Monitor Russian Vote – Again

    The OSCE has again pulled out of monitoring elections in Russia. During partliamentary elections in December, the OSCE refused to send monitors because the Russian government place too many restrictions and did not process visa requests in a timely manner to make observation meaningful. The OSCE announced today that they will not monitor again, because of similar restrictions.

    This is a good move by the OSCE, as it was back in December. Any type of half-ass monitoring that the Kremlin could strong arm the OSCE into carrying out would only add legitimacy to the process. Now, the OSCE needs to work with the European parliaments to make sure they do not send their own observation team of “notables.” This undermined the “Western” boycott of election monitoring. Furthermore, the OSCE needs to work hard to publicize instances of alleged election fraud in the international arena when brought by the domestic civil society groups. Just because they aren’t able to work fully on the ground, doesn’t mean the OSCE can’t serve a constructive role in the process.

  • Russia – UK Conflict Intensifies

    UK FlagRussian FlagIn December the Kremlin informed the British Government that branches of the British Council in St. Petersberg and Yekaterinburg would have to close at the start of the year. The British Council is a UK-funded organization that promotes cultural exchanges and is located in UK embassies and consulates in more than 110 countries around the world. I recommend checking out their website linked above to examine the menacing work that they carry out. They even have a page detailing their recent problems with the Russian government.

    It appears that the British Government will stand firm and refuse to voluntarily close the office, forcing the Russian government to take more drastic measures to shut them down. The Russian government has already threatened to bring tax violation cases against the group and refuse to provide visas to British Council staff.

    This is the first time that I can remember that a Western government and stood up to the Kremlin’s attempts to bully organizations that it does not agree with. How this feud develops will tell us a lot about the extent to which the Kremlin will go to remove foreign organizations it deems unfriendly and if a stronger stance against the Kremlin when they attempt to kick out organizations is fruitful.

    The expulsion of the British Council’s offices outside Moscow are largely tied to a decline in diplomatic relations between the Kremlin and the British government following the assassination of Litvinenko. Many suspect that the Russian government or a rouge element of the Russian state acting in what was assumed to be Putin’s wishes is responsible for Litvinenko being killed by an exposure to Polonium-210, a highly radioactive material that resulted in his slow, painful death. After the Kremlin blocked any serious inquiry into potential elements in Russia, a series of diplomatic retaliations has followed.

    UPDATE:  Robert Amsterdam has some great analysis on this story today.

  • Russian Democracy NGO Opens in New York City

    Russian FlagBack in October I noted a story where Putin announced he would seek to establish NGOs in Europe and the United States that would work to promote democracy and human rights. In today’s Moscow Times a story covers the registration of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York city.

    The group, which claims to be completely independent from the Kremlin and is funded by private Russian businessmen, will work to improve the reputation of Russia in the U.S. and provide analysis of democracy in the U.S.

    The director couldn’t help himself in taking a swipe at Freedom House who recently rated Russia as “not free” in their annual report on the state of freedom in the world. Money quote:

    “I have no desire to copy the behavior of organizations like Freedom House,” Kucherena said. “We have completely different tasks. … Freedom House has only one goal: to publish data, which was assembled using methodologies that nobody understands, in order to draw attention to themselves.”

    The organization is also planning an office in Paris with perhaps additional office in other European countries and some former Soviet states. According to the article, they are currently hiring staff for their NYC office. Time to dust off that resume.

  • I Didn’t Vote!

    Russian FlagA fascinating movement has grown in small Ingushetia, a small autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. In the recent parliamentary elections, local officials claimed that more than 98.35% of the registered voters turned out and98.72% of those supported Putin’s United Russia.

    These figures are blatantly false and a local movement has started to gather signatures of people officially stating “I Did Not Vote!” Paul Goble, who runs a great blog on Eurasia, has been following the movement. His latest post details that the movement has gathered signed statements from a stunning 54.5% of registered voters indicating that they did not submit ballots.

    That type of organization is pretty impressive. Paul indicates that other groups may seek to replicate it elsewhere, but I doubt that will be feasible. This movement is finally being picked up by the domestic and international media.

    Money quote:

    The signed declarations have been put into 290 volumes that are now in the hands of Moscow lawyers who plan to transmit them to the Procurator General of the Russian Federation with a request that the election results from Ingushetia at least be reviewed and possibly overturned.

    Reporting of this kind is the reason for the continuing efforts by Zyazikov and Moscow to close down the independent-minded Ingushetia.ru site. Having failed to do so through pressure on the local ISP provider, redirection of visitors to porno sites, and threats on the life of the site owner’s father, this week the authorities did something new.

    They overloaded the site’s popular forums with material so radical that its posting would certainly subject the site’s current owners to charges of extremism and thus forced them to restrict access to the forums to registered users lest such posts become the basis for officials to shut down the site itself.

    The state is clearing feeling the heat of this grassroots movement. In a country where the central government has such firm control over many of the levers of power, I believe one of the best tactics to undermine it is to do exactly this. Gather irrefutable evidence and throw yourself with it at the corrupt gears of the state and demand a response. Every time the Russian government fails to act on something this blatant, they hurt their international credibility and domestic legitimacy as proving for the “rule of law.”

  • Putinism As Ideology

    Russian FlagTwo interesting posts today regarding the development as Putinism as an ideology.

    First, Prespectives on the New Russia has a post on the development of a Putin Museum and the establishment of Putin Studies. Money quote:

    This ideology seems to be developing into a strange blend of continued capitalist reforms, Eurasianist ideology (Dugin, the Eurasianist thinker is now featured prominently in Kremlin propaganda and espouses similar ideas regarding Russia’s use of landpower and what he calls a “conservative revolution” – one that seemingly preserves traditional Russian institutions while also brings about needed change), anti-Americanism (see Nashi’s frequent attacks on America and on opposition politicians as being American), and good ole fashioned nationalism (this is mainly manifested through spending oil money on the army and “national projects”, though here, there is a difficult struggle going on between those who are more and less willing to flirt with anti-immigration and racism in Russia as another plank in the Putin coalition).

    A few months back, I wrote about the commissioning of new Russian history books.  La Russophobe has an update regarding the project today. Money quote:

    Here’s a few lessons from a textbook called Russian History from 1945—2007:

    1. The abolition of directly elected regional governors was a good thing because Russians cannot govern themselves.

    2. The re-privatization of Yukos means Russia no longer has oligarchs.

    3. Georgia gave up its independence in 2004 with its presidential elections and is now illegitimate.

    4. Stalin was an “effective manager,” taking Russia from the plow to the atomic bomb in just a few years. His repressions were necessary to mobilize for war and industrialize Russia so quickly. Same goes for Brezhnev. Krushchev, Yeltsin and Gorbachev on the other hand were bad because they were weak.

    Brilliant.

  • At least they vote on weekends

    Kyrgyzstan had a fraudulent parliamentary election on Sunday, according to the OSCE. As in Russia, the strongman’s party won a lion’s share of seats under a new list PR system (5% threshold).

    Russia dumped its mixed system for list PR before elections earlier this month. Kyrgyzstan recently passed constitutional amendments, one of which abolished a single-member district plurality system.

    Like Russia, Kyrgyzstan also made it harder for small parties to get on the ballot.

    Unlike in Russia, the supreme court is reviewing changes to the electoral law.