US Election Day’s unsung races

Beyond several “off-year” and special elections with or without predictive significance for major future races, there were several ballot measures or elections today involving STV/IRV, including:

• One on a new IRV implementation (at time of writing, it looks good);
• One on a new STV implementation (at time of writing, it doesn’t look good;
• One on whether to keep IRV;
• One advisory vote on whether to keep IRV;
• One first-time use of IRV;
• Three uses of IRV for the second or more times;
• And two uses of STV in the same town, continuing an almost 70-year run with the system.

Over the last decade, we’ve accumulated quite a set of referenda on these systems. That set does not include legislative votes (probably several) or statewide referenda (one). It would be interesting to identify patterns in support for these measures.

Preference voting for El Sal?

The other day I had the opportunity to attend a talk by Juan Carlos Sanchez from the Foundation for the Study and Application of Law (FESPAD), a civil society organization that seeks to reform El Salvador’s electoral system.

He opened by arguing, quite bluntly, that El Salvador has “one of the worst electoral systems in Latin America.” To demonstrate this, he pointed to a number of specific facets of the system, such as the lack of absentee voting, the politicization of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the laissez-faire approach to parties and campaign regulation, and feckless mechanisms for enforcing the rules of the game.

What struck me most about Mr. Sanchez’s talk was what he did not address: the actual processes by which voter preferences are translated into political representation.

El Salvador utilizes a system of closed-list proportional representation (CLPR), a system known for encouraging strong, platform-oriented, but sometimes also deeply ideological and polarized parties, not unlike those found in El Salvador. Briefly, a closed list allows the party leadership to select candidates with little or no input from the electorate, while proportionality provides opportunities for parties to garner substantial representation without necessarily having to reach across the political aisle or even into the center aisle in order to acquire district-wide majorities/pluralities. While it must be recognized that the two main parties – Arena and FMLN - have made considerable strides in moderating themselves since the days of the civil war, they nevertheless remain deeply divided, so much so that many question whether they will uniformly recognize the legitimacy of a loss in the upcoming presidential election.

Of course, in a country where civil war wounds have not yet fully healed, and where substantial socioeconomic disparities remain a potent political reality, it would be silly to attribute full blame for the country’s polarized politics to its electoral institutions. Yet, it seems reasonable to begin to question the degree to which this system may be exacerbating, or at least failing to ameliorate, the nature and dynamics of existing political divisions.

To be sure, PR has its virtues and it has been proposed as a means to alleviate the effects of deeply divided societies in a number of contexts. However, such proposals are almost always tied to the caveat of parliamentarianism and the assumption of several relevant political parties - two additional factors that would presumably contribute a more conciliatory executive, legislative coalition building and, by extension, a more consociational political dynamic overall.

This model, however, does not reflect the political realities of El Salvador, where holdover Cold War manichaeism and deep class divisions have encouraged the emergence of two dominant parties, which are currently involved in a bitter, winner-take-all struggle for the powerful presidency.*

With this background in mind, I asked Mr. Sanchez whether anyone has ever recommended a move away from CLPR, towards a system that provides incentives for existing parties to moderate the selection of their candidates, and for individual candidates to soften their rhetoric, such as the Alternative Vote (AV) or the Single Transferable Vote (STV) (the latter would seem a more likely option for a country already accustomed to proportionality and multi-member districts). The virtue of these systems is that they allow voters to select not only their first choice, but their second, third, or however many candidates decide to run. If their first choice does not receive enough votes to win a seat, their second choice candidate then receives their vote. For this reason, AV and STV systems are both referred to as forms of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). This can create strong incentives for parties and candidates to attract votes outside their traditional base by moderating their platforms, campaigns, and rhetoric, as they begin to recognize the value of being voters’ “next-best choice.” Given that upwards of 14 percent of the electorate remains undecided going into tomorrow’s presidential election, it seems plausible that there is a substantial underrepresented “center,” whose voice could serve as a force of moderation if amplified through one of these preferential systems.  

To Mr. Sanchez’s knowledge, despite the near-universal recognition of the need for a less polarized political dynamic, no one has made such a recommendation. In fact, he confessed that he - ostensibly one of the foremost domestic experts on reforming the Salvadoran electoral system – was unaware of any electoral alternatives for diminishing polarization.

This response surprised me, and I was thus wondering if anyone out there on the “www” with knowledge of El Salvador or electoral systems has any insight with respect to this issue, especially since our computer time at the hotel is rationed, and opportunities for even basic research are extremely limited. Has anyone proposed a preferential model for El Salvador? Might it help temper the country’s polarized politics? Is it even a plausible option? To what degree are current power holders’ interests tied to existing procedures? Are there potential unintended consequences that one should consider? Might a simple shift from CLPR to open-list PR offer a less drastic means of achieving greater moderation, or might this have the opposite effect? Perhaps what is really needed is a focus on reforming the executive branch vis-a-vis other organs of the state, whether this means a move toward parliamentarianism or simply a curtailment of executive authority.

So many questions. With any hope, the conduct of the parties and their supporters during and after tomorrow’s election will make them all seem a little less relevant.

*Although the president of El Salvador is selected through a two-round system, which in other contexts has been credited for the success of more moderate candidates (according to the same logic of the aforementioned IRV systems). However, in tomorrow’s election, because none of the smaller parties have put forth candidates, it is understood that there will be no opportunity for a second round of voting.

STV in British Columbia?

Just a quick note to record the upcoming May 12 referendum on the single transferable vote in British Columbia. The pro side is running a good website at www.stv.ca. Here is the government’s page.

This is BC’s second referendum on electoral reform. In 2005, STV came within 2.3 points of winning, and majorities in 77 of 79 ridings (districts) supported it. The provincial government had set the threshold for passage at simple majorities (50% + 1) in at least 60% of BC’s ridings and a 60% supermajority province-wide. The same thresholds will apply this time. However the government is funding more extensive voter education, including recognized for and against groups.

The first referendum spawned this useful flash animation on how STV works.

District magnitudes will range from two to seven, with most in the four- to five-seat range. Surplus transfers will be fractional. Voters will not be required to use all rankings. It does not appear that the referendum will affect the number of members of the legislative assembly (MLAs); instead this number appears to be a function of population.

This is on the ballot because the province, like Ontario, convened a Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform. Under that reform model, people not connected to politics meet, learn about electoral systems, decide whether they want reform, and adjudicate among the options. Some see the citizens’ assembly as a way to achieve electoral reform where self-interested lawmakers otherwise would not pass such legislation.

Preferential voting is not too difficult

Several political scientists have advocated for preferential voting systems as conflict management devices in divided societies.¹ The most common criticism I hear is that they are too complicated. I do not believe this, at least where literacy rates are reasonably high.

Recent American experience with ranked voting systems shows that a little voter education goes a long way. Burlington, VT just held its second ever instant runoff voting election. Of 8,980 total ballots, only four were invalid. That’s a 0.04 percent error rate. Less fatally, only one voter did not use all five of his/her rankings, according to Rob Richie.²

Here is an example of the ballot voters used.

1. Donald Horowitz has advocated instant runoff voting/alternative vote. Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds have variously advocated and highlighted the single transferable vote.
2. UPDATE: Actually, the voter did not specify a first choice.

STV in India

A note from Rob Richie at FairVote reminded me of this often neglected case.¹ 238 of 250 members of the Indian upper house, the Rajya Sabha, are elected under the single transferable vote.

Seats are apportioned to states in proportion to population. Terms are six years, staggered, with one-third of the membership standing for election at a time. Elections are indirect by each state’s legislative assembly. The chamber’s session is continuous, and it is not subject to dissolution.

The elections made news due to evidence of inter-group preference swapping:

Just five months after the Amarnath land agitation divided them bitterly along regional lines, the recent Rajya Sabha election was witness to politicians in Jammu voting for those from the Valley.

During polling for two Rajya Sabha seats from Jammu and Kashmir last Friday, one of the BJP MLAs cast his second preference vote for National Conference candidate Farooq Abdullah…

1. We usually stop at Ireland, Northern Ireland, Malta, Australia, Scotland (local) and New Zealand (local).

STV for Wash., DC

My op-ed with Rob Richie in today’s Washington Times:

Electoral rules may be boring, but Tuesday’s D.C. Council election saw them fail. While Congress designed the District’s system to let voters in the minority elect a winner, it misfired on Nov. 4. Now that the council is effectively single-party, it’s time to implement a system that guarantees the intended outcome…

Yes on Cincinnati issue 8

Most TDP readers know that Cincinnati will vote on proportional representation (STV/choice voting) in November. This is an historic and crucial reform opportunity.

The Cincinnati Better Ballot Campaign runs a website worth sharing. If someone you know lives in Cincinnati, pass it along.

Who supports PR in Cincinnati?

This is a very clear discussion of the Cincy PR campaign. It looks like a radio broadcast.

In the battleground state of Ohio, it should be an especially high turnout year. Do you think this coalition can tip the balance?

Former City Councilman Chris Smitherman says he expects Republicans, independents, Libertarians and Greens will vote in favor of proportional representation, because PR could break up Democratic control of the council.

PR-STV on the ballot in Cincinnati

The Hamilton County, OH Board of Elections yesterday certified a petition by the Cincinnati NAACP to put proportional representation on the November ballot.

If the measure passes, voters will use the single transferable vote to elect a nine-member city council, renewing a 30-year good government experiment that ended in a vitriolic 1957 repeal effort:

The single transferable vote had allowed African Americans to be elected for the first time, with two blacks being elected to the city council in the 1950s. The nation was also seeing the first stirrings of the Civil Rights movement and racial tensions were running high. PR opponents shrewdly decided to make race an explicit factor in their repeal campaign. They warned whites that PR was helping to increase black power in the city and asked them whether they wanted a “Negro mayor.” Their appeal to white anxieties succeeded, with whites supporting repeal by a two to one margin.

I have tried recently to focus on international democracy assistance, but this could be a major development in the history of American democracy and world of electoral systems.

Today only Ireland, Northern Ireland, Australia, Malta, New Zealand, Scotland (h/t to James) and Cambridge, Mass. use STV (of the multimember variety) for governmental elections, so Cincinnati would add a case to that family.

Cincinnati is the next page in a long and underexposed history of election reform in America. From the Progressive Era through the Civil Rights movement, 22 US cities (or 24 depending on definitions) used PR-STV for local elections, many of which were in Ohio. The second to last experiment ended in 2002 with the disbanding of New York City’s school board.

While system performance varied by city and indicator, STV’s overall record was positive:

On the whole, from the available evidence, proportional representation seemed to have a beneficial effect on the cities that adopted it. It clearly produced more representative government and, where voters wanted it, a more diverse party system. Large increases in the number of effective votes were also enjoyed in these cities. It may not have resulted in the substantial increases in voter turnout that proponents predicted, but neither did it produce the increases in voter alienation that critics feared. And finally, even though PR city councils were often more diverse politically, this did not seem to impair their political efficiency or effectiveness.

Good sources for more specifics are Doug Amy’s site linked above and Robert Kolesar in Proportional Representation and Election Reform in Ohio, Kathleen Barber ed., OSU Press 1995.

STV seeks proportional results and maximizes ‘votes that elect’ by transferring votes in excess of a quota to voters’ next-ranked choices. With nine seats in Cincinnati, it will take 10 percent of votes to win each. There are different ways to transfer surplus, and Cincinnati would use the quasi-random “Cincinnati method.”

Who cares? American reformers, for one, but the ends they are pursuing should not be lost on the international democracy assistance community, which has engaged in electoral engineering from Afghanistan to Nepal over the past few years.

As Donald Horowitz, Ben Reilly and others have noted, STV (and its single-winner cousin) can benefit divided societies through the incentive it presents to campaign for second- and third-choice support outside one’s group. Because it’s a proportional system, STV prevents exclusion of significant minority groups, especially as the number of seats to elect increases. As a candidate-centric system, STV emphasizes entrepreneurial campaigns over party labels. Finally, as a system based on multimember districts, it reduces incentives to gerrymander.

Not all contexts would benefit. Innumeracy can be a barrier to a method based on ranking, and places with highly fragmented party systems probably need stronger incentives for cohesion. These caveats notwithstanding, democracy promoters should embrace the wealth of lessons learned – and to be learned – about the growing number of STV cases at home and abroad.

History of STV

Anyone with time and interest should read this column about the genesis of the single transferable vote and its history in America. It’s written by someone at Princeton U who knows her stuff.

There was controversy recently at Princeton over their STV student government elections. As with Georgetown undergrads earlier this year, calls for repeal were rooted in misunderstanding of the system.

Good article, Josephine.