Last April, it appeared Mugabe was in a bind. He was losing a presidential election, and the South African judiciary was blocking $1.2 million in Chinese guns from entering his repressive arsenal. There were rumors in state news of a “national unity government.” Later on, Botswana’s Seretse Khama led regional rejection of Mugabe’s “win.” The pressure was on from multiple fronts, and the only thing holding Mugabe in place was his ability to maintain the loyalty of the military.

At first glance, this is a Kenya-style solution: invent a prime ministership, inflate cabinet, split the spoils. While the NY Times is light on details and slightly optimistic, Le Monde spells it out:

1. Tsvangirai gets the new title of Prime Minister;
2. Cabinet is now 31 members large;
3. Mugabe gets to name 15 members;
4. Tsvangirai gets to name 13;
5. a “dissident faction” of the opposition, led by Arthur Mutambara, names the remaining 3 members;
6. and Mugabe gets to keep the National Security Council, which covers the army, police and secret service.

The Financial Times disagrees a bit on that last point, nonetheless offering an insightfully sober analysis:

Who controls the security portfolios will be critical to restoration of confidence. It appears that Mr Mugabe will control the army, and Mr Tsvangirai the police and justice ministry. That might work, but all those institutions are currently controlled by Zanu-PF loyalists. They cannot be purged overnight.

It appears that the MDC will get the most important economic jobs in the cabinet, although that could be a poisoned chalice if swift action proves impossible to stabilise the economy and revive the vital farm sector. The task would be daunting for a united government: it could prove overwhelming for one divided by years of intimidation and rivalry.

The important question is whether Mugabe will use the army to repress opposition activity. On that, the Times offers this bit of inconclusive insight:

Talking about the negotiations that led to the agreement, Mr. Mugabe also said there were “lots of things in the agreement that I don’t like, and still don’t like.”

However, he said, “we are all Zimbabweans and is there any other road, any other route to follow? History makes us walk the same route.”

According to the New York Times, a neighboring democracy won’t let Mugabe bust opposition heads:

South Africa’s High Court on Friday barred transport of the ammunition, rockets and mortar bombs across South Africa from the port of Durban to landlocked Zimbabwe, after an Anglican archbishop argued that the arms were likely to be used to crush the Zimbabwean opposition after last month’s disputed election.

The 77-ton shipment from China was worth $1.245 million. Inflation notwithstanding, Zimbabwe’s dictator has missed out on a lot of guns.

The Times also said Zimbabwe’s state news, “deep in a long editorial,” hinted at a “national unity government.” If I have found the right article, the suggestion is quite near to the top. Here is the first mention:

The [International Crisis Group] report suggests that a negotiated way forward for Zimbabwe need not necessarily exclude President Mugabe, and should that inclusion be part of a genuinely negotiated agreement that aims at reconciliation and renewal, the Euro-Americans “should not hold back”.

On my way over to find the editorial, I noticed on the front page of the site that the ZEC has started releasing election results:

Zanu-PF retains Goromonzi West
ZANU-PF has retained Goromonzi West House of Assembly and Senate seats in the first batch of poll recount results released last night while the Sadc observer team says it is satisfied with the vote recounting process currently underway in 23 constituencies.
FULL STORY

These developments raise several questions.

Is Zimbabwe moving toward a pacted democratic transition or a Kenya-style band-aid solution?¹ Mugabe is an old man, and the rest of the editorial could be read as celebrating his legacy. Will he tap a successor or negotiate his way out?

Is the regime’s repressive capacity dwindling? The coincidence of the “unity government” announcement and failed Chinese arms shipment suggest it might be. If so, what is the opposition’s capacity to get concessions from Mugabe?

In blocking the weapons, is South Africa nudging the country toward democracy, or is this an isolated attempt to maintain social peace?

1. Kenya now has a 40-member cabinet: 20 members from the ruling party, 20 from the opposition.

UPDATE: April 22′s Reuters backs my rough projection of yesterday. Headline: “Maoists lead as Nepal heads for hung assembly.”

Of 601 seats in the coming constituent assembly, 240 are elected under first-past-the-post, 335 under nationwide closed-list PR, and the Council of Ministers appoints 26¹ “from amongst the persons of high reputation who have rendered significant contribution in national life.”² There does not appear to be a PR threshold.

Late last year, Maoist leaders began threatening to boycott the elections a third time unless status quo parties agreed to use closed-list PR nationwide. I speculated that they might even benefit from FPP rules given their rural base, but Bob in the comments noted a poll indicating they’d lose handily.

With all but one seat counted, however, Maoists have taken 120 of 240 seats in the FPP tier.

As of yesterday, PR tier results were still pending in 23 districts.

Deputies from the country’s southern Madhesi community are also poised to win a sizable share. Shortly after the Maoists agreed to the mixed system, Madhesi groups issued similar demands for PR rules.

I have done some rough calculations with current data from the election commission. If PR seats were allocated using a Hare quota/largest remainder formula based on results downloaded 13:30 eastern time:

Maoists: 101 seats
Nepali Congress: 72 seats
United Marxist-Leninist: 69 seats
Madhesi (2 lists): 30 seats
Other: 63 seats

Two Madhesi parties hold 29 and 9 seats, respectively. Assuming the Maoists and Madhesis form a coalition of sorts, they would be at 289 seats by these calculations. 301 is a majority. This scenario would give the 63 elected from “other” parties kingmaker status.

Based, of course, on assumptions about the allocation rules.

1. IHT reports that 335 seats are elected under PR. Earthtimes.org agrees. That would leave 26 seats for eminent persons. I do not know whether the IHT or election law, which breaks the tiers down 240/240/17, is correct.
2. Election Commission of Nepal, Ch. 2, Constituent Assembly Election Act (PDF – 254k).

My gut reaction is threefold, and most readers will assess the embargo in at least one of the following ways: (1) It’s a Cold War anachronism. (2) The costs fall on the people, not the dictators. (3) It’s an excuse for incumbent lawmakers to keep their districts on lock.

Yet the pressure of a foreign power matters for democracy promotion. If nobody inside a country has the capacity to make leaders respect democratic institutions, maybe external forces can. I enter the treacherous territory of counterfactuals in suggesting the apparent suppression of an IRI exit poll last month helped Mwai Kibaki steal Kenya’s election.² Moreover, most would agree the carrot of European Union accession has sped democratization and economic reform in the former Soviet satellites. Diplomacy seems to matter.

The efficacy of the Cuba embargo turns on two questions. One, what are the costs for Raul? We know it contributes to general poverty, but how does it make letting go more attractive for him? Two, does the lack of similar policies by all other powers render useless our own?

If we take democratizing Cuba seriously, there’s a third question: how do we minimize the pain to Castro II of stepping down?

1. HT to S. Taylor of PoliBlog.
2. Some say the poll was flawed, and that’s why it was sealed. I leave judgment to the reader. For now, note how both McClatchy and I have to use the passive voice to describe the poll’s non-release.